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A B S T R A

CT

The following study has as its purpose the desire
to identify what qualities have become characteristic of the
present day Italian Communist Party and to relate historically
their ideological and political genesis during the years froir
1911 to 1964.

The former date represents the year when the

two most important leaders of the party began their intellectual
preparation for future political careers; the latter, the year
the celebrated Yalta Memorandum was written by Palmiro Togliatti.
It is hoped that this will contribute to an appreciation of
the reasons why il Partito comunista italiano has succeeded in
exercising a profound influence on all aspects of contemporary
Italian national life and how it has attracted and retained
the immense following it possesses among the Italian masses.
The desire also is to trace the origins of the party*s
considerable reputation for intellectual competency to the
ideological heritage left to it by Antonio Gramsci, one of the
two great personalities of the party and the most eminent
Marxist thinker produced in Italy during this century.
thought is little known outside Italy.

Gramscirs

liven there, the greater

part of his writings have been published posthumously only since
the collapse of the Fascist regime which incarcerated him in
order —

to use the public prosecutor*s words —

this mind from operating for twenty years."

"to prevent

It is impossible
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to overlook Gramsci's ideas when discussing Italian Communism
because they pervade the thinking of all his successors.
Gramscifs Marxism is characterized not by a raonophagous concentration on economics but rather by a profound
attentiveness to the importance of culture and philosophy as
both catalysts and media of social change.

This has led the

Italian Communist Party to place particular emphasis on the
role of the intellectual in revolution.
that, in any society

It was Gramsci*s view

the intelligentsia provides the rational

shield for the existing socio-political-economic order.

Remove

the protective veneer provided by the "mandarinate" and society
will be exposed to the corrosive effects of whatever new ideals
the disaffected intelligentsia champion against the old order.
The importance it attached to the cultural aspect of
political and social transformation caused the Italian Communist
Party to adopt with reluctance any dogmatic ideological postures
in charting its political course and it did so only when poli
tical conditions made it imperative.

Conversely, the party

remained responsive to the exigencies of changing conditions in
society which exacted political inaleability and ideological
heterodoxy in adapting to them.

The party was to experience

many changes of fortunes from the time of its founding in 1921,
but the quality briefly mentioned above remained a constant
feature of Its political personality and in the end this was
to prove to be its most valuable trait.
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While subject of this paper has meant that the time span
covered is necessarily quite long, what follows is not intended
to be an exhaustive study of Italian Communism.

A profile

ought to be detailed enough to suggest the whole character of
the subject it depicts but it cannot be, by its nature, a full
length portrait.
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INTRODUCTION
The threads of history which were spun together to
form the Italian Communist Party can be seen today in the form
of the bright red fibres woven into the political, economic,
social and cultural fabric of contemporary Italy.

This inter

weaving is not a recent thing; it is the result of a painstaking
process which took years to achieve.

It began not just at the

formation of the Italian Republic after WVtf II; but must be
traced back to the time of the party’s own origins in 1921 and,
earlier still when today’s reality was only a wild aspiration
in the minds of a few men.
The circumstances under which the "Italian Section
of The Communist International" was organized ought not to be
disregarded for the truism that "the Child is Father to the Lian"
can well be applied to politics.

Thus it is important to look

at the environment in which the Italian Communist Party was
gestated to see what nurtured those characteristics which are
discernible today in a party which is seeking to revitalize
itself and reinsert itself into il sisterna of Italian politics.
The physical and ideological environment in which
the growth of the party was fostered prior to its formal creation
at Livorno in 1921.. was principally, but, by no means exclu
sively, the city of Turin.

The importance of this particular

environment is stressed because it influenced very deeply the
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won who wore ho give il Part It o comunista italiano* its most
enduring philosophical and political leadership.

Above all,

it worked upon the thought of Antonio Gramsci, the most subtle
and profound theoretician ox Italian I'iarxism, and his colleagues
Palmiro Togliatti, Umberto Terracini and Angelo Tasea, who were
to collaborate with Gramsci in editing the weekly publication
L TOrdine Nuovo.
Of this group, Togliatti was to become the best known
Communist personality inside and outside of Italy because,
from the time of Gramsci1s eventually fatal incarceration in
1926, until his own death in 1964f il was he who led the PCI
with grew, after World War II, to become the largest Communist
Party in the West,

During the Thirties, under the pseudonym

Srcole Ercoli, Togliatti also held responsible positions in
the Comintern and played an important role, as a leader of the
Communists, in the Spanish Civil War.

Today, Terracini heads

the Communist group in the Italian Senate and, despite his
fifteen years in Fascist prisons is still considered to have
one of Italy*s more brilliant legal minds.

Of the four original

Ordinovisti only one, Tasca, was eventually to become estranged
both from his colleagues and their party the PCI.

*

For the sake of convenience the initials PCI will be used
henceforth.
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The Setting
As capital of the region of Piedmont and as the
seat of the House of Savoy, which became the national dynasty
of Italy during the Risorgimento. Turin has held a prominent
place in modern Italian political history.

From the time of

the Risorgimento. with perhaps more enduring effects, Turin
has been a major protagonist in the economic development of
the country and, as its political and economic importance
increased, the city became a centre of Italian cultural life
as well.

Its university attracted some of the finest scholars

in Italy to its faculties and it became one of the most impor
tant in the country.
Piedmont, the northwesteramost region of the penin
sula, has a character quite unlike Mediterranean and insular
Italy.

If the "boot” ware severed from Europe, Piedmont vrould

be one of three Regions left entirely on the continent.

It is

differentiated not simply by geography or greater industrial
advancement.

The Piedmontese, who speak a dialect with strong

and unmistakable French qualities, revealing their long detach
ment from the mainstream of Italian history, are a rather sober,
earnest, unartistic people with little of the supposed Southern
Italian penchant for speculative dolce far niente. which Is
not suited to their temperament.

The role of the Piedmontese

in modern Italian history has paralleled none so much
1
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as that of the Prussians in Germany,
Like the neighbouring Lombards, they are an industrious
people who, perhaps because of a less enervating climate, have
applied themselves to affairs of business with more success
than their southern compatriots.

Under ambitious leadership

in the later nineteenth century, (Cavour was Piedmontese), the
region began to become industrialised and this process naturally
took place in the cities, principally Turin,

There, metallur

gical industries, later to become associated with the making of
automobiles, flourished particularly, and by the early twentieth
century great industrial organizations such as Fiat2 became an
enormously powerful force in the economic life of the city whose
population came to depend so much on Fiat for its livelihood.
While the Piedmontese countryside remained poor,
agrarian, and really quite backward, with little in the way of
non-agricultural industry, the population of the Region as a
whole did not grow very greatly.

However, between 1901 and 1911,

the population of industrial Turin was swelled by over
through internal migration of provincial Piedmontese seeking
more lucrative employment in the capital.

These new Turinese

became an urban industrial proletariat of almost classical

1.

Vide Berard Wall, Italian Art, Life and Landscape. (London,
1962), See Chapter 1 particularly.

2,

The name is formed by the initials of the company’s full
title, Fubbrica italiana automobili Torino.
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Marxist description; wage-earning, unorganized and victims of
the fluctuations of a developing capitalist economy.

Industries

were large, still largely controlled by individual capitalists
(the Agnelli family in the case of Fiat), and rigorous ten or
eleven hour, six-day work weeks were the rule for the workers
who depended entirely on these factories for their livelihood.
These new workers were not all simply peasants
transferred into the factories.
required skilled tradesmen,

Metallurgical industries

while in 1912 there were some

93,000 factory workers in Turin, some 30,000 were skilled.^
Class differences in the city were accentuated by the fact
that those citizens who could have formed a substantial "whits
collar" middle-class as government bureaucrats had long left
Turin to follow the royal government to the new capital of
united Italy, Florence, and later, home.

As industry expanded

with greater rapidity, a situation was created in which "Pro
letarian" faced "Capitalist" with little middle ground.
It was in such a situation that Socialism was to
find numerous adherents among workers who 3aw in it justifi
cation for their claim to a greater share of the wealth they

3.

John M. Cammett, Antonio Gramsci and the Qrdine Nuovo
Movement: A Study in the Hise oi* Italian Communism.
(Columbia University, Faculty of Political Science, 1959),
an unpublished doctoral dissertation, p. 27.
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were producing.^"

Since the turn of the century, Piedmont had

been the second most important source of Socialist party strength
(after Emilia-Romagna).^
As their sense of solidarity and of common interest
developed the metallurgists started their first unions and by
1911 began seriously to organise agitation for better working
conditions and higher wages.

During the grim winter of 1911 a

strike was staged and for three months the determined Turinese
workers held out for their demands.

Cut their efforts were to

meet complete, frustrating defeat.
In this same year Antonio Gramsci arrived in Turin
to begin studies at the university.

His own background could

hardly have been more different from the Turinese environment
which he was Just entering.

As Piedmont was continental,

European, industrial, progressive and dynamic, Gramsci’s
native Sardinia was insular, Mediterranean, agrarian, backward
and static and, for all that, perhaps more "Italian."

He was

4.

Palmiro Togliatti, II nartito cociunista italiano. (Rome,
1961) p. 20.
Togliatti admits that the early spread of Socialism among
the Turinese proletariat resembled a religious phenomenon
as much as anything:
Among the masses. Socialist ideology took on an ele
mentary, messianic character, but it was precisely
this quality which allowed it to reach hundreds of
thousands of workers who were being awakened for the
first time to a political consciousness and thus it
profoundly convinced them that, even under the most
wretched conditions, they would win respect by their
daily struggles and sacrifices to reaffirm their
solidarity and strengthen their economic and political
organizations.

5.

Cammett, op. cit., p. 25 (Footnote)
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born into a family of economically modest station*

His father

was employed as a clerk for the local office of the provincial
government but this itself signified having an above average
education for the time and place and all the Gramsci children
grew up in a home where books circulated and where reading was
encouraged*

Antonio revealed himself to be a highly intelli

gent child but as he grew older a serious physical handicap was
to reveal itself.

Gramsci greiy to be hunchbacked.

His physical

deformity bore as much weight as his evident intelligence when
the decision was made to have him schooled despite the hardship
involved for the family.
Even so, the future Marxist personally became
acquainted, at a very young age, with the sternness of econo
mic necessity which introduced him to labour ha could hardly
perform physically.

For two years, starting at the age of

eleven, to contribute to the family income, Gramsci was working
ten-hour days including Sunday mornings concerning which he
was later to write:

"I used to move about registry books which

weighed more than I did and many nights I used to cry in
hiding because my whole body ached.” 6
This early experience with hard economic reality
left an indelible impression on an impressionable mind of the
pitilessness of economic deprivation and its indifference to

6.

Paolo Spriano, "Gramsci,” I prota^onisti della storia
universale. {Milano, 19&5 )7p"*~~3V?
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individual needs or the human capacity to satisfy them.
Luckily, Gramsci*s excellence in school permitted him compara
tive mobility amidst the otherwise torpid and primitive
pattern of Sardinian life.

His introduction to the Italian

intellectual world was to reveal to him the immense distance
which separated the peasant masses from the intelligentsia
and seeing that culture and learning was the one nexus between
the two, Gramsci became acutely sensitive to the role and impor
tance of the educated and cultivated in society.

Another

glaring contrast within Italian society was observed by Gramsci
when he was exposed in Piedmont, to the existence of another
Italy; an advanced industrial North, to which an agricultural
and backward south was a stark contradiction.

Despite half a

century of unity, the two Regions did not seem to be part of
the same country,
Gramsci was able to attend university upon winning
one of several state scholarships for needy students in a
rigorous competitive examination.

Another successful candidate

in the same competition wa3 a student of similar background,
Palmiro Togliatti.

The two young intellectuals met, became

close friends and, as history would have it, the two outstanding
figures in the Italian workers* movement.

For the first two

years at the university, both Gramsci and Togliatti immersed
themselves in their studies of history, economics, languages,
philosophy, philology and literature following the classical
university curriculum.
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Two other students at the university at the same
time, Umberto Terracini and Angelo Tasca also formed a friend
ship with Gramsci and Togliatti and all four became part of
the nucleus which was to have great significance for the future
PCI.

During these years before 1920, Turin University had

enrolled a number of future Communist leaders including Luigi
Longo and Mauro Scoccimarro as well as outstanding Liberals
such as Piero Gobetti who became Gramsci*s counterpart as
ideological ancestor of the radical Giustizia e Liberty antiFascist resistance movement and its heir the Partito d ,Azione.
Gramsci and Gobetti also became close personal friends despite
their ideological differences.

All these early colleague-

friends sincerely acknowledged Gramsci*s intellectual pre
eminence.
If the proletariat of Turin was being drawn to
Socialism for practical economic reasons, the young intellectuals
of the city, such as Gramsci and Togliatti, Terracini and
Tasca associated with the university, were coming to an intellec
tual encounter with Marxism.

It was not that the faculty of

Turin University was bursting with Marxists.

There were some

who declared themselves to be of such orientation but Italy*s
outstanding Marxists were to be found at Home or Naples.

At

Turin, many of the most distinguished professors, such as the
economist, Luigi iiinaudi who was later to become the first
constitutional president of the Italian Republic, were in fact
classical Liberals,
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Nevertheless, students were exposed to vivid person
alities such as that of the professor of German literature,
Arturo Farinelli from whom, Togliatti later was to recall, they
learned:
a new morality...whose supreme laws were utter sincerity
with ourselves, refusal of conventions and abnegation^for
the cause for which we had consecrated our existence.The Turinese students arrived at Marxism by following
an exhaustive intellectual path, by way of Hegel and especially
by way of Italy’s most distinguished modern philosopher-historian
and virtual cultural dictator, Benedetto Croce.

Croce and his

outstanding teacher, Antonio Labriola, both Neopolitans, were
Marxists although Croce’s early Marxism was but a passing
phase in his intellectual development (to Gramsci’s disapproval.)
As this exhilarating intellectual confrontation was occurring,
Gramsci and his friends were coming into personal contact with
the concrete problems of the working class:
In 1912, in 1913” wrote Togliatti, "at certain hours of
the morning, when we left the classroom and went out from
the corridors into the porticos heading toward the Po, we
met crowds of men different from us, who were taking the
same road. A whole crowd headed toward the river and
toward the parks on its banks where in those days the wor
kers held their meetings during strikes or holidays. And
there we went, accompanying these men; we heard their
speeches, .we spoke with them, we became interested in their

struggle.“

7,

Togliatti, quoted by Cammet, op, cit., p. 16

8.

Togliatti in Robert Wohl "Togliatti, Master of Maneuvra"
Communist affairs. Vol. 1, No. 9, (Nov.-Dec. 1963) 21-26
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Through the Socialist Youth Federation, to which they
were introduced by Tasca who was already active in its ranks,
they established their first formal links with the Socialist
party.

Thus, young workers and students came together and the

experience was to affect both.

The presence of the latter

raised the intellectual level of the Section and their meeting
with the former introduced the young intellectuals to the
realities of proletarian Turin.

Under the auspices of the

Federation, the students organised and administered numerous
mutual benefit societies and taught night courses to the keen
workers whose intelligence, character and political conscious
ness won their admiration.
This combination of serious theoretical study and
practical party activity gave the energetic Marxists scholars
an enthusiasm for their political commitment.

During the day

they debated theory at the university and, at night, would con
tinue their activities at the Federation:
We often left the party meetings in a group surrounding
whoever happened to be our loader, Gramsci wrote, We
continued our discussions through the streets of the by
now silent city while the few late goers stopped to watch
us, amazed at our ferocious propositions, our explosive
laughter, our sorties into the realm of dreams and the
impossible...For us the future tvould be a perfect alloy
between the old...and over cautious socialism...and the
new socialism full of moral and revolutionary energy in
which there was not a party and a Proletariat but a single
mass rapidly moving toward a goal which at certain moments
we believed so near and imminent.°

9.

Cammett, op. clt.. p. 32, quote of Antonio Gramsci

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

10

Gramsci*s political activities were to absorb his attention
Increasingly.

He left university without taking his degree

for despite his promising career as a philological scholar
he grew dissatisfied with the university*s "isolation" which
prevented him from taking a more active part in the European
drama which daily was coraing closer to a climax.
The year was 1915.

Europe was at war and European

Socialism had collapsed in humiliation as national parties
abandoned Internationalism to support national war efforts.
In Britain and France Socialists even entered the government.
In Italy only did Socialists, reflecting general public
feeling, oppose the war consistently:

when Italy did enter

on the side of the Allies the Socialists unofficially split
and compromised on a "neutral" formula of "neither support nor
sabotage."

It was a compromise which merely papered over the

differences between the "reformist" Right and "revolutionary"
Left-wings of the party which had been living in an uneasy
menage since the turn of the century and which were becoming
increasingly alienated from each other.

The sentiments of the

politically conscious Turin workers, however, were clearly
and most decidedly anti-war.

Four days before Italy entered

the war the workers of that city staged a general strike in
resentment and protest against impending Italian intervention.
It was in this charged atmosphere that Gramsci
committed himself completely to journalism and party work.
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Because of his poor physical condition he wa3 exempted from
military service, but many Turin Socialists were conscripted
and Gramsci consequently rose in the party to take increas
ingly responsible positions.

During this period his

incipient elaborations of theory began to acquire greater
articulation.
Up to now the impression given has been that
Gramsci and the ’'Piedmontese" Communists were the princi
pal movers in the founding of the PCI.

This is misleading.

It is certainly true that they wore to emerge triumphant
and form the leadership and that Gramsci*a ideas were to
hold sway, but this was not settled until 1926.

Until then,

the dominant figure of the future party was the young Neopolitan engineer, Amadoo Bordiga.
Bordiga was a revolutionary thinker of consider
able stature but neither he nor his faction, though more
politically energetic, were as subtle or as theoretically
exhaustive as the Turin colleagues.

While he remained

within the Socialist party, Bordiga was leader of the
radical Left-wing known as the Abstentionists.

This group

identified itself with one of the three rival groups in the
Second International which had formed on the eve of World
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Bordiga’s views at this time were very close to
Lenin’s.

Indeed, at about the same time Lenin was formulating

his ideas on the imperialist nature of the war in Zurich,
Bordiga was arriving independently at the similar conclusions
in a series of articles written during the winter of 1914-15
and published in Avanti. the Socialist daily.

(At this time

Gramsci became editor of its Turin edition.)
Once Italy’s entry into the war was an established
fact the Reformist Socialist Right-wing, whose strength lay
in the parliamentary group led by Filippo Turati, was not long
in approaching "defensist11 postures and giving its blessing
to the Italian war effort.

1G,

V.hile the wavering Left, still in

The three factions in the International were split on
doctrinal issues concerning the position Socialists
should a33umo in relation to their national participa
tion in the War.
(a) The Defonsists (mainly French and German) maintained
the right of' a state to defend itself from external
attack.
(b) The Left wing (led by Lenin and Rosa Luxembourg)
stressed therevolutionary possibilities caused by the
critical situation and urged action by the Socialists
to promote overthrow of their governments.
(c) The Pacifists rejected the proposition that "defen
sive wars" were legitimate and rejected the idea that
revolution was more necessary than peace.
(For a fuller discussion of how this division was related
to the PSI soe Donald Vi. Urquidi, The Origins of the Italian
Communist Party 191&-1921, (Columbia University, Faculty
of Political Science, 19u2), an unpublished doctoral dis
sertation. See Introduction particularly.)
See also Carl Landauer, iiiuropean Socialism. (Berkeley, 1959),
Vol. 1, Chapter 17
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formal control of the party machine, stuck to the original
neutralist formula, Bordiga, speaking for the radical Absten
tionists, was preparing the ground for the inevitable split.
The Abstentionists essentially took the following
positions:

As long as Capitalism was solidly entrenched, the

most fruitful Socialist tactics could only consist of propagan
dizing, recruitment, criticism and vigorous verbal opposition
to the dominant class in control.
obsolete.

But such tactics had become

In a period of revolutionary crisis in which the

breaking point between Bourgeoisie and Proletariat had been
reached, the proletarian party must push for the violent over
throw of bourgeois domination.
The issue was one of updating old policies to fit
new conditions.

The arguments which were to rage within the

Socialist party concerned just this:
from yesterday?
policies?

was today really different

Did conditions demand new attitudes, new

The Abstentionists answered an emphatic yes.

war had undeniably thrown the world into crisis.

The

Europe and

Italy had surely entered into a phase of imminent revolution,
and, if the time for revolution was ripe, the proletarians
must indeed unite and prepare for it.
time for class collaboration.

There was no longer

It was, above all, wrong to join

a bourgeois parliament or a bourgeois cabinet.
corrupted Socialist deputies.

These only

The behaviour of European

Socialists in the face of World War I had proved this.

And

Socialists in the government proved to be window dressing to
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keep the working-class quiet while important decisions were
still being made by conservatives.
Parliaments only smothered revolutionary intransi
gence in the illusion that Socialist participation in govern
ment meant the working-class was sharing in power while real
power was still exercised by the police, the army and the
courts.

The Abstentionists insisted that those Right-wing

elements in the Socialist party who had become collaborators
be expelled and wanted the party transformed into a militant,
disciplined revolutionary party.

11

By then external events were weighing heavily on
Italian events.

The civilian populations of Europe were

smouldering in bitterness and discontent over the human suffer
ing the war was causing and resented it all the more since
they felt it was a useless war for them.
true in Turin than elsewhere.

This was no less

It was 1917 and the March

Revolution had already taken place in Czarist Russia.
There was no bread in Turin and other staples were
extremely scarce but the factory workers were subjected to
rigid work discipline under the surveillance of a government
supervisor.

The Kienthal and Zimmerwald manifestos calling

for peace, of which Lenin was a leading signer, were well cir
culated among proletarians in the city who sympathized with

11.

Urquidi, op. cit.. p. 2b-37
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their resolutions.

Finally, at the end of August, 1917 the

eruption occurred.

For five days the Turinese workers raised

the barricades in a spontaneous, unled insurrection which was
to become one of the most bloody events in the history of
Italian labour.

Despite the armed support of some sympathetic

Alpine troops, the uprising ended in defeat.
Suppression was not easy.

Some fifty were killed,

two thousand were wounded and thousands of workers were
arrested and sent to the front, ironically to Caporetto.

12

Socialist leaders of all levels were subsequently imprisoned
and in the vacuum the relatively unknown Gramsci became provi
sional secretary of the Turin Section of the party.

The Left-

wing of the party seemed vindicated and it accused the previous
Turin leaders, who were largely Reformists, of not having had
the courage to channel the resentments of the workers into a
more effective protest with less tragic results.
After Caporetto, the parliamentary Right-wing became
openly Defensist while the Left, in disgust, called for a
national conference to coordinate its own action in the face
of this clear rupture over strategy.

On November lb, 1917 some

forty delegates gathered in Florence and for the first time
Antonio Gramsci and Amadeo Bordiga were to meet.

12,

Gramsci and

It has been stated that the collapse of the front at
Caporetto which took place in October 1917 was due partly
to the defeatism and low morale of the soldiers sent to
this front.
{Footnote in Cammett, p. 53)
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Bordiga spoke for the extreme Left while Giacinto Menotti
derrati and Costantino Lazzari dominated the more numerous
Massimalisti .^

trying to steer a middle course*

The former

urged expulsion of the Right and abandonment of the official
but now meaningless neutralist position of the party with
regard to the war effort in order to organize for the revolu
tion.

The final declaration of the meeting, however, was

less radical and, while condemning the Right’s support of the
war, limited itself to reaffirming the principles of the
Zimraerwald and Kienthal meetings.
Once the de facto split existed, every new issue
only served to sharpen divisions. The Bolshevik

revolution

became the issue of greatest consequence to face the now dis
united PSX,

While the revolution evoked widespread sympathy

in the whole party, especially among the Maximalists and
Abstentionists,^*" it was the latter which was most heartened

13.

This term refers to that section of the party which pushed
for implementation of the maximum programme of the party
as opposed to the Right wing "gradualist3 ."

14*

In December Lazzari, who was a principal Maximalist spokes
man of the PSI, circulated a note stating:
"All should
follow with confidence the developments in Russia where,
thanks to our comrades, peace and socialism are being
achieved."
Quoted by Aldo Garosci "The Italian Communist Party" in
Communism in Western Europe, (Ithaca (NX), 1951), Mario
Einaudi (Ed.) p. 156
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by the Bolshevik success and fully identified itself with the
Bolsheviks.

Reaction to the setting
Gramsci hailed the October revolution because it
proved that Marxist laws were not rigid.

The revolution could

be carried out where there was a revolutionary will and it was
thus not necessary for Socialists to sit on their hands until
immutable economic laws developed conditions for Socialism,
at the Right was pedantically arguing*

Gramsci did not deny

the tenet that Socialism depended upon industrialization to
function properly but he emphatically denied that mature,
fully-developed industrialization was an essential pre-condi
tion or that full capitalism had to pass before the socialist
transformation could take place.
revolutions.

Revolutionaries could create

This emphasis on will, revolutionary conscious

ness, and action characterizes all of Gramsci*s thought.
Soon after the Bolshevik overthrow in Russia, Gramsci,
Ta3ca, Togliatti and Terraclni foundod L*Ordino Huoyo in Turin.^-5
This weekly journal which first appeared on May 1, 1919 became

15.

At about the same time Bordiga was publishing his ideas
in the journal 11 Soviet published in Naples.
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the most Important organ of Italiam Communism.

It was to be

a journal of Marxist theory and Socialist culture, according
to the young editors, but its most important contribution
was to be the elaboration of the theory of creating a new
state and a new proletarian civilization based upon a new
■I £

representative institution, the factory council.
Ordine Nuovo was convinced that the creation of
the Soviets, which Italian Socialists were then hearing about
increasingly, had a value beyond the Russian situation.

It

sought In Italy an indigenous ’'germ” of this proletarian
institution which was comparable to the Soviets in nature
and could confirm a universal validity beyond the Russian
situation to show that the Soviets were the natural form for
proletarian self-government.

Gramsci felt that the Soviets,

by any name, were the concrete expression of the latent ten
dencies for emancipation already existing in the revolutionary
consciousness of the proletarian masses.

Theorizing from the

real situation he was most familiar with, Gramsci was not
incorrect.

In Turin, the germ of the Soviets had, in fact,

existed since 1906.

The Internal Factory Commissions had been

created to hear workers’ complaints to Management and to
settle disputes concerned with labour conditions.

During the

War their importance grew notably and they became the single

16,

Consigli di fabbrica
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instrument for exerting pressure on Management since strikes
were outlawed.
In Marxist terms, by which the contradiction of the
existing state structure exists latent within itself and
hastens collapse of the old structure, Gramsci and the "Ordinovisti" saw in the Factory Commissions the embryo of the new
Socialist state, the kernel of worker self-government*

Since

the factory was the source of modern economic power, and the
political superstructures of all societies were a reflection
of the productive nature of the economic base, Communist
society would necessarily rest upon the factory and therefore
the political structure of this society had to be based in
the factory also.

The factory would be to the socialist

worker what the constituency was to the bourgeois voter,
This emphasis on the factory council was not merely
an aping of the Russian experience.

It came from a Marxist

conviction that this was the most suitable instrument by which
the working class would create a new Socialist state.

The

real revolution, in Gramsci*s theory, did not consist simply
in toppling a bourgeois government.

It was a process of

replacing the entire capitalist system with a "New Order."
As Gramsci*s theory developed in Ordine Nuovo a doctrine

17.

It should be noted that until 1913 the franchise in
Italy was restricted to a minority of the population,
about 2% of adult males.
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•unfolded which sought to justify concentration on the factory
1 fi
council. It was based on three basic positions.
A principal consideration was the conviction that
traditional organs which spoke for tho working class, that
is, unions and the political party, were not and could not
be revolutionary in the sense that Gramsci took revolution
to mean.

Both of these organs were not directly or permanently

connected with the workers.

The Party was able to reach the

worker imperfectly, by periodic local or mass meetings or
more continuously by the press.

It could not assimilate the

whole working class and train It for its future tasks.
was this its proper function.

Nor

The Party must remain the organ

of the vanguard of the working class, keeping its attention
fixed to broad general problems and the planning of strategy.
The trade unions were also imperfect for they spoke for mem
bers of specific trades and were organized to achieve limited
goals:

higher wages, fewer hours, better working conditions.

Unions necessarily treated the worker as did the Capitalist,
as a commodity to be bought and sold for a price to be bar
gained for.

18.

For a more complete discussion of the Ordine Nuovo pro
gramme see Urquidi, op. cit., pp, 41-51; Cammett, op. cit.
pp. 60-113
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Gramsci emphatically rejected the notion that the
worker was a commodity.

The worker himself had to reject this

view and see himself as the essential active component of the
economy, of society.

He must see himself not as just another

wage earner but as the producer of wealth, not for the capi
talist, but for himself and for his fellow man.
According to this analysis, neither the Party nor
the Union could be considered to be the latent anti-thesis
to the capitalist system.

Both wore creatures of Capitalism.

The Party was molded by the bourgeois institutions in which
it participated.

It faced the danger of becoming a reformist

body merely seeking concessions for the workers within the
capitalist system without seeking fundamentally to change it.
The Unions for their part were defective because they could
only 3eek to compete with the entrenched capitalist; they
could not remove him.
Another major assumption was that since real poli
tical power in Marxist terms is ultimately derived from
economic control and ownership, the Proletariat must not be
diverted or distracted from gaining control of the means of
production merely to chase after the state instruments
exercised to protect that control.
take place in the factory.
managerial control there.

The real revolution would

The worker must gain real
Industrial sophistication had

diminished the importance of the Capitalist:
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The captain of industry has become the cavaliere
d*industria hidden in the banks, salons, stock exchanges,
and ministerial and parliamentary corridors. The owner
of capital has become a dry branch in the field of pro
duction. Since he is no longer indispensable— since his
historical functions have atrophied— he has become a mere
agent of the police. He puts his interests immediately
into the hands of the state which will ruthlessly defend
them. *
Once the workers controlled the factories the capi20
talist grip would weaken until it was forced to lose hold.
This persuasion led finally to the assumption that
the taking of power would be a continuing process.

Revolution

had not merely to be provoked, its success had to be guaranteed
and since the protagonists of the revolution would be the
workers it was they who had to prepare themselves culturally
to build and run the new socialist state they would create
once power was achieved.

This carried the implication of

mas3 participation in the social and economic revolutionary
process.

And, since neither the Party nor the Unions could

bring this about it was the Factory Council which became the
perfect organ for this participation.

Membership would be

general and universal and based not exclusively on trade union
membership or party militancy but on basic membership in the

1 9 . Gramsci in Cammett, op. cit. p. 83
20.

One might be led to assume from this that Gramsci was not
terribly concerned about the capitalist '’superstructure."
On the contrary, this very thing was Gramsci*s most con
suming interest.
The emphasis on worker control of industry
was made in the conviction that once this was an established
fact it would form the economic basis of the new proletarian
civilization or superstructure and that this control was the
essential condition for it.
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labouring masses.

The Internal

Factory Commissions therefore

■would have to be transformed from agencies dealing only with
conditions of work and wages into instruments for gaining con
trol over the actual management of factories.
The Ordina Muovo articles continued to elaborate
upon the programme and organisation of the Factory Councils
in great detail but the Ordinovisti did little to organize a
Leninist type of party or even a Communist faction in the PSI.
Bordiga was taking care of that problem.

In Turin, however,

a young Bordighist Fiat worker, Giovanni Parodi, active in
the Socialist Youth Federation, did much to spread Ordine Nuovo
ideas among the workers in the city’s factories.

Factory

Councils soon formed so that by 1920 more than 150,000 workers
were organised in the Italian "soviets."
Committed as it was to the concept of the Factory
Council, Ordine EJuovo became as dedicated to the inescapable
task of raising the cultural level of the proletariat to prepare
it for its difficult new responsibilities.

In substance

Gramsci insisted upon the need for creating a new proletarian
intelligentsia, of forming intellectuals from the working
class, a recurronca of h±3 own exparienco.

But their education

must not be arid and isolated, merely literary or traditionally
academic.

It must relate to life and have a scientific com

petence related to industrial society.

Learning, too, is work

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

24

and the working class must realize that:
...it is in their interest to submit themselves to a
permanent discipline of culture, to develop a concep
tion of the world and the complex and intricate system
of human relations, economic and spiritual, which give
form to the social life of the globe.
The Turin environment in which a modern efficient and
technological, industrial society was developing found an echo
in the emphasis of Ordine Nuovo on the role of the worker as
producer in a simultaneously social-economic arrangement:
The more the proletarian is specialized in a professional
act, the more he feels the indispensability of his com
rades, the more ha thinks of himself as a cell of an
organized body..., (then) the
he feels the need for
order, method (and) precision.
Consequent to this, the worker-producer would con
ceive of society as a whole as "one immense factory organized
with the same precision, method and order which he sees as
vital in the factory where he works."23

Gramsci*s attention

to this problem was fervent in the belief that:
For the proletarian it is a duty not to be ignorant.
Socialist civilization, without the privileges of caste
and class, to be fully realized, demands that all citizens
know how to supervise what their spokesmen decide and do.
The problem of the education of the proletariat is the
problem of freedom. ^

21.

Gramsci in Cammett, op. cit., p. 89.
Gramsci, "In Searchof Education" Hew
(July-August 1965), pp. 53-63

22.

Gramsci in Cammett,

23.

Ibid.

24.

Gramsci in Spriano,

op. cit., p.

84

op. cit.. p.

373

Seealso Antonio
LeftReview. No. 32,
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Gramsci did not escape criticism, for his idea3 were
difficult, not easy to grasp, especially for workers who did
not have his erudition.

But he insisted that a question which

was basically difficult should not, nor could be watered down
or reduced to neat, uncomplicated rudimentaries to make it
more accessible to the workers.

Too much was at stake:

To be easy we ivould have had to misrepresent and impoverish
the debate which extends onto concepts of the greatest
importance, onto the most intimate principles of our
spirit. A concept which is per 3e difficult cannot be
made easy in the expressing of it without its becoming
vulgar.25
And, instead of diluting the quality of his arguments, Gramsci
and his colleagues on Ordine Nuovo, aided by some professors
from the university, organized schools for workers to raise
them up to the level of the debate.
Gramscl’s insistence that the Proletariat achieve
economic, technological and intellectual superiority was related
to another, much broader, more complicated problem.

While

Turin absorbed Gramsci*s attention for its industrial advance
ment and for the militancy of its working class, he was not
blind to the larger problems of Italian society as a whole.
His Sardinian origins remained a vivid memory for Gramsci and
he was to devote much study to the ‘‘questione del Mezzogiorno,”
the southern issue, especially during his long incarceration.

25.
I ■:- .

I bi d r„

■ -IT

UNIVERSITY OF WINDSOR LIBRARY
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And because Italy remained overwhelmingly agrarian, outside
of the industrial islands of the North, the southern problem
was connected to the whole of Italy’s socio-economic structure
and was one of the greatest problems that would face the
Italian revolution.
Gramsci viewed the peasantry and specifically the
southern peasantry tolling on the great "latifondi" as a vast
submerged mass whose economic, social and political aspira
tions were constantly frustrated and rendered impotent by the
amorphous, undirected, usually violent manner in which they
were vented.

This grew out of the traditional social establish

ment of the South.

Roosting above the unschooled masses was

the class of the rural petty- and middle-bourgooisie and Its
intelligentsia and lording over the whole were the great land
owners and the small elite of great intellectuals.

Traditionally,

the political agents of the peasant masses were members of the
rural middle-class intelligentsia but it was the great land
owners and the great intellectuals who really channelled and
directed the activity, political in one case, ideological in
the other, of these deputies.
The peasantry, especially the vast, illiterate dis
inherited mass had however to be convinced that their real
interests lay in an alliance with the urban proletariat and
that their emancipation from nearly feudal conditions depended
on the success of the proletariat in achieving its aims.
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the latter could win power it would use it to attack and over
throw the rigid rural hierarchy lifting it from the shoulders
of the overburdened but inarticulate peasantry*
For just as the peasants needed the industrial worker*
the latter needed the peasantry.

Cities had to be fed*

But,

for Gramsci, the solution to the peasant*s problems could not
end at the division of land into small individual plots*

The

peasants would bring with them nothing but antiquated, ineffi
cient and unproductive habits of cultivation.

And to modernize

agriculture required investment capital which peasants did not
have.

In agriculture, as in industry, progress could only

emerge from constructive planning for efficient collective
effort administered by peasant councils through which the
awakened peasantry would participate in self-government.
But the majority of "gradualist" Socialist leaders
failed to tackle the problem of the countryside, preferring to
view everything through rigid Marxist economic formulae.

The

frequent violent rumblings unsettling the agrarian South were
not recognised as the ideal opportunity to detach the peasantry
from Its faith in its reactionary leadership.

Instead, the

traditionally conservative peasantry was allowed to flock to

the clerical Populist Party, forerunner of the Christian
Democrats.

And those who could prod the "contadlni" into an

awakening chose not to.
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Gramsci inculpated principally the great intellec
tuals such as Croce, {who was the independently wealthy son of
great Southern landowners) for this state of affairs.26

By

rationalizing and defending the status quo to the parsons who
spoke for the peasantry, these great intellectuals bound the

26.

In this ethical search...for a new quality of life under
socialism...Croce?s name recurs constantly in Gramsci,s
writings. And the relationship is one of mixed respect
and blame. Gramsci was fond of comparing Marxism to the
Protestant Reformation or the Enlightenment of the eighteenth
century. Like them he argued, it had the function of
creating a "new integrated culture" of a "mass character."
Hence it "did not matter” that it was originally based
on "mediocre philosophical works.” The Marxist writings
that would have the "classical characteristics of Greek
and Renaissance culture" would come later. Meantime,
Gramsci argued, in his role as a highly educated leader
of European thought, Croce was wrong to turn his back on
Marxism.
He was behaving like Erasmus and the other
Renaissance humanists who were repelled by Luther’s
crudities. Impatient for an immediate refinement of
thought, Croce refused to recognize a new culture in
embryo: he forgot that it had taken German Protestantism
three centuries to produce a Hegel...by viewing Marxist
philosophy as a mere "parenthesis" in his intellectual
life Croce had blinded himself to the potential importance
of his own thought in the culture of the future (and) he
had denied himself a truly popular influence. For the
wider strata of the population, Gramsci reasoned, the
Crocean philosophy held the promise of raising the
intellectual level of twentieth century Marxism in the
same fashion in which Hegelianism had given to the doc
trine its original philosophical categories.
This brief summary of part of Gramsci*s ”11 materialising
storico e la filosofia di Benedetto Croce" is contained in
H, Stuart Hughes* Consciousness and Society The Reconstruc
tion of European Social thought 1896-1930. (New York. 1961),
p. 103-4

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

29

peasant to his helpless subordination to the great landowners.
It became, therefore:
...important and useful that within the mass of intel
lectuals...a left tendency be formed..., oriented toward
the revolutionary proletariat.
The alliance between the
proletariat and the peasant masses requires this formation.
The alliance between the proletariat and the peasant masses
of the South needs it even more. The proletariat will
destroy the southern agrarian bloc in the measure in
which its party succeeds in organizing larger and larger
masses of poor peasants into autonomous and independent
formations, however, its success in this necessary task
is dependent upon its capacity to dissolve the intellec
tual bloc which is the flexible but highly resistant
armour of the agrarian bloc.*7
Gramsci was sure that the intellectuals could be won over and
would throw in their lot with the cause of the proletarians.
If bourgeois society could be deprived of its man
darins who spoke on its behalf, praising it, defending it and
protecting its institutions, it would be left exposed to the
corrosive Influence of new views concerning "the good society,”
When a social structure commands no confidence from its members
it evokes no enthusiasm for its perpetuation.

If it tottered,

the response would be apathetic and indifferent.

And, while it

was in crisis, while It crumbled, if there existed within this
old society a vital well articulated challenge to the status
quo, this new rival opposition could enlist the disaffected
majority of the population who found its programme valid
enough to tilt the balance of social forces to the side of the

27*

Gramsci in Cammett, op. cit. p.

21+2
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innovators.

This new grouping would form a "hegemony" within

the civic institutions of society, its schools, its political
groupings, its cultural movements, literature, the arts,
theatre, even the Church, so that only the persistence of the
coercive political apparatus of the old ruling establishment—
the courts, police, army and bureaucracy— existing beyond its
valid time, would prevent the assumption of power by this
renovating movement.
For Gramsci the State was the "apparatus of hegemony,0
This was orthodox Marxism for it did not negate the class nature
of the state nor conceal its repressive potential.

Within

political society Gramsci perceived two aspects of power, one
was managerial power (direaione), the other, ruling power
{dominlo}.

Since the State as superstructure reflected its

economic understructure, a social group had to exercise manage
ment power over the economy before it could rule politically.
Moreover, once it exercised political rule, or dominio. it .had
to continue to exercise the managerial function or direzione.
For State hegemony was in fact the unity of the two.

If this

unity broke, or crumbled, the State structure was placed in
crisis.
There was a further elaboration in Gramsci1s theory

28.

See Luciano Gruppi, nLa tesi di Lenin e di Engels sullo
Stato" Rinascita. (Rome.) Ho. 30, Anno 21, {July 25, 1964)
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which concerns the nature of popular consent to being ruled.
There v 3re two "momenta” to consent.

One was:

...the ’spontaneous* consent given by the great masses
of the population to the direction impressed upon social
life by the fundamental ruling group, a consent which
arises •historically’ from the prestige (and hence from
the faith) resultant to the ruling group from its posi
tion and function in tho world of production.^
The second source of consent is:
...the apparatus of state coercion which assures •legally*
the discipline of those groups which do not ’consent*
either actively or passively, but is established for all
of society in the expectation of times of crisis in rule
and management in which the spontaneous consent diminishes.^
Hence, from this stemmed the crucial importance of
winning over the intellectuals as well as raising the Prole
tariat to tho cultural level it would require during the
"time of crisis" in order to build its moral and intellectual
hegemony.

And amid the ruins of World War I the time of crisis

seemed to have arrived all over burope.
These ideas, presented here in fragmentary summaries,
form the core of Grarosci’s entire intellectual achievement,
which ha3 been described as the "most subtle and original” of
twentieth century Marxist thought.-*1

Indisputably, one of

Gramsci’s bequests to Italian Communism has been a tradition
of sincere intellectual openness toward problems arising from

29.

Gruppi, p* 28

CO.

Ibid.

31.

Hughes, op. cit., p. 99
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the complexity of social relationships and a profound respect
for the position of the leaders of thought whose analyses
must produce some valid contribution to the solution of the
problems.
This tradition has formed one of the two dominant
qualities of Italian Communism.

Gramscifs ideas were not lost

to his heirs, particularly his younger friend and colleague,
Togliatti, who has himself, however, been accused of exploiting
the Gramsci "myth" to conceal his own (and the PCI's) intel
lectual intolerance to dissent.

Yet, recently, an Austrian

Communist who knew Togliatti in Moscow in 1935 recalled how
the latter, upon learning that he like many knew next to
nothing about either Gramsci the man or his ideas, lamented:
Unfortunately you are not the only one who knows little
or nothing about Gramsci. Gramsci is one of the major
Marxist thinkers of our time. I do not exaggerate in
placing him, for the originality of his thought, next
to Lenin. We Italians are reproached for a tendency
toward vainness. Yet we have been less effective than
other nations in making known what we have achieved in
the elaboration of theory. When the historical-philo
sophical works of Gramsci are translated, the fullness
and profundity of his thought will be a surprise,
Social-democracy has flattened out Marxism reducing
it to a mere economism,,.Gramsci knew how to avoid
this defect. He arrived at it through the study of
philosophy:
Giordano Bruno, Spinoza, Hegel, Marx.
From Marxism he was able to cull its philosophical
substance.•.No one before Gramsci underlined with as
much conviction the importance of intellectuals in
the formation of a nation. Certainly he did not
idealize the intellectual, but he refused every
form of anti-intellactualism.
Discussions were not
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lacking between him and mo. But what a great man* what
a precursor, what a teacher Antonio Gramsci w a s H
Such are the ideas which, perhaps still inchoate,
were circulating and argued over in the editorial offices of
Ordine Uuovo. in the local organs of the Socialist party, within
the party as a whole, during lectures in the workers* schools,

32,

Ernst Fisher, MUn debito di gratitudine” XI ContgmporaneoRinascita. (Rome) No. 34, Anno 22, (28 August, 19&5), P* 10
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Earlier in the same article, Fisher recalled Togliatti*s
comments on the situation of intellectuals in some parties.
They bear recording for their "Gramscian” tone:
The anti-intellectualisra which prevails in some communist
parties, has nothing at all to do with bolshevization and
does no good for the working class. We communist intel
lectuals must overcome our own one-sidedness, we must know
how to remain intellectual, as Hegel says. We must not
strike poses in front of proletarians, we must not speak
to workers in a manner differing from that which we use
with other adult human beings, and at the same time we
mu3t continuously improve ourselves through practical work,
through action, through organizational activity. The work
table must not be transformed into a wall between U3 and
living beings. Not all books are worth reading but every
human being deserves that one speak with him, that one
listen to his opinions, that one promote his best qualities,
that one find for him an activity through which he can
express the best in himself. V»Te must continuously re
establish in ourselves the balance between the intellectual
and the man of action, between the individual who reads,
who writes, who gives shape to his preparation in theory
and the organizer who takes part in the organization,
between the individual who brings to his thinking visions
of the future and the man who works for the future: only
in this way can one train the party as a whole to achieve
an analagous balance. If the communist intellectual
neglects this duty, within a short time, the party will be
managed only by the organizers, by party regulars and by
tacticians which cannot bring about much good.
Ibid
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in tho unions and in the factories of Turin.

And in the

immediate post-war atmosphere these ideas attracted attention
for their seeming relevance to tho situation in Italy and
Europe.
The air soerned charged with the threat of revolution.
Left-wing European Socialists were filled with hope by Laninas
success in Russia and were poised to spread the revolution
westward.

The Great War had banished forever the 3erene com

placency of pre-war bourgeois capitalist regimes.
monument:

Their

thirteen million dead, twenty million wounded or

maimed, three proud empires crumbled, fearful devastation and
suffering wherever armies had marched.

Among the civilian

populations in Central and Eastern Europe, exhausted and
starving, epidemics of typhus, cholera and influensa claimed
millions.

And over the vrhole continent the weary demoralized

and frustrated mass of common people were not prepared merely
to restore with meelc docility the status quo of social privi
lege and economic discrimination.
In Berlin, Bavaria and Hungary proletarian insurrec
tions tried and almost succeeded in demolishing the 3haken
capitalist structures, leaving the Bourgeoisie terrified of the
Red peril.

Indeed, the Bolsheviks were counting upon European

successes to support the besieged revolution in Russia and to
make the communist movement solidly international with a firm
industrial basis in Europe which could be complimented by
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agrarian Russia and vies versa.

Rut European Socialists were

not united in support of the Bolshevik programme.

Some were

hopelessly ’'Opportunist*' and "Reformist,” others were unable
to carry verbal violence over into action.

Lenin decided in

1919, to create a new alliance of Socialists, in a Third or
Communist International where they could be coordinated and
encouraged to act.
In March 1919 it was created, but by the summer of
1920 it became clear that the spontaneous revolutionary move
ments in Central Europe were losing their momentum.

Therefore,

European Socialists had to discipline themselves, they had to
imitate the militant Bolsheviks in creating a unity of purpose
directed to the single revolutionary aim under the direction
of a central committee to be based in Moscow.

During its

Second Congress an ultimatum to these parties was laid down
in the famous "Twenty-One Conditions" for membership in the
Third International.

In response every Socialist party in

Europe was split into two hostile parties.
In Italy, Lenin*s manoeuvres only succeeded In
accelerating the formal separation of the two already alienated
wings of the Italian Socialist Party which had been maturing
for a considerable time and which was being promoted by the
dissatisfaction of the Bordighlsti and Ordinovisti with the
tactical positions of the PSI.

But in Italy the break was not

clean for the uncertain Massimalisti assumed an ambiguous
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attitude between the Left and Right*

Like a child in a suit

for divorce, unable to choose between parents, hoping a recon
ciliation would make it unnecessary, this wing was tormented
by the breakup of the irreconciliable mates.
The breakup had begun in 1919 at the Sixteenth Con
gress of the PSI where the outline of the three wings of the
party clearly emerged.

Significantly the party at this congress,

dominated by Serrati and the Massimalisti. became the first and
only European Socialist Party to affiliate with the Third
International although the Italians* knowledge of what it stood
for or what its intentions were was at the time still scanty,
unclear and not officially communicated in the invitation.
The Comintern which had held only one congress, was still
badly organized, had been hastily established and lacked
official representation from numerous European Socialist par
ties with which there was barely any correspondence.
The PSI voted unanimously to join but only the intran
sigent Left was enthusiastic.

The Massimalisti joined as an

act of solidarity and emotional sympathy for the Russian
Communists.

The Right, for the sake of unity, gave only hesi

tant and lukewarm support with misgivings.

Its alienation from

the Left was so great that the latter pushed for its expulsion
from the Party.

The motion failed but the break could not be

long postponed.

In the elections of April 1919, the first under

universal manhood suffrage, 32%of the Italian electorate sent
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156 Socialist deputies to Parliament.
largest political party in Italy.

The PSI became the

The outstanding parliamen

tary personalities were still leaders of the Right while
simultaneously Bordiga was denouncing Socialist participation
in parliaments.
Between this event and the final rupture two events
of dramatic historical Importance occurred in Turin which were
to put Gramsci irrevocably on the side of Lenin.

For the

Italian workers the crucial year of their struggle was to
be 1920.

Casting the die
In the atmosphere of the post-war period in Europe
and hence in Italy, the significance of the times was not
appreciated just by the revolutionary Socialists.

The capi

talist bourgeoisie was not blind to events and the Italian
bourgeoisie was no blinder than elsewhere.

The abortive

communist insurrections in Germany and Hungary were not as
distant as the Russian revolution which was stubbornly resisting
foreign intervention to reverse it.

It had merely been isolated.

In Italy, the ivorker had won the vote and ha had used it to upset
the old balance of parliamentary forces.

His spokesmen in the

Chamber were Socialists even if not the extremists on the party
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Left-wing.

But the latter were openly militant and did not

hesitate in staging bloody riots to express their views.
Their leaders were revolutionary and the Italian state
repressed these demonstrations with difficulty.

After the war

the police were entirely reorganized and a crack guard corps
was established to meet the situation for the threat came not
only from the Left but also from the Right.

The Fascists,

however, were nationalists and rivals of the Socialists who
were themselves frequently the target of Fascist club-swinging
squads.
Northern Italian industrialists still saw the Red
insurrection as their greatest threat and in early 1920 Confindustria, the organization of industrialists, was formed and
recruited representatives from almost all industrial bodies in
Italy.

During the founding meeting a plan for action was laid

to combat strikes and significantly to check the Factory Council
Movement which had grown alarmingly in Turin.

Confindustria was

ready to throw down the gauntlet for it knew the unions were
financially weak.

Italy had entered a period of inflation and

the workers could not financially afford a strike because the
rise in the cost of living had reduced the purchasing power of
their wages.

For their part, the unions realized the unfavour

able bind they were caught in and watched the industrialists'
manoeuvres with apprehension.
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The first major confrontation occurred again in the
bastion of worker militancy, Turin, and its outcome had massive
importance for Italian Communism.

On March 29, 1920 the

management of a Fiat subsidiary plant dismissed its Factory
Council.
known.

For what reasons this was done is still not exactly
In retaliation tho same Council called for a sit-down

strike in protest.

The management answered with a lockout.

This chain of events was amplified in two days by imitations
in all other Fiat factories in Turin.

The result was not

desired by the workers for, on April 11, they met with the
industrialists to try to reach a settlement.

The latter, how

ever, insisted upon reducing Factory Council power to that
possessed by the old Internal Commissions, a demand equivalent
to depriving the Turin labour movement of all its gains and of
repudiating Its programme.

Against this showdown attitude, the

Turin workers were drawn, unprepared, into a struggle over two
alternatives; either accepting the idea of utter domination of
factories by the Capitalists, or defending the principle of
worker control of production.

Their unanimous answer was a

massive General Strike which was totally to paralyze the city
and Turin Provinca for tan days.

It was not on economic strike

for It did not involve matters of wages or hours.
first political strike in Italian

It was the

history, but, although the

strike spread to embrace most of Piedmont, it was doomed to
fail.

Troops were sent to surround the city despite sympathy
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strikes by railroad workers who belatedly succeeded in halting
troop transports.

The Turinese strikers found themselves sur

rounded and outnumbered and besieged by a situation which forced
the choice of capitulation or open revolution.

They were

forced to choose the former and conciliation by third parties
because it was clear that Turin was isolated from the rest of
Italy.
Turin Socialists reserved their greatest bitterness
for the timid national leadership of the PSI which left the
Turin workers to meet their defeat alone without seeking to
spread the strike or even to support it.

On May 8 , Ordine

Nuovo printed the reaction of its editor, Grarasci, in one of
the most important articles he was to write, stingingly accused
the Socialist leaders of continually stiffling the revolutionary
militancy of the rank and file by their incompetence, ignorance
and indifference.

Worse still, the Maximalists had given too

much attention to the "respectable” opinions of the neo-bourgeois
Reformist-wing, whose spokesmen held positions of authority in
the party organisations but who did not speak for the mass of
members.

This was utterly inconsistent with the principles of

the Third International.

The party had thoroughly to rid Itself

of these opportunists and had radically to revise Its tactics
to become a tight knit disciplined body.

The PSI leaders

ignored Gramsci*s lacerating denunciation but it received the
close and favourable attention of one important observer, Lenin.
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During the summer of

1920 the

Third International

held its Second Congress, this time with a large delegation
from the important PSI.

Lenin up to then had supported Serrati

with the hope of keeping the Maximalists and PSI Left united
against the Turati wing.

After the Turin events, however, his

attitude toward the PSI changed.
from two maladies.

The Italian party suffered

First it was saddled with Reformist leaders

who influenced the Maximalist leaders too much for the party’s
good.

They only prevented the exploitation of real revolution

ary possibilities.

But on the other hand, the Communist leader,

Bordiga, was sun intransigent Abstentionist, a "left wing
extremist*1'

The latter attitude was not reasonable.

T,an infantile disorder.”

It was

Communists need not shun parliaments.

They must use them to beat the Bourgeoisie at its own game,
to gain a grip on the levers of poxirer even if only to be ob
structionist and subvert parliament from within.

In the mean

time, however, the first aim was to expell the Reformists.
To this end the Comintern adopted the famous "TwentyOne Points" several of which were directly aimed at the PSI.
Point Seven peremptorily demanded expulsion of Reformists:
The Communist International is unable to agree that notor
ious opportunists such as Turati, Modigliani...shall have
the right to appear as members of the Communist International.-5^

34.

Jane Degras (ed.J, The Communist International 1919-1943.
Documents. Vol 1, 1919-1922, (London: 1956), p. 170
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The conditions stipulated further that affiliated
parties had to be formally known as communist parties and had
to submit to decisions of the Executive Committee of the
International#
The most jarring thing the Italian delegation was to
hear, however, came directly from Lenin who stated openly:
In regard to the Socialist Party of Italy, the Second
Congress of the Third International considers that the
criticism of that party and the practical proposals
submitted to the National Council of the Socialist
Party of Italy in the name of the Turin Section of that
party which were formulated in L y0rdine Nuovo of May 3,
1920 and which fully correspond to all the fundamental
principles of the Third International are in the main
correct.35
In the same speech Lenin also told the astonished PSI delegation,
principally Maximalist, that it was to call a congress to purge
itself of its ”non-Communist elements,” i#e, the Reformists.
Thus, Gramsci, who was not even present at Moscoiv,
received Lenin»s authority in support of his views despite
Grarasci’s relative obscurity on PSI national councils and, less
so, within the communist wing which was still dominated by
Bordlga.

Gramsci had been described as too absorbed in the

journalistic Turinese aspects of his work to assert himself more
in both national bodies.

His modesty and reticence were

described as other impediments to his ambitions to positions

3 5.

V.I. Lenin, ’’Theses on the Fundamental Tasks of the Second
Congress of the Third International” Selected Works.
(Moscow, n.d\), p. 177
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of party responsibility.

But, from the time of the Second

Congress, Gramsci’s ideas \ircre to loom large in the internal
debates raging Xfithin the PSI, which wore finally settled at
Livorno in January, 1921.
Before the Livorno Congress, one final occasion for
the Italian revolution was to present itself to the divided
Socialists*

In the post-war economy of Italy inflation was the

greatest nightmare for it ate away at fixed income groups as
well as wage earners.

The latter, however, could negotiate

adjustments*
During the summer of 1920, in Milan, the Metallurgist
Unions began to present demands for wage increases to the
management of this industry which had been particularly depressed
after the war.

The latter flatly refused and the unions, by

prearranged tactics, started a slowdown which reduced output to
6Gyu of the usual level.

The unions, which were financially

weak, were not aiming for a costly strike and tha "Reformist"
leadership wa3 not prepared to repeat the April events in
Turin.

The plan was to respond to a possible employer lockout

with a sit-down strike.

But it would be a sit-down strike with

a difference, for tha plants ware to be kept running by the
workers until the lockout was called off.

As it was to happen,

by the end of August 280 factories in the Milan area ware
dramatically "occupied" by the employees.

The hopeful expec

tation of the union leadership was that the government would
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intervene to demand that the owners enter negotiations for new
contracts.

The government, however, chose to stay aloof.
On the other hand, on September 1, the Turin xyorkers,

rather than isolate Eilan, tool: over their factories and quickly
the movement spread to involve every industry in Northern Italy.
This time, as contrasted to the Turin strike in April, the
militancy of the workers was not contained in on3 city but
covered the entire industrial heartland of the peninsula.

And

this time the workers were armed and ready to use tha factories
as fortresses*

In Turin, Giovanni Parodi, the young Fiat worker

active in the Socialist Youth Federation, and a propagandist
for Ordine Nuovo. sitting in the office of Agnelli, ran Fiat for
a month in the name of the triumphant Factory Councils.
Again Italian Socialists were confronted with a choice.
It soon became clear that the occupation of the factories had
to be supported by an attempt to seize political power.

The

plants were surrounded by troops and the flow of raw materials
and transportation of finished goods were being strangled by
their presence.

Production inevitably slackened.

The momentous

choice was to begin the revolution now or the opportunity would
vanish from Socialist dreams for unforaseeable years.

The

government had not intervened to pressure the industrialists to
accede to worker demands and the economic purpose of the strike
had to be reconsidered.

Insurrection or capitulation was the

choice.
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The Maximalist leadership could not overcome its
indecision while the Right was troubled already by the turn of
events.

The Left, which was not represented in the higher

offices of the party and especially in the unions, could not
influence the official course of the Socialist party.

The out

come of the wavering was an acceptance by the PSI and the
unions of a late offer of government mediation,

VThile a new

contract won raises and other benefits, the Factory Councils
were dealt a death blow*

A promised government bill to

legalize them was quietly lost in the Chamber under a pile of
shelved projects.

On September

25

the workers ratified an

agreement to return the factories to the furious owners*.who
began to look for some new political allies.who could protect
their interests better than the weak Liberals.

From the end of

1920 Fascism would grow to become a major political force in
Italy.
In Turin, Gramsci was later to recall, he had to
restrain workers who were determined to break out vrith a violent
insurgence by reminding them of their debilitating isolation
during the strike in April , ^

But he became convinced that

the existing PSI was dead as a revolutionary force in Italian
society.

36.

Spriano, op. cit., p, 377
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In January 1921 the party met in Livorno*

On a vote

to accept the Twenty-One Conditions, the Maximalists were unable
to break with the Right who possessed some of the oldest and
most illustrious names in Italian Socialism*

Rather than unite

with the Communists who were the second largest faction, the
Maximalists, who were known during the Congress as "Unitarians,"
watched the Communists walk out of the auditorium and out of
the party*

The latter called for the first Congress of the

Communist Party of Italy for the next day.
tionary communist party was officially bora.
late.

Thus, the revolu
But it was too

The revolution in Italy had already failed to ignite and

the chance would not present itself again for decades.
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II

THE LONG VOYAGE THROUGH FASCISM
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The Nascent Party and the Fascist Offensive 1921-1926
When the secessionist Left wing of the PSI led by
Bordiga met in Livorno’s San Marco Theatre on the morning of
January 21, 1921, it felt confident that It was about to
initiate a revolutionary communist party pregnant with the
historical mission of emancipating the Italian masses.

If

Bordiga were to have his way the new party would single-mindedly
consecrate its existence to this one aim of sparking the revolu
tion while scorning the old parliamentary tactics of the party
it had just repudiated.
or 1917.

But the year was 1921, not 1920, 1919

The revolutionary wave which had rolled across Europe

had crested and was withdrawing to Its Eastern source where it
would be kept in reserve until it was unleashed again after
another great war.
The melodramatic performance of the previous day in
the Teatro Goldoni, although played to a packed house, was not
going to prove to be the opening bars of a fiery Red tarantella,
played fortissimo, which would send Italian society into revo
lutionary convulsions.

Rather, it was to be the introduction

to a long political adagio with many improvisations and inter
polations to elaborate the principal theme, played lento. ma
risolutamente.

For Italy the main tune to be played for the

next twenty years would be a loud brassy martial number called
Fascismo and the band leader was Maestro Benito Mussolini late
of the PSI.
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Looking back with comforting historical hindsight,
the split in Italian Socialism just at the moment when Fascist
reaction was about to set in can

be seen as a disaster to the

working class movement in Italy.

One might ask, however, how

an undivided PSI, unable to act vxith decisive unity in the past,
would have reacted to the threat of Fascism.

The pre-Livorno

PSI had been quite clearly two parties; one reformist, one
revolutionary.

Living together within the same organization,

neither could fully make its own principles prevail over the
entire body.

Separation at least had succeeded in clarifying

party lines.

But at Livorno the lines were still not yet made

fully clear.

Again the sentimental Serrati and his Maximalist

followers were the cause.

The former was in sincere sympathy

with the PSI Left and the Third International except with regard
to their unyielding insistence on "purification," that is,
expelling the Right.

At Livorno, Serrati could not bring him

self to support this expulsion, but the equally schismatic
result was that the Left walked out on its own.
This act, it should be noted, was not according to
Comintern or to Lenin’s desires.

It was his tactic to "expel

Turati then unite with him;" that is, to create first a "revo
lutionary" party with a large mass following which could then
coordinate its efforts, whenever possible, with a clearly
identified social-democratic party to achieve specific goals.
Serrati’s argument against this was that to expel one’s Right-
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wing colleaguea would envenom relations so much that postschism relations would be impossible.

As a result, for many

years, Italy, unique in Europe for this, had two authentic
Marxist parties existing side by side in the same body politic.
It is convenient to argue that the Italian Communist
Party was created and manipulated by the direct interference
in the PSI by Comintern,

Though convenient, it is inaccurate.-*■

Nonetheless, while the birth of the PCI was the culmination
of an Inexorable process which had been maturing for years,
independently of the Bolsheviks, eventually the PCI did come
to depend upon Comintern support to a notable degree.

Almost

from the start, duo to the ominous political situation in
Italy, the PCI became a semi-clandestine and conspiratorial
party concerned as much with preserving Its own existence as
with political agitation among the masses.
admitted:

As Togliatti has

"One can say that the greatest part of Italian

public opinion became aware of the Communist party, for what
it really is, only in 1944."2
This dependence upon the support of the Comintern was
not Immediate.

It became clear by 1926 when Gramsci rather

1.

This, substantially, is the thesis of Urquidifs disserta
tion. Convincingly, he argues that, at Livorno, the Comintern
obtained a party "which it neither anticipated nor fully
accepted."

2.

Togliatti, II partito comunista italiano. p. 5
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than Bordiga won full control of the party.

And, soon after

that the de facto leadership passed to Togliatti upon the
imprisonment not only of Gramsci but also of Bordiga, Terracini,
Scoccimarro and many other leading party figures.

Until then,

as Urquidi argues, it is questionable as to who used whom with
regard to PCI-Comintern relations.
7/hen Comintern became seriously enough interested in
the P3X to try to influence its leadership and programmes it
was not very successful in having its will obeyed.

It was not

capable in the first instance, in having tha PSI Right-wing
expelled.

Rather, the PSI Left,under Bordlgafs leadership,

walked out in the face of Maximalist inability to choose sides.
That this was not the desired Comintern policy was proven when,
with hopes of mending the split, it invited delegations from
both the PCI and PSI (which had voted at Livorno not to cast
off its Comintern membership) to attend the Third Congress in
June, 1921.

In October, 1922 the Maximalists finally did decide

upon a belaued policy of "purification" and just barely succeeded
in expelling the Turati faction which then openly became the
Social-Democratic party of Italy.
Bordiga, however, did not rush to reunite with the
Maximalists.

The Communists in his view had to remain "pure"

and avoid collaboration with the spineless Socialists who had
even toyed with the idea of coming to an understanding with the
Fascists.

Earlier in the year, In March, when the Second
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Congress of the PCI was held, Bordiga had dominated the Con
gress and his non-collaborationist, abstentionist ideas still
prevailed.

Again, this was in divergence from Comintern posi

tions.
The Comintern naturally saw the political situation
most clearly from the Moscow vantagepoint since the Bolsheviks
were still the only successful Communists in Europe.

If, in

1920, Comintern sensed the opportunity for fostering the
revolution in Western Europe by prodding "Communist" Socialists
still wedded to "Reformist" Socialists to expel their Rightwings and get busy with revolution, by 1922 the situation
appeared quite changed*

The heady euphoria of 1920 was

replaced now with a real 3ense of isolation and a sober under
standing that the order of the day was not revolution but
reaction.
Russia was still reeling from its own internal as
well as external problems.

The exigencies of a collapsed

economy had even forced the Bolsheviks to adopt a partial
restoration of Capitalism.

Lenin himself, by now, was so

wrapped up in the endless exhausting problems of the Russian
revolution that it was increasingly difficult for him to devote
very much of hi3 rapidly diminishing energy to international
problems. 3—

3.

This is the position of Adam B. Ulam in his book The
Bolsheviks (New York, 1965), p» V93-51A-
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To his realist mind it must have been more than
clear by 1922 that there would be no European revolution.
All attempts had failed, except in Russia, and there the
revolution was fighting for survival.

The necessity of the

moment was not revolutionary adventure but consolidation.
As for European Communists, it was to be a question of pre
paring to meet the ineluctable forces of reaction which
were gathering strength increasingly.
nowhere more menacing than in Italy.

These forces seemed
A new policy had to be

adopted, and thus Comintern turned one hundred and eighty
degrees from advocating schisms to promoting the policy of
the ’’United Front" among all Socialist parties.
Western European Communists who, after years of
struggle, had just succeeded in forming autonomous parties
found this radical about face very difficult to accommodate.
For his part, Bordiga objected vigorously for it went con
trary to all his Instincts about cultivating a revolutionary
elite, non-uollaboration and abstentionism.

At first,

Gramsci had dcubts also but his entire career as an acute
analyst of soc:*.^-political problems equipped him with a
greater intellectual sensitivity to changing circumstances
than tha less flexible Bordiga who adamantly resisted
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tactical adaptations.^
Comintern used two principal arguments to try to
convince the stubborn Italians,

First, the PSI had finally

expelled the Right and Serrati was not prepared for a fusion
with the PCI.

Secondly, while Italian Socialists had remained

split, Mussolini had taken over the government.

In November,

1922 an agreement toward PSI-PCI fusion was finally negotiated
at the Fourth Comintern Congress despite Bordigafs continuing
objections.

Ironically, Mussolini provided a solution to the

test of wills.

4,

Upon his return from the Moscow meeting,

Gramsci*s doubts about Comintern policy stemmed from his
conviction that the newly-formed party had an immediate,
pressing task to accomplish, that of persuading the
greater part of the proletariat to come over to the PCI
and, in doing this, to put pressure on the Maximalists
to come down one way or another for Right or Left Socialism.
To accomplish this would require full energy being dir
ected to organizational and propagandistic work and would
amount to engaging in a real rivalry with the PSI. By
changing over to a policy of collaboration would mean post
poning this contest. On the other hand, Gramsci was
acutely conscious that the menace posed by the violent
Blaek-Shirted souadristi was being assisted involuntarily
by the quarreling Italian Left which rather than combat
Fascism was sniping at itself. Profitting from this
lack of solidarity among the Socialists, Mussolini set
his squads of thugs to attacking socialist cooperatives,
unions, printing presses, Chambers of Labour and indi
viduals in order to try to purge the latter of their
beliefs with liberal doses of castor oil.
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Bordiga and the Executive Committee of the PCI were arrested
and jailed.^
Togliatti had escaped the Fascist dragnet while
Gramsci at tha same time was still in Moscow where he had been
sent in May 1922 as PCI delegate to the Executive of the Inter
national.

Much of the time there, Gramsci spent recuperating

from a collapse of what was normally less than robust health,
but the Russian sojourn allowed him to study the Bolshevik
experiment firsthand for the first time.

When in Turin, he

was able only to theorize on the system of Factory Councils;
in Russia he could closely study their actual operation under
the direction of Lenin,

5.

In his role as member of the In t e m a -

Upon his return from the Fourth Comintern Congress, Bordiga
was as opposed to political collaboration with the Social
ists as ever even though at the last PSI Congress held in
October 1922 the Turati faction was expelled, albeit with
a bare majority, and the PSI expressed a new willingness to
seek a fusion with the PCI.
This lack of any enthusiasm
and procrastination by Bordiga was reciprocated in the
P3I where in the meantime a new body of opinion against
fusion was being formed and articulated by the editor of
Avanti. Pietro Nenni.
The continuing extremism and intran
sigence by the Neopolltan Communist alienated him as much
a3 anything from the Comintern (as well as the PSI). With
his removal from the scene by his imprisonment the fusion
of the two parties could continue and was finally (but
only partially) realised in the latter part of 1923. By
then, the antl-fu3ionist Socialists led by Nenni had gained
the bare majority to vote against reunion.
Thus, the
"fusion" when it finally took place was with the Serrati
faction rather than with the entire PSI.
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tional Executive, Gramsci was able also to observe "panorami
cally" the international communist movement from its centre
rather than from the "provincial” Italian angle,

v.’hile pri

vately noting the defects of the central body, its bureaucracy,
its sense of authority and, disturbingly, the obscure rivalries
shaping up in Moscow, he also acquired an appraisal of his own
PCI and was able to appreciate its problems from another view
point, a non-Italian one, one which permitted him, in a sense,
to see himself through the eyes of others.

Whatever he thought

of this other analysis, Gramsci harboured a deep conviction that
the PCI-Coniintern relationship was a vital one, especially to
the former.^

6.

There wa3, undoubtedly, at bottom a certain practical and
political conviction, which the new position for observa
tion reinforced and nourished; that one niu3t not and that
one could not break with the Comintern. He knew that the
party had a meaning, a position, a bond with the proletar
iat only if it remained the Italian Section of the Inter
national. More than once he would say that only, or rather,
above all for this reason fifty thousand Socialist militants
at Livorno followed the communist group and that, if the
half of these resisted persecutions, continued to struggle,
to nourish hope, to organise itsslf, it was oecauae the
Communist Party of Italy was a part of that international
front which was being guided by the Country of the Revolu
tion (and) by the party of Lenin.
Paolo Spriano, Gramsci. p. 3#5
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It has been maintained that the source of Bolshevik
influence, first in sections of the PSI and afterwards in the
PCI, was not based on doctrinal superiority but rather stemmed
from the immense prestige won by the Bolsheviks who alone had
managed to carry out the only successful revolution.*^

Only

when it became quite clear that the various attempts to ignite
revolutions in Europe were failures did the Bolsheviks
increasingly receive the mantle of complete doctrinal authority
as well.

And, once this became the situation, Comintern bless

ing became a requisite for any communist party leader pushing
a particular programme, for it bestowed on the individual or
policy an inconfutable status and prestige.
If Bordiga, who had ju3t been arested by the Kussolini
government still could not understand that the immediate
problem to be faced by the Italian Section in 1923 was not
revolution but Fascism and insisted on following his "purist"
abstentionist programme, the Comintern could only see one
solution; to remove Bordiga from the secretaryship of the PCI
and replace them ivith someone else who was more attuned to

7.

At the Livorno Congress, Turati, speaking before the whole
party had declared "When the Russian myth has passed, our
classical conception of socialism will again come to the
fore." Cammett, op. cit.. p. 29
Urquidi maintains that: "The basic source of Bolshevik
authority was derived largely, if not entirely, from their
successful revolution." op. cit.. p. 399
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events and adaptable to changed conditions.

Since Bordiga was

now in forced prison isolation the occasion to change the
leadership presented itself conveniently.
fell to Gramsci.

Bordiga*s position

As early as the Second Congress the Turinese

leader had seemed to Lenin to have had adopted realistic
ti
attitudes,
and now his candidacy for Bordiga*s position seemed
the most suitable.

Gramsci in turn appointed Togliatti, who

was still in Italy, as ad hoc leader.

8.

Vide supra, Chapter 1, p. 43
In his Ordine Nuovo article of May 8, 1920 for which Lenin
publicly expressed admiration and agreement, Gramsci,
writing after the collapse of the "occupation of the fac
tories11 foresaw the consequences of the failure to push
the occupation to its logical conclusions.
The State had
to be taken over by the working class and its party or:
there will be a tremendous reaction on the part of the
propertied classes and the ranks of government...no violence
will be neglected in order to subjugate the industrial and
agricultural proletariat...they will seek relentlessly to
smash up the working class bodies for political struggles
and to incorporate bodies for economic resistance within
the gears of tha bourgeois state. Gramsci quoted by
Togliatti "L*Anti-fascismo di Antonio Gramsci" Moment! della
otoria d*Italia (Rome: 1963), p. 174
This passage written two years before the advent of Fascism
was an acute prophecy of future events. Not only did the
Fascist squadristl use violence to intimidate rank and file
socialist supporters but within a year of holding office
Mussolini and Confindustria reached an agreement permitting
virtual autonomy of the latter within tha economy while
suppressing non-Fascist unions and forbidding the formation
of factory committees and the right to strike to the working
classes.
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It is quite true that it is unlikely that Gramsci
would have assumed party leadership without Comintern assis
tance and influence and this would appear to confute the
thesis that the PCI was not the child of Comintern or the
"agent of Soviet Communism*' in Italy.

It should be kept in

mind that until Gramsci, (whose views lyere to begin with
more in harmony with those of the Comintern than anyone elseTs),
assumed party leadership, the PCI was not at all what Comin
tern had hoped for.
As has been pointed out, Comintern had wanted "puri
fication" of the PSI, that is, expulsion of the Right wing.
Instead, the extreme Left wing walked out leaving Serrati to
tergiversate about splitting with the Turati faction for
another precious year.9

Subsequently, once the PSI Left became

the new PCI, Comintern could not impose its views on party
tactics upon the new leader.

Bordiga insisted upon sustaining

parliamentary abstentionism and, related to this, refused to
collaborate with the old Maximalists,

Finally, neither Bordiga

nor Serrati had been considered by the Comintern to be really
ideal for leading the PCI,

9.

Bordiga was too rigidly extremist

IM

Speaking to the Third PCI Gongress as a full member Serrati
explained his position in the period of schism thusly:
"Even
in the course of our polemics and of our bitterest debates,
I felt myself to be spiritually closer to you than to many
elements of my old party. No one will ever know what suffer
ing those contradictory feelings provoked in me, I thought
was right and instead I was committing a grave error, the
gravest of all my life." Quoted by Togliatti in "Serrati”
Momenti della storia d 1Italia, p. 15
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in hi3 views and Serrati too sentimental about the venerable
Partito socialists italiano with its great uninterrupted tra
dition and its great parliamentary orators.^

Only the Ordine

Nuovo group seemed to espouse the right policies and pursue
the correct line of action.

But Comintern was not certain

until the Third PCI Congress in 1926 that the Ordine Nuovo
group would prevail.

By that time Fascism was entering its

thoroughly totalitarian phase and the PCI was driven underground
and into exile.
Noting these facts, it is difficult to claim that the
Italian Communist Party was nothing more than a creature of
the Communist International.

This does not negate, on the other

hand, the clear fact that Comintern did actively push forward
the Ordine Nuovo group into the leadership.

But it does not

imply either that Gramsci was merely a puppet repeating what
ever Comintern told him to 3ay.

Gramsci assumed the leadership

convinced of the correctness of his {and Comintern’s) position.
He was increasingly convinced that Bordiga1s ’’sectarianism1' was
wrong and that the party had to change Its line.
essitated an Inner-party struggle, so be it.

10.

If this nec

And, if the

"...the Italians are notoriously soft-hearted and senti
mental over old friendships. An Italian Lenin would to
the end sneak out for a glass of wine with an Italian
Martov..
Ulam, op. cit.. p. 502
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Comintern wars eager to help him vrin against the Bordighists,
this aid would be welcome.

Although Bordiga supporters were

important personalities in the party leadership, the party press
since Livorno was in the hands of old Ordlnovisti.

In Rome,

the party*s central organ, II Comunl3ta was being edited by
Togliatti.

And in 1924 I*Unita. edited by Gramsci, made its

first appearance.
In these publications Gramsci and his colleagues
could press for unity of action among Italy*s leftist parties.
Ivith Bordiga in prison and assured of Comintern support Gramsci
and his supporters set about to win control of the party
machinery as well.

It had been Gramsci, significantly, who

had guided the merger of the Serrati faction and PCI in 1923
while Bordiga was in prison, and, early in the next year, he
again diverged from Bordiga*s abstentionist programme when he
was elected to Parliament, where, a3 leader of the Communist
group inthe Chamber of Deputies, his views received national
attention and wide publicity.
VJhile he worked towards forming a united front against
the Fascists, Gramsci simultaneously set about to apply to his
already aeni-clandestine party some of the Bolshevik organiza
tional structure he had studied while in Moscow.

By adopting

the cell system not only could the party be changed, if the need
arose, from an open legal organization to a skeletal, illegal,
clandestine one, but the molecular-sized cell could more easily
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penetrate places of work and other organizations, evade detec
tion and escape suppression.

At least in this way the party

could maintain some semblance of organization even as a secret,
conspiratorial grouping.

As it turned out, this preparation

gave the PCI the best underground apparatus of all the anti
fascist resistance groupings.
Although Bordiga was released after several months
imprisonment, the Grarasci-Togliatti-Comintern alliance utilized
the period of absence to secure the appointment of an enlarged
executive committee of the PCI to assure Gramsci of a majority,
although the inner party rivalry continued about a year, until
January 1926.

During this time, the party organization rever

berated with the jostling for positions, and party meetings
rang with accusations and counter accusations.

Finally, at the

PCI Third Congress the Bordiga group was overwhelmingly voted
down.
Meanwhile, Gramsci was using his parliamentary posi
tion to the fullest in order to powmote the anti-Fascist front.
To Bordiga1s dismay, ha became a prime mover in Important par
liamentary manoeuvres.

This was occasioned by the murder of

the Socialist deputy and critic of the regime, Giacomo Matteotti,
in June, 1924 by order of Mussolini,

The general uproar that

followed this crime shook the regime so violently that for a
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a while its downfall appeared c e r t a i n . I n protest the socalled ’'Aventine” was formed.

It consisted of some one hundred

and fifty anti-Fascist deputies who walked out of the Chamber
vowing not to return until the Fascist government resigned (or
hopefully until the king dismissed the prime minister).

Gramsci

took part in this opposition.

11.

This murder led Gramsci to write about the actual politi
cal situation in Italy with an analytical penetration
that verified in part elements of the prophecies he made
in his 1920 article (quoted above p. 57 footnote):
There exists a crisis in Italian society, a crisis which
traces its origins to the same factors with which this
society is constituted and to thoir insuperable contra
dictions; there exists a cri3is which the war has acceler
ated, deepened, rendered insurmountable. On one hand
there is a State which cannot hold itself up because it
lacks the support of the great masses and which lacks
a class of leaders which is able to win for it thi3
support; on the other hand, there is a raaes of millions
of workers who have slowly been awakened to politics who
seek to assume an active role In It, who want to become
the footing for a new State which will incarnate their
will.
There i3 on one hand an economic system which no
longer is able to satisfy the elementary requirements of
the enormous majority of the population because it is
built to satisfy the particular exclusiviat interests of
a few restricted privileged classes; there are on the
other hand hundreds of thousands of workers who cannot
live under this system unless it is modified at the
roots.
Quoted by Togliatti
p. 173

Anti-fascismo di Antonio Gramsci” ,
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While the majority of the "Aventina" deputies hesi
tated in pressing their moral advantage and wasted their time
in irresolute debate, Gramsci vigorously proposed establishing
a rival "parliament11 which would pass its ov:n laws in opposi
tion to the government, putuing pressure on the king to take
some action and spark a general uprising against Mussolini.
Whan thi3 revolutionary proposal won no support, Gramsci led
the Communists back into the Chamber and carried out his own
fiery opposition to the regime.

After six immobile months,

the "Aventine" began to disintegrate and this gave Mussolini
time to regain his shaken confidence.

By the autumn of 1926

by proclaiming his "Exceptional Law3," after an assassination
attempt on him failed, ha reimpo3ed press censorship, deprived
the rebel deputies of their se^ts and dissolved political par
ties and every form of anti-Fascist organisation.
Earlier in the year, in January 1927, before the
decrees were proclaimed, the PCI had held its Third Congress
in Lyons, France to escape Fascist suppression.

It was there

that Gramsci proposed his "Lyons theses" which eliminated
Bordiga*s "Rome theses" of the Second party Congress of 1922.
These theses were a compound of Gramsci*s pristine political
concepts especially with regard to the sysfc em of the Factory
Councils and the general problem of the South and his more
recent positions on collaborationist tactics which were influ
enced by his Soviet sojourn, the experience of his personal
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participation in the Comintern, and the awareness that his
worst expectations about Fascism were in the process of being
realized.
Speaking at the Lyons Congress against the back
ground of a discouraging disunity among the anti-Kussolini
"'Vventine* Gramsci explained tha new party orientation:
In no country is the proletariat in a position to win
power and to hold on to it solely with its own forces:
it must therefore procure some allies for itself, that is,
it must carry on such a policy that it will be able to
place itself at the head of other classes which have anticapitalist interests and guide them in the struggle. The
question is particularly important for Italy where the
proletariat is a minority of the working population and
is disposed geographically in such a way that it cannot
presume to carry out a victorious struggle for power
except after having provided,an exact solution to the
problem of its relation to the peasant classes. In the
near future our Party vri.ll have to dedicate itself par
ticularly to posing and solving this problem,
11In the near future" however, was to be too late for
Gramsci himself, who, despite his status as a deputy, was
air ested along with most of the leading PCI personalities,
except Togliatti, and the party itself wsb

driven underground.

Thus, Gramsci, who had been one of the first to predict the
intensity of the inevitable reactionary counter-revolution
while flailing the PSI leaders for not profiting from the revo
lutionary situation in 1920, became one of its first and one of

its most lamentable victims.

12.

His efforts, as an influential

Spriano, op. cit.. p. 339
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and responsible political leader, to organize a resistance to
stem the increasing menace of Fascism by effecting an alliance
with other antl-Fascist parties were too late.

By the time his

opinions and policy decisions carried any notable weight and
could determine the political action of at least the PCI, the
danger he had early foreseen had not only manifested itself
but had acquired such power as to quash any belated opposition.

The Clandestine Existence
The incarceration of such a large number of important
communist leaders was a painful blow to the PCI although it was
not fatal.

With Gramsci removed from active leadership, Tog-

llatti assumed de facto control of the party.

Two years after

being arrested and after being shunted from prison to prison
across Italy, Gramsci was brought before the "Special Tribunal
for the Defense of the State" in 192$.
Gramsci before the
that:
ting."

Declaiming against

ribunal, the Fascist prosecutor demanded

"for twenty years...this mind be prevented from opera
Obligingly, the judges condemned the accused to twenty

yoar3, four months and five days imprisonment for treason.
During the trial, Gramsci warned the Fascists that they "would
lead Italy to her ruin" adding that "it will be left to us
(Communists) to save her."
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After serving ten corroding years of his sentence,
during which time his health broke down completely, Gramsci
was released "for compassionate reasons" to enjoy three days
of freedom before he died in April 1937*

Despite his isolation

and while prevented from receiving detailed new3 about "outside"
events or all the books he wished, Gramsci did not resign him
self to an arid, unproductive prison routine.

He instead

tried to organize his thoughts in as systematic a way as he
could under the circumstances and set about recording them on
hundreds of pages of notes to form what have been called his
"juademi del Careers" or"Prison Notebooks."

The subjects of

his contemplations, often written in cryptic form to escape
prison censors, were numerous and varied but, by intention,
much of his effort was directed at one of his most enduring
interests, an analysis of Italian intellectuals, their role in
Italian society of the past, and, leading from this, a consi
deration of Machiavalli, the Risorgimento. the philosophy of
Croce, the nature of Italian institutions and countless other
varied subjects.
After the Second World V/ar, the "Notebooks" as well
as hundreds of his letters were painstakingly collected and
systematically published.^

13.

The effect of these writings on

In 1947 Gramsci*s "Lettere dal carcere" or"Letters from
Prison" won one of Italy13 major literary awards, the
Viareggio Prize.
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wide sections of the post-war intelligentsia of Italy was so
profound that unknowingly and unintentionally by his own in
tellectual accomplishment Gramsci single-handedly succeeded to
a remarkable degree in attracting the intelligentsia of the
country into forming that alliance of the workers and thinkers,
the "hegemony of the proletariat," he had so deeply committed
himself to work towards back in Turin as a young, idealistic,
university student.

Gramscirs thought Is hardly known outside

of Italy, but there its influence has been real and deep.
Referring to the "Quaderni” a young Italian historian of the
working class movement had written that:
their significance (and) influence in the formation of
new generations of scholars and militants cannot as yet
be fully appraised.
But, it can already be said that
without them one could not conceive of the renewal of
the intellectual life of our country over two decades
(whatever the political, ideological orientation of
individual intellectuals has been),..1^
In Italy today it is certainly not the case that
every intellectual is a communist.

But, it can be said that,

in general, quality intellectual life, intellectual achieve
ment in all Its manifestations often doe3
from the Left.

take its flavour

Numerous intellectuals may well harbour suspi

cions about the PCI as a party for various reasons (such as its
long identity with unpalatable Soviet policies) or may prefer
not to pledge formal political allegiance to any political

14.

Sprlano, op. cit. p. 3^9
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party whatsoever, but these same individuals will almost
invariably express admiration and respect for the human example
and the thinking of the Sardinian hunchback, Antonio Gramsci.
That there should exist a suspicion or perhaps an
ambivalent uncertainty toward tha PCI can be explained.

It,

too, is a product of the historical vicissitudes the party
experienced after 1926.

If Gramsci gave the PCI one of its

qualities or traditions, the other emerged from nearly two
decades of exile, conspiratorial struggle, and dependence on
Soviet support for its only claim to "legitimacy” in absence
of any demonstrable mass support during the long Fascist reign.
With Gramsci, Bordiga, Terracini, Scoccimarro as wall as other
principal Communists imprisoned, Togliatti assumed what was to
become an uninterrupted career as PCI leader which lasted
almost forty years.

Being in Moscow at the time of the arrests,

Togliatti was able to escape the fate of his comrades.
Lenin had died two years earlier in 192!* and although
Stalin had already assumed affective control of the Soviet
party and state machinery, his authority was not yet undisputed
by rivals.

The struggle for power had already begun before

Gramsci was arrested.

As absorbed as he was with his own pro

blems in the Italian party, Gramsci observed the Moscow
rivalries with some misgivings and apprehensions for the
jostling of Right and Left groups in the Russian party, and
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the manipulations Stalin made with one and the other was con
fusing the other sections of the International.

One of Gramsci,s

last acts as party leader was a letter he wrote to the Bolshe
vik leaders:
Comrades*..today you are in the process of destroying
your work* You are degrading and running the risk of
nullifying the directing functions which the Communist
Party of the USSR had conquered through the work of Lenin.
It seems to us that the violent passion of the Russian
questions is causing you to lose 3ight of the interna
tional aspects of those very Russian questions. It is
causing you to forget that your duties as militant Russians
can and ought to be carried out only within the framework
of the interests of the international proletariat*^5
However, Gramsci1s protests went unheeded.

Unlike

most Russian Communist leaders who had lived in Western Europe,
were often multi-lingual and outward-looking, Stalin was not an
international-minded thinker.
Russian.

His experience had been internal,

If the international movement was failing, Stalin

believed, unlike Trotsky, that the revolution would have to
depend on Russia itself.

The hostile capitalist states refused

to recognize the Soviet regime and tried to prevent it from
infecting the rest of the world.

Thus for a decade this regime

concentrated on assuring its own survival.

Stalin declared

therefore that the task of world Communists, for the moment,
would be to promote the success of Socialism in one country."
To assure this Stalin had at his disposal the authority of the

15.

Gramsci in Cammett, op. cit. p. 243
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Gcviet-dominatod Comintern.

For parties auch as the* PCI which

hatl just suffered almost fatal blows in their own countries
and lookod for cover under the win^ of the nourishing maternal
body, the Communist International, the prudent policy was to
accept Soviet policies as they were decided without alienating
the beneficence of the senior party.

Consequently, the Soviet

influence on the PCI became increasingly evident.

As tha

years of exile passed, the party became identified more and
more as a "Soviet agent" and as "an obedient tool of Soviet
foreign policy."

As PCI leader and eventually as a member of

the Praesidium of the Comintern, Togliatti resigned himself to
the exigencies of the political situation and sought to guide
party activities as effectively as the limitations on his init
iative permitted.

The Turinese idealism ha shared with his

university friends as a young man took, in those discouraging
years, a secondary place to the practical, detached, tactical
calculations exacted by a bitter struggle against rival
Fascism,

But, the non-Bolshevik, Gramsaian elements in his

Intellectual attitudes were not entirely smothered by the con
formist, authoritarian, Stalinist atmo-phera.-1-^
Vthen the PCI was forced undarground the precautions
It had taken to create a oami-clandestine structure proved

16.

Vida Grnst Fisher "tin debito di gratitudine" Rlnasclta.
Vol. 22, No. 3'+,(“August 26, 1965) pp. 9-11
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prudent.^

A "Foreign Centre" had already been established in

Switzerland in the early twenties.

Later it was moved to Paris

where it remained in contact with both Moscow and the secret,
skeletal remnants of the party in Italy,

The base for the most

important offices of the "Internal Centre" was Milan.

The

party managed for a while to continue clandestinely to publish
and distribute its newspapers and, to stir up labour unrest,
tried to infiltrate the Fascist-controlled unions.

In 1927

and 1928, however, the party was dealt two more painful blows.
Dozens of "internal" party leaders were caught by poJi ce drag
nets and the Internal Centre itself was discovered and smashed.
The dilemma of the PCI as a victim of relentless
hounding by the Fascist police was not aided by the new policies
it had to adopt after 1928 as directed by Comintern.

Reflect

ing new Soviet attitudes, sections of the International scorned
those parties which had scorned the Iiternational, such as
Social Democrats, whose hoji,

r to revolutionary Communism

and it3 institutional incarnation the U33R had only helped the
growth of Fascism.
The motivation of this new attitude of the Interna
tional stemmed also from an analysis of the economic situation
which concluded that the world of capitalism was on the brink

17.

A most useful book to consult on the resistance period Is
Charles Delzall*s Mussolini*s Enemies The Italian AntiFascist Resistance" [Princeton, 1961). Much of* the infor
mation In this section of the paper, I owe to this
excellent study.
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of a major collapse.

Therefore, communist parties, to pre

pare to exploit this impending crisis, must prepare their own
ranks and cut off relations v;ith those socialist parties v;hich
in the past had only held back the revolutionary energies of
Communists.
This policy which was promulgated nt the Sixth Comin
tern Congress went against everything Gramsci had worked for
as PCI leader when he worked to reunite with the PSI, when he
was a member of the initial "Aventine” and contradicted what
he had declared before the Lyons Congress.^

Togliatti's

views on the question of combatting Fascism were similar to
Gramsci,s and at the 192c Congress he quoted Goethe's last
utterance ’'Light, more light” in the face of the adamance of
the International in pushing the new attitude.

It was Togliatti,

however, who submitted to the views of the Comintern and, for
the next six years, guided the PCI in its political isolation
until 19 k when it resumed its collaboration with the PSI in a
■'unity of action” pact.
During the intervening period, In Italy, the PCI con
tinued to try to infiltrate Fascist bodies with undercover party
agents to cultivate discontent among workers who were being sub
jected to pay cuts.

In some cases, party influence could be

16.

See quotation p. 63,

19.

It was during this period that nngalo Tasca, who had over a
long while slov/ly become alienated from the course of the
party was taking broke with the PCI on the question of the
new isolationist t.ctics after incurring his public denun
ciation by Stalin.
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detected in attempted strikes.

Simultaneously the party was

attracting to itself numerous young idealistic nnti-Fascist
students.

Some of them bore famous Italian political names.

One was Giorgio Amendoln, son of the Democratic deputy,
Giovanni Amendola who had been leader of the /.ventine and who
had died from beatings he received from a Fascist gang.
Many of these young men, such as '\mendola, were in the futur°
to become outstanding lenders of the post viar PCI.

Also at

this time Luigi Longo, the present PCI secretary, was assuming
increasing responsibilities as head of the Communist Youth
Federation.
In 19^1 the party held its Fourth Congress in s^misecrecy in Germany.

This was the first gathering of all major

party leaders in on° place since the Lyons meeting and wag an
encouraging proof of party continuity.

Many delegates had

managed to come from Italy and saw for the first time the man
behind the pseudonym "Ercoli."

The Congress vias principally

used as an opportunity to plan strategy and as a result the
delegates returned to Italy with the goal of reestablishing
much of the "internal" organisation which had been suppressed
by the police.

But the latter was able, with discoursgingly

efficient doggedness, to smash the party apparatus and continued
arresting numerous Communist activists.

Their suppression was

so thorough that the PCI experienced its lowest point of effec—
tive internal activity since its formation in 1921.
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By 1934 the policy of isolation was finally discar
ded.

The dangerous assumption of power by aggressive German

Na-.ism, which could form a bloc with Fascist Italy, the near
degeneration into Fascism by a still democratic but weak and
bitterly divided Third French Republic, the existence of

n

quasi-Fascist, pre-Nazi regime in austria, the clerical
Fascism in Portugal and the mounting threat from the Right in
Spain, as well as the constellation of anti-Russian Right-wing
regimes in Eastern liurope, all united in bitter hostility
towards Soviet Communism, upset the uneasy equilibrium in
Europe.
When Soviet leaders turned from the absorbing work
of building a Socialist system to take a deep hard look at
developments in Europe, what was seen was alarming.

The vivid

contemplation of a menacing alliance of Fascist states united
against it was

a fearsome

threat to be urgently undermined.

The

collapse of the capitalist economies with the consequent revo
lutionary possibilities which had been predicted at the Sixth
Comintern Congress had indeed materialised but the swelling
ranks of the unemployed were not all automatically pledging
their allegiance to the Left.

The Communists, Socialists .and

Social Democrats were facing an energetic competition for
support from a militant Right and this competition alarmed not
just the Communists but the rest of the Left as well.
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Pressed by the French Communist Party and the PCI,
who joined the French and Italian Socialist Parties in pacts
of "unity of action" in mid-1934* the Comintern assented
officially to this policy at its Seventh Congress in 1935.
The USSR itself, facing the threat of the Fascist advance
willingly cultivated anything which would strengthen and defend
what it had already accomplished with 3uch painful sacrifices
and internal convulsions toward creating "Socialism in One
Country."

For now, behind the consolidation of Fascist regimes

in Europe, it perceived not just an undirected play of poli
tical forces, but a concerted effort by Capitalist Reactionaries
to manoeuvre for a war against the Soviet Union and to accom
plish what it could not do in 19143-21; that is, to destroy
Communism at Its source once and for all.
The devalopmonts in Germany more than anything worried
the Soviet leaders who had heretofore come to 3ome understandings
with capitalist states to the point of entering commercial rela
tions with them in order not only to mitigate the economic
straits within the USSR but also to try to weaken the "Capi
talist Encirclement" of those states which quarantined it into
its isolation.

Tha Hitlerian intention to renew G e r m a n y ^

Drang nach Oaten at Soviet expense was a grave danger to European
peace.
Thus, international developments, inaugurating a
change in Comintern policy, permitted the PCI to pick up the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

75

threads of its old struggle against Fascism in collaboration
with the Socialists and according to the policies Gramsci had
promoted almost a decade earlier at Lyons.

The ’’Popular Front"

defensive policy was basically an actuation of the axion "united
we stand, divided we fall," which contained within it an impli
cation of preparing for an impending engagement of the enemy.
Within Italy, the PCI {in concert with the PSI) directed its
propaganda against Italian aggression in Ethiopia and urged
strikes, array desertions and sabotage of the military prepara
tions.

This met with only limited success while among Italian

emigres in Europe the Communists were much more effective in
launching anti-war demonstrations.

The PCI also sent its agents

to infiltrate the Italian Royal Armed Forces to insinuate paci
fism and cultivate resentment of the rival Fascist Militia.
None of this succeeded in preventing the subjugation of Ethiopia
by Fascist Italy.
The real chance for open combat with the Fascists came
in Spain where a Popular Front government was being faced with
a revolt by the clerical-military Right led by army general
Francisco Franco who was in sympathy with the Fascism of Musso
lini and Hitler.

The latter assisted their protege with generous

support in arms and men while on the other side the "Loyalists"
requested help from the European Left.
materiel and agant-advisers.

The Soviet Union sent in

Thousands of left-wing volunteers

poured into Spain to form "international brigades" of antl-
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Franco forces.

Many of the brigade commanders were leading

personalities of other communist parties such a3 Luigi Longo
from the PCI.

Togliatti himself became the chief political

delegate of the Comintern in Spain and wielded a great influence
in the Spanish CP.

The Spanish Civil L’ar was to give Italian

Communists an experience In civil war which was a foretaste of
what was to occur in Italy in the near future.
Despite the ultimate defeat of the Spanish Loyalist
cause, the Civil War taught Communist leaders in Spain an impor
tant lesson, one which would be helpful in the future.

Regardless

of the deep differences which normally kept parties of the
Left bitterly divided amongst themselves, unity in defense of
a common interest, in the struggle for a common goal, in the
face of a common enemy had been the most powerful weapon in the
arsenal of the entire Spanish Left.

This unity 3hould therefore

be constantly promoted and reinforced amongst all parties of
the Left in all countries.
In the larger European scene moreover, developments
in the late Thirties indicated the trend toward a showdown war
with Fascism was gaining momentum.

Spain had been a prelude.

During the late Thirties, with all the Popular Front engagements
against Fascism in the Iberian peninsula, communist successes
in tha Italian one were not encouraging.

The internal party

activity had been effectively quashed by the police and Communists
directed most of their efforts at infiltrating Fascist organi-
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zations where largo numbers of members, who were not necessarily
Communists, ware passive participants out of convenience.

The

younger generation especially became increasingly disaffected
from the hollow porap and inflated rhetoric of the Fascist
regime and were more and more attracted to the appeal of the
Left •
In 1939 an event occurred which seriously strained
the alliance between Communists and Socialists.

The cause again

derived from a change in Soviet strategy in Europe.

For a

period of time the Soviet Union had been cooperating with West
European states in the policy of "collective security" against
Germany.

The USSR had even been allowed to enter the League of

Nations after Germany walked out.

However, by the end of the

decade Stalin grew suspicious of his western allies especially
after they pacified Hitler at Munich by offering up Czechoslovakia.
The Soviet Union had been shut out of tha Munich talks and it
appeared to Stalin that the West was treacherously seeking to
encourage Hitler*s appetites in Eastern Europe and scheming to
set Germany and the USSR at each other’s throats.

Not to be

outdone in perfidy, Stalin cynically concluded the notorious
Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact which stunned Europe and especially
the Socialist Left which had thrown in with the Communists in
order to fight Fascism.
For Comraunist3, the significance of the Pact was
clear.

Keeping foremost the constant need to protect and

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

78

defend the cradle of Revolution, the Popular Front had to bide
time and not provoke, by its anti-Fascist intensity, an attack
by the Axis on the USSR.

When the inevitable war "between

imperialists" exploded, the Communists would promote a policy
of defeatism among the proletariat who must escploit the revo
lutionary possibilities of the war.

The overwhelming cynicism

of this manoeuvre of Realpolitik appalled all but the most
disciplined party comrades who bowed to the turn of events.

In

the rest of the Left countless numbers, who had idealistically
conceived of a united struggle of all "democratic" forces
against Fascism, could not blandly accept the apparent communist
duplicity and broke away from the Front in dismay and out of
an increasing aversion to events in the USSR— the purges, the
collectivization of agriculture, the conformity all of which
gradually had revealed an unhesitating ruthlessness in Soviet
methods.
If Communists internally harboured similar emotions,
few chose to break with the Party.

Most chose not to aggravate

a critical phase in international movement.

Although the P8I-

PCI relationship suffered serious strains from these events, it
was never completely ruptured.

While there was no lack of

support for such a move among some Socialist leaders, figures
such as Nenni chose to see the Non-Aggression Pact as a tem
porary stalling for time by the Soviets who would resume the
antl-Fascist offensive in short time,

Nenni was not incorrect

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

79

Tor as soon as Russo-German solidarity broke and Fascist Italy
entered the war the PCI-PSI collaboration went into full gear.

Toward the Year of Reckoning —

19^3

For the PCI, the PSI and for all the anti-Fascist
fuorusciti or exile groups the war was not just a chance to
coordinate their common resistance to Fascism.
chance to demolish Fascism completely*

It was the

For the PCI it was long

awaited chance to promote its leadership to the working classes,
to launch Communism in Italy, to vindicate the sacrifices, the
years of struggle, the disciplined obedience invested to maintain
Soviet support.

It was also a chance to ra-assert and re-

articulate Gramscifs noble concepts to begin building a new
proletarian civilization.

This was the significance of the

war and the war and the PCI leadership realized it fully.
For Togliatti, personally, the years of exile and
total dedication to his cause must have provided abundant
occasion to Apply the lessons he had learned from Farinelli
many years before at the University of Turin,

Nov/, finally,

it would bear fruit but not yet without more bitter struggles.
For the PCI, as much as for those to whom Churchill had directly
addressed his famous words, the war would bring "blood, tears,
toil and sweat."
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Italy*3 entrance into the war was to prove a disaster
for Fascism and for Mussolini.

Both were to become its victims

but not without causing immense suffering to the country and to
its people.

Against the advice of his generals, who pleaded

that Italy was not militarily prepared for such a foreseeably
long and exhausting war, II Puce, declaring that it was better
to live a day as a lion than a thousand years as a lamb, led
his hopelessly un-martial people into the thick while there were
prizes yet to be had.
Not only was the general civilian population, tired
of years of war discipline stemming from Ethiopia and Spain, as
apathetic and gloomy as it was over Italy’s participation before
W.W.I, but the men in arms, who were poorly equipped because of
th9 heavy draining of arms into Spain.and earlier Ethiopia, did
little better than go through the motions of combat and in the
process won a widespread reputation for military mediocrity.
Led by officers for whom they held little respect and who seemed
bettor at organizing parades than solving problems of logistics,
the Italian armies suffered humiliations and defeats right from
the beginning.

The African Empire, which Kussolini had wasted

no time in monumentalizing in the hardest Ozymandine marble with
new Roman fora and broad avenues slashing the Eternal City, was
being lost piece by piece.

The British Navy was successfully

insisting that Mare Nostrum was as much theirs as Fascist Rome’s
whose navy was substantially sunk at Taranto over this nasty
property contention.
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The effect of the accumulating disasters, especially
after Italy itself began to be bombed, was to sink civilian
morale even lower into defeatism, to give heart to the antiFascist exiles, and to stir hostility and opposition to Musso
lini within circles of the government and among top Fascists
rivalling around the dictator.

Even Victor Emmanuel III, whose

moral stature was even lass exalted than his physical one began
to stir, if for no other motive than from an abiding and utmost
concern over any threats to Savoy occupancy of the throne and
anger over the regime *s increasingly unconcerned lese majeste.
YJhlle all this internal ferment was catalyzing the
"loyal opposition" to the regime, the PCI along with other parties
of the exile opposition, was intensifying its efforts to transfer
the centre of operations to the peninsula.

This required no

little exertion in the face of new difficulties for, with the
establishment of the Vichy regime, many leading Italian
Communists in France, including Longo, were arrested and deported
to Italy where they were put in confino on an island off the
mainland coast.

'gliatti, after a brief French arrest upon

hi3 return from Spain, took up residence in Moscow until he
could return to Italy.
The party did succeed in its immediate aim which was
to send infiltrators into Italy to agitate among the population
and particularly to stir unrest among the workers of the indus
trial heartland.

These infiltrators, with great risk, managed
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to reestablish cells in crucial places such aa Fiat to try to
sabotage military production and to stimulate industrial unrest
by exploiting the brooding discontent among employees who, under
increasing air raids, became intimate protagonists of war.
Thousands of pamphlets and leaflets were distributed by the
PCI over northern Italy.

These relentless efforts were finally

capped with success.
Largely because of communist exertions, by the end
of 1942 northern industries were subjected to numerous "hiccough"
strikes which were only ostensibly economic.

Finally on March 6 ,

1943 the industrial workers of Turin, the traditional strong
hold of the PCI, "came through" and thousands of workers of
the immense Fiat works at Mirafiori {some 21,000 strong) led
other Turin factories on strike.

Thousands of Turinese women

joined their husbands and staged their own public demonstrations
calling for the regime to sue for peace now that Sicily itself
was being invaded.

Quickly, major Milanese plants were sub

jected to similar demonstrations which lasted into April.
Not only did these massive strJ.kes unsettle the already
shaken confidence-of the.regime i/hich had forbidden strikes
for twenty years since the Confindustria-Mussolini agreements
in 1923, they interrupted production and galvanized the palace
plotters against the Duce.

For the PCI the strikes affirmed

it3 leadership and control of the workers of the North who
responded to its appeals even before the regime was toppled.
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The latter was not long in coming, for, on July 25 of 1943»
i'iussolini fell from a coup d*etat, filling the streets with
demonstrations of approval.
Although the coup did not abolish the entire regime,
the new royalist government released ail anti-Fascist political
prisoners who wasted no time in assuming their activities.

One

of the first important achievements of the PCI was to win leading
control of positions in the old Fascist labour confederations
with Socialist and Catholic support and, by this, quickly obtain
an open, recognized, public position of influence and adminis
trative control within the tolerated political structure.

As

soon as the Allies invaded the mainland at Salerno, Togliatti
as well as other exile leaders were allowed to return to Italy.
The long wait had finally ended.
was at hand, but not just yet.
tion.

The hour of victory

The coup had not been a revolu

The dictatorship of Palazzo Venezia was merely transferred

to the Palazzo del Quirinale.

The nev;

^ .

rnment. under Karshall

Badoglio, was not revolutionary nor even liberal,
been taken into custody but not imprisoned.

kussolini had

Rather, he was con

fined to an eyrie on top of the highest peak in the Appenines
where he was soon rescued by Germans.

The latter, quickly

sensing the treacherous intentions of the king, soon turned
from allies into military occupiers of the country.

Badoglio*s

intentions which were first to neutralize Italyfs belligerent
status then join the Anglo-Americans after evading possible
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German retaliation vrere foiled.

The Allies were not much more

eager to cooperate with Badoglio and insisted on complete capi
tulation prior to armistice and invasion.
Finally, on September 9- a day after the Armistice
was declared, while the Allies were landing, the Italian Royal
Family and Badoglio courageously fled south abandoning Rome to
German control.

During the previous "Forty-five Days" political

formations were slowly reemerging in Naples around the venerable
and prestigious old philosopher Croce who had maintained a
"quiatist" opposition to the regime during its two decade long
existence.

The Communists took part in this but in the North

their difficulties were .just beginning.

Under Nazi patronage,

Mussolini proclaimed the formation of the puppet "Italian
Socialist Republic” based near Verona.

While the Fouth was

being liberated by the Allies, in the North an armed guerilla
partisan resistance was quickly taking form.

Although its

leadership reflected every political hue, the role of the
Communists was primary.

Mot only would its activities be

directed against the Nazi occupiers, but for two years, Italy,
or at least the North, would suffer the worst experience a
nation may sustain, Civil 'Var.
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CHAPTER

III

A noi comunisti spettera di salvarla!"

Gramsci addressing the
Special Tribunal
May, 1928
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Return to Legality
Italian democrats like to consider "la resistenza armata"
to have been one of the great periods of modern Italian history,
the culmination and fulfillment of the Rlsorgimento which had
been left "unfinished."

The moral resurgence incited by the

final, bloody combat against Fascism during the Resistance
affirmed the ideals of democratic, economic and social justice
with the same intensity with which the Risorgimento had celebra
ted the ideals of national unity and the independent liberal
state.

And these later commitments to ordain the Rights of the

Common Man were consecrated by the amplitude of the sacrifices
exacted to legitimize them.
In the vanguard of this struggle for the future of
Italy, which had enlisted thousands into its ranks, were the
Communists.

Although the Communists constituted about half the

partisan brigades they were not alone in this movement.

At

their side stood all the other anti-Fascist movements of vary
ing size and varying degrees of political radicalism.
For the PCI itself. the Resistance was a great turning
point, the start of a still continuing metamorphosis.

During

the years of the clandestine struggle the PCI had assumed a
Russo-bolshevist character which served well to protect it in

1.

Of ovor 200,000 more or less regular participants in the par
tisan movement it has been estimated that over 70,000 were
killed and 40,000 severely wounded.
Vide G. Mammarella Italy
After Fascism A Political History 1943-1963 (Montreal, 1964),
_3I
lhe iiifth Army sustained 54.000 losses in the Italian campaign.
Delzell, op. cit. p. 543
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times of weakness and adversity.

Now this chrysalis stage

was ending and out of the political cocoon of anti-Fascisia was
emerging a new imago ready to spread its red emblazoned wings
before a fascinated public which had been used for twenty years
to the colour of Black.
One of Togliattifs last important acts in Moscow
before his return to Italy in early 1944 was to help prepare
the dissolution of the Third International of which he himself
was Vice-Secretary.
On May 15s 1943 the Executive Committee passed a
resolution:
The development of events in the last quarter century has
shown that the original form of uniting the workers chosen
by the First Congress of the Communist International (in
1919) answered the conditions of the first stages of the
working class movement, but has been outdated by the growth
of the movement and by the complications of its problems
in individual countries, and has become a drag on the fur
ther strengthening of the national working class parties.
The Praesidium of the ECCI submits for the acceptance of
the sections of the Communist International:

2.

(i)

The Communist International, as directing centre of
the international working-class movement is to be
dissolved.

(il)

The sections of the Communist International are to
be freed from the obligations of the rules and regu
lations and from decisions of the Congress of the
Communist International...^

David Floyd Mao Against Khrushchev. A Fhort History of the
Sino-Soviet Conflict (New York, 1964), Part Two (Documents),
pp. 209-210
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Even if >iachiavellian motives led to the dissolution
of the Comintern^ its effect, in the case of the PCI was to
allow a great deal of room for manoeuvre.

On the other hand,

after being used for twenty-four years to the idea of an
international cosrjnunist centre, the absence of one was a now
factor to which communist parties had to adjust.
The International had been a source of legitimacy
for exiled communist parties and it had given member parties
a sense of unity and strength, a sonse of charing in the
success and prestige of the USSR in building the first socialist
society in history and a senso of furthering the cause of
"proletarian internationalism" by remaining loyal to the
cradle of the revolution,

flow, parties v/ould not be obliged

formally to follow tho policies of si Central Committee In
Moscow despite the habit of doing so for almost a quarter of
a century.

3.

Togliatti was aware of the importance of this

See Leopold Labedz "The End of an Ipoch" Survey £54»
(January, 1965 ) p. 7
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new situation.^

He was especially attuned to the exigencies

of political conditions in Italy in the context of the general
European situation and with regard to the post war aims of
both the USSR and the Anglo-Americans*

When in March, 1944

Togliatti returned to Italy to assume the leadership of the
PCI he held no illusions about the limits of his immediate
powers*
His prominent position in the International had
afforded him a vantage point to observe the political objectives
which motivated the military operations of both sides of the
Allied effort.

If, by mutual understanding, the USSR would be

permitted to exercise its influence in East Europe it was clear

4. "During the discussions (on the commission charged with dis
solving the International) Togliatti posed for the first
time the issue of collaboration among communist and worker’s
parties after the victory over Fascism, in the absence of
a Communist International.
Few know that the ideas under
stood subsequently by the nominative "polycentrism" were
born at that time, from the reflections which Togliatti
made in those days while the International was being nulli
fied. Even then he was wont to draw attention to the
importance of bilateral, multilateral and, even more,
regional collaboration. Even then he used to underline
the importance of collaboration among parties which were
operating and struggling in analogous conditions.*1
Veljko Vlahovic "A Mosca nel 1943:
Prima formulaaione del
policentrismo" II Contemporaneo/Rlnascita (Rome), XXIX.
No. 34»(August 2tT,
) P* 12. Even if this recollection
was made after "polycentrism" became common currency in the
communist movement there is no reason to assume that Togliatti
did not hold such ideas in 1943 and helps to understand
postwar tactics of the PCI.
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that Western Europe was to remain under Anglo-American influence.
The Mediterranean zone in turn was of particularly British
interest for it was the strategic anteroom to the Suez canal
and the Empire in Asia and East Africa,

Italy clearly fell

into this latter zone, as did Greece, and in neither area
could the Red army guarantee, as in East Europe, the success of
communist control of government even if in the case of both
countries this accession to power was more than just a remote
possibility.

'When Togliatti landed in Naples the solution of

the "institutional problem" concerning the form of government
for liberated Southern Italy was already largely decided by
the British (i.e. Churchill).
Churchill, who was well aware of the potential power
of the Left in Italy, was adamant in his support of the dis
credited King and Badoglio whom the Allies had installed in a
minuscule "Kingdom of the South” at Brindisi.

The British Prime

Minister, who prevailed over his American colleagues in
Italian matters, resolutely backed Victor Emmanuel in resisting
the bids for power of the anti-Fascist leaders on the Committees
of National Liberation (CLN) who had loudly demanded his abdi
cation at a CLN Congress in Bari.

In the face of this refusal

by the tenacious Savoyard, the leaders of the various parties
refused to serve in 3Badoglio,s government.

Thus the political

situation in Liberated Italy in early 1944 was in total paralysis.
The break in this political deadlock came from the least expected
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source*

Two weeks prior to Togliatti*s return, the USSR

announced formal recognition of the Dadoglio government, catching
the Anglo-Americans by surprise and thoroughly confusing the
CLN parties.
Clearly, such an action 'was not motivated by sympathy
for the royal government.

The Soviet recognition foretold the

attitude which would be adopted by the PCI upon the return of
its leader.

On March 2£> the Italian Communist Party secretary

carried out what has been known as the "svolta di Salerno" or
the turnabout at Salerno.5

Togliatti declared that for the

moment the question of the monarchy was of secondary importance.
The primary task facing free Italy was to create a united and
representative National Front to prosecute the war against the
Nazis and the quisling Fascist Republic still in control of
more than half of the peninsula.

Until the war was over, there

fore, the PCI would be willing to enter the King’s government
and to postpone institutional questions for the time being since
it was all too clear that the Allies were not yet prepared to
dispose of the compromised royal government.
Both the Soviet diplomatic recognition of the Badoglio
government and the "svolta di Salerno" were evidence that
neither the USSR nor the PCI nourished the illusion that a

5.

After the Allies achieved general control of Southern Italy,
the seat of the Royal Government was moved from Brindisi to
Salerno.
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revolutionary communist assumption of power in Italy was
imminent.

At this stage PCI tactics were dictated primarily

by the realities of the situation rather than purely theoretical
considerations and the ,fsvolta” was in communist terms the most
favourable extrapolation of a difficult political problem.

The

"svolta" became in effect the first step made along the "Italian
Road to Socialism" which the PCI would travel for the next two
decades under the navigation of Togliatti.^
This first step could hardly have been more auspicious
for the party.

In a stroke it promoted itself into the fore

ground of the political stage and demonstrated to the other
Italian parties the quality of the political leadership with
which they would have to rockon.

The PCI immediately became

one of the principal elements in the nov/ government formula.
The other parties, perched firmly and stubbornly on their plat
form of non-participation, found their position cut off from

6.

"Unlike the Bourbons— of whom it was said when they returned
to France in 1814 that they had learned nothing and forgot
ten nothing— Togliatti had learned much and managed to
forget what might be embarrassing in the future. From
Gramscl and the Ordine Muovo experience of 1920-1922 he
had derived the lesson that revolutions are determined by
the balance of social forces and not by violent words.
From the long struggle against Fascism he had learned the
danger of isolation from the other left wing parties; and
from Spain, the potent force of nationalism and the possi
bilities of multi-class anti-Fascist government which
would call itself democratic and not Socialist."
Robert Wohi "Togliatti, Master of Manoeuvre" Communist
Affairs, Vol. 1, Mo. 9, {Mov,-Dec. 1963/, p. 24
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behind and were quickly constrained to come to a temporary
compromise on the issue of the monarchy.

This flexibility by

the PCX was to remain one of its most important instruments
in promoting its own cause.

V/oll aware that the British, with

Vatican concurrence, were promoting a conservative, preferably
royal government in the liberated touth, the constant policy of
the PCX was to maintain its presence in various cabinets and
in government generally.

V/hile this collaborationist attitude

appears cynical and hypocritical it was prudent.

The British

on their part had not hesitated in vetoing participation in
the government of an outspoken Republican, Carlo Sforza, who
was unacceptable to them, but whom the CLN had wished to make
Foreign Minister.
Wot to have collaborated would have meant abandoning
the field to the spokesmen of conservatism; notably to the
Christian Democrats and, to their right, the Liberals.

In the

pasc these parties had adopted an equivocal attitude towards
Fascism and had not had any scruples about entering the first
Mussolini ministry.

In the South, moreover, the forces of con

servatism had an initial advantage over the Left since the
Anglo-Americans were clearly on the side of the conservatives.
In the war-torn Worth, however, the Left was deeply
engaged in carrying on with the Resistance.

Its military

efforts were by no moans negligible; but the Resistance also
symbolised a radical, reform-minded and, at its extreme, outright
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revolutionary, political-social movement in which the pre
vailing vision of future Italian society was decidedly
socialistic.

At its maximum strength in the latter part of

1944 and early 1945 the partisans succeeded actually in routing
the German armies out of a number of Alpine valleys long before
Allied armies arrived.
In the liberated areas tiny "republics" were created
and the sweeping reforms inaugurated In them Illustrated the
general orientation partisans expected Italian society to take
after the war.

The headquarters for Northern Resistance was

in Hilan where the CLNAI (Comitato della liberations nazionale
per l*alta Italia —
Italy) was centered.

Committee of National Liberation for Upper
One of the most outstanding of the leaders

of this most radical of the Liberation Committees was Luigi
Longo.

Thus, aside from whatever military value the northern

partisan movement possessed, its political extremism and Red
sympathy was not ingratiating to the Allies, who feared another
Tito-type movement in Northern Italy.

Until the Normandy front

was opened on June 6, 1944> causing several Allied divisions to
be removed from Italy to France, the Resistance did not receive
extraordinary support from the Allied Military Command.

Toward

the final days of the war in Italy the partisans nevertheless
succeeded in liberating on their own virtually every important
northern city:

Bologna, Venice, Genoa, Milan and Turin, winning

in the process of leading the insurrections an immense moral
prestige with the population.
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The symbolic end of this long and painful purifica
tion by fire which reduced Italian Fascism to ashes was the
exposure of the suspended corpse of its champion to the vengeful
abuses of Milanese victims of past Fascist terror.

”11 vento del nord”
At the end of hostilities in Italy domestic politics
were characterized by a resuscitation of pre-Fascist parties
which represented basically two opposing viewpoints about the
manner in which post-v/ar Italian political life should be
organized:

the old Right, symbolized in Croce, wanted to

revive the orthodox pre-Fascist liberal state and, taking a
lesson from the past, to start again along the old lines while
avoiding the errors which led to Fascism; the Left, symbolized
by the Resistance and especially by the revived revolutionary
parties, sought to lay entirely new political and economic
foundations upon which postwar Italy would be built.

It did

not 'want merely to rebuild upon the old foundations buried under
the debris of Fascism,
For two years from the time of MussoliniTs fall to
the end of hostilities two differing ideals concerning the
future of Italy rivalled each other.

In the North the partisans

fought for the sake of one ideal whilo in the South the conser-
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vatives, under Allied aegis, began applying their concepts
about the governing of Italy.

Thus, by the end of the actual

fighting, the two halves of Italy had undergone profoundly
different experiences.

Ordinary Italians in both areas became

even more isolated from each other by these experiences.
In the South the passive, apolitical peasantry, little
changed from the way Gramsci described them, strove desperately
to make ends meet under wartime conditions but they experienced
little of the viciousness of the partisan vs. Fascist blood
letting.

In the North the peasantry became intimately involved

in the civil strife.

While the South was being governed oy the

spiritless king and the conservative minded Allies, neither of
whom were immediately concerned with changing the status quo,
the North was being governed by the Leftward-looking CLNAI
which lost no time in making changes in the existing order.
In areas liberated by the partisans, industrial workers, for
example, were encouraged to group themselves into consigli di
gestione or management councils to run the factories.

This was

an indication of Communist influence in the CLNAI (and the unions)
and revealed a durable commitment to Gramsci*s early ideas of
the Ordine Nuovo period.

V/herever the partisans gained control,

government was purged of its Fascist bureaucracy and local
offices were filled by CLN appointees.
VJhen finally the military role of the CLNAI was
finished and its leaders could concentrate more fully on the
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political consequences of the armed Resistance they had just
finished leading, their attention was directed toward the con
servative government in Rome about which they scarcely concealed
their hostility.

Considering the politicians of the South to

be stale and timid old men not fully committed to the idea of
renewing the Italian political, economic and social structure
and to have begun this renewal only half-heartedly the CLNAI
declared that it would direct the ’'wind of the north” toward
Rome to clear the air of the putrid atmosphere of compromise
and end the hesitancy about reform.
The militancy of the CLMAI leadership, which was
underlined by sporadic acts of violence against wealthy Fascist
sympathizers by extremist squads of still-armed ex-partisans,
caused panic among propertied upper and middle classes who had
not fared badly under the orderly regime of Mussolini,

For a

period these classes lived in real fear of a revolution in which
their privileges and possessions would be swept away.

The

brigades of hardened partisans were still armed in early 1945
and among the communist-dominated brigades a real effort was
made to retain these weapons despite Allied requests to surren
der them.

Thus it was that the threat of revolution appeared

to the frightened upper and middle classes to be most seriously
posed by the Communists and fellow travelling Socialists (and
to a lesser degree by the other partisans led by the Action
Party).

This fear, la grande paura, lasted for the duration of
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1945, a year in which revolution in Italy seemed not only
possible but very probable.
Yet the expected did not take place.

The principal

reason for this was the policy adopted by the PCI itself under
Togliatti*s leadership.

Upon his return to Italy, Togliatti

stated to his followers that for the PCI the days of clandes
tine conspiracy were ended.

Without alluding to theoretical

motivations he declared to the PCI National Council in April
1944 that:

"We are no longer a sect of agitators but have
7
assumed the responsibility of a great party.”
Responsibility
did not suggest inciting revolution as a means of gaining power.
The PCI did not discard its aspirations to power but in pursu
ing them the party was to choose different tactics.

In judging

its chances for success the PCI was to play its hand carefully,
always keeping in mind the final stakes of the game in order
to forego the temptation of quick, easy and temporary gains.
The party was not weak:

after sustaining twenty years

of Fascist violence against it, it was, in terms of organisa
tion, stronger than any of the other Italian parties; it had
won an immense prestige during the Resistance and it had demon
strated the real support it possessed among the industrial
workers of the North who had overwhelmingly accepted its leader
ship in staging the great strikes of 1943.

7.

Nevertheless,

Fulvio Bellini "The Italian CP: The Transformation of a
Party 1921-1945” Problems of Communism, Vol. V, No. 1,
(Jan.-Feb. 1956), p. 42
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certain facts remained to be taken into account.

These facts

ruled out revolution regardless of impatient militancy
especially among ex-partisans who feared a restoration of the
old order.

Revolution in occupied Italy was quite simply out

of the question.

Such an adventure would never be tolerated

by the Anglo-Americans even if its success were possible.
Soviet military power could not guarantee the success of any
revolutionary insurrection in Italy and the civil war in Greece
provided sobering evidence to Italian Communists of the futility
of going it alone.
Even if Communism had successfully been replanted in
fertile Italian soil, in 1944 it was still a relatively weak
plant.

The prestige of Soviet solidarity and support for the

resurgent PCI was necessary until it could bore its roots
deeply enough into the political loam of postwar Italy to be
able to sustain its own growth and development.

With revolution

ruled out, therefore, the PCI pursued two goals which in differ
ent manner it still pursues today:

one was to achieve a "unity

of action" with Italian Socialists; the other was to arrive
at a working understanding with the mass-based Catholic party
to persuade it to govern Italy i.i concert with the other two
"mass parties," the Communist and Socialist.
While a Catholic confessional party would seem to be
an unlikely candidate to enter a government coalition with
Social-Communists, it was not an entirely inconceivable arrange-
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Kent especially* in the eyes of Communists.

The Democrazia

Crlstlana was an extremely heterogeneous political alliance of
disparate elements united by little more than a common Catho
licism which was exploited effectively by the party to win the
allegiance of the church-going masses.

There was reason to

believe that a greater identity of views concerning economic
and social reform could be found between the anti-clerical
Left and populist Left-wing Catholics than between the latter
and the reactionary Right in the DC party.

Taking the long-

range view the PCI leadership concluded that the forces to be
reckoned with in future Italian society would be three:
lic. Communist and Socialist.

If these forces could be brought

to cooperate in shaping public policy
experience progressive reforms.

Catho

Italy could rapidly

Hence, PCI policy was directed

toward achieving this long-range goal.
As for the Action Party, Togliatti correctly concluded
that despite its appeal to democratic-minded professionals and
intellectuals, it lacked fundamental mass support.

The Action

Party was a great hope and a great disappointment to radicalminded Italians.

Ferruccio Parri, the former Actionist head

of the CLNAI and Prime minister for some five months in 1945,
tried to bring about the changes in political orientation
implicit in the phrase Mil vento del Nord.”

This included among

other projects, for example, breaking up the powerful monopolies
which had thrived under Fascism, instituting new taxation plans,

UNIVERSITY OF WINDSOR UBMRY
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land reform, controlling distribution of scarce raw materials
to favour small and medium concerns, and hastening the establish
ment of a republic, all of vrhich aroused implacable hostility
from the privileged conservative classes and their political
parties.
On the other hand, the desperate economic misery
among the general Italian public caused massive demonstrations
by the unemployed and landless who often had been part of the
Resistance and who demanded relief from their economic plight.
Unwilling to repress the latter and unable to carry out pro
jected plans against the former, Parri was caught in a bind.
The impasse was abruptly terminated when the conservative
Liberals and Christian Democrats pulled out of the radical
Parri government whose programme the latter felt was too
closely aligned with that of the extreme Left.

Before giving

up his office, however, Parri took the occasion to denounce
before the public "the fifth column inside his government (i.e.
Christian Democrats and Liberals) which after having systemati
cally undermined his position, was now preparing to restore to
power those political and social forces that had formed the
basis of the Fascist regime."^
The fall of the Parri government signified not simply

8.

Mammarella, op. cit. p. 104
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the failure of the Action Party to

i

tfill its potential as an

important moderating influence in Italian politics, to become
a bridge between the clerical Right and Marxist Left; it meant
the end of the period when the militant reformist idealism of
the Resistance motivated the leaders of subsequent post-war
Italian governments.

Parri*s fall did succeed in illustrating

to extreme ex-partisan Communists the prudence of Togliatti*s
moderation.

Seeking above all to maintain Communist partici

pation in government, Togliatti urged caution in order not to
alienate the middle-classes and their parties.

An open clash

with the already hostile bourgeoisie was to be avoided.

The

moment was not opportune for the kind of extremism which would
frighten off potential allies.

Thus, the party was not upset

when Christian Democrat Alcide de Gasperi was called upon to
form his first government since it v/as to be basically a tri
partite government of Christian Democrats, Socialists and
Communists.

The PCI ambition to share influence and control In

shaping and applying public policy would not be frustrated in
such an arrangement.

It was the occasion to carry out the

responsibilities of a "great, national party."
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Premises and Postulates
In September 1917, almost on the eve of the Bolshevik
Revolution, Lenin warned in State and Revolution that "it is
obvious that the liberation of the oppressed class is impossible
not only without a violent revolution, but also without the
destruction of the apparatus of state power which was created
by the ruling class."9

as

Marxist-Leninists, Italian Communists

were well acquainted with this classic text.

One of its chief

aims was to defend Bolshevik revolutionary tactics while
attacking the "revisionism” of certain Marxists, particularly
some leaders of the German iiocial-Democratic party, who were
urging the adoption of gradualist, non-violent tactics to create
Socialism by utilizing existing bourgeois institutions,
especially parliaments and trade unions.
It might appear that, in 1946, the PCI by following
a policy of collaboration with bourgeois parties which had
revealed their hostility to change by toppling Parri*s reformminded ministry, was moving away from Lenin and actually
moving towards Eduard Bei-nstein.

This was not the case and

certainly the idea would have been ridiculed by Communist and
non-Communist alike.

True, the PCI was not about to launch a

violent revolution and the reasons have already been stated.

9.

Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 25 (London: 1964), p. 368
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Italy, 1946, simply was not Russia, 1917.

This did not mean,

however, that violent revolution as such was being permanently
rejected:

it had its validity under certain conditions.

Those conditions, principally a sure chance of success, x*ere
at the time lacking in Italy,

To have tried and to have failed

was felt to be more dangerous and potentially disastrous to
the cause than not to try at all.

There was, moreover, subtler

reasoning behind PCI policies.
In 1946 the PCI had cause to be optimistic about its
chances of gaining power for "the destruction of the apparatus
of state power which was created by the ruling class" had
largely occurred in Italy as a result of the x*rar.
The Italian military

capitulation, the collapse of

the national government and the internecine war of the Resis
tance were the substantial equivalent of the "violent revolu
tion."

Of course, the particulars of the Italian debacle were

somewhat unusual and it cannot be said that the Allied invasion
caused everything that was to be swept away before it.

In

being allowed to "earn its passage" back into the good graces
of the victorious allies, Italy was permitted to carry on with
something like limited self-rule while the war-front was pushed
up the peninsula.

But the only instruments of government

tolerated by the Allies were the leftovers from the previous
state apparatus;

the king, his ministers and the bureaucracy

and, as has been pointed out, this ’was not a regime which was
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about to ’'utterly destroy the bourgeois state,"

Nevertheless,

by the time the fighting ended and the smoke had cleared away
it was unmistakable that the old order in Italy had emerged from
the ordeal in a tottering condition and could not survive intact.
In the wake of './orId Y/ar II, the Italian political
situation v/as one i^hich Gramsci would have described as an
"organic crisis" of the State.

The unity of dominio and dire-

zione, the prerequisite condition for any ruling group to
exex'cise power, had been ruptured:

nor was populai’ consent to

be governed under the status quo forthcoming either spontaneously
or by coercion.

Much like the situation after World War I, the

balance of forces for change versus the forces of reaction were
even.

It would require little added to either side to upset

the delicate equilibrium.

In prison, Gramsci had theorized

upon this:
...a crisis of hegemony of the ruling class...comes about
either because the ruling class has failed in some big
political undertaking for which it asked, or imposed by
force, the consent of the broad masses (like war), or
because vast masses (especially ox peasants and petty
bourgeois intellectuals) have passed suddenly from poli
tical passivity to a corbain activity and put forward
aims which in their disorganic complex constitute a
revolution.
One speaks of a "crisis of authority” and
this in fact is the crisis of hegemony, or crisis of the
State in all spheres.
The crisis creates immediately dangerous situations,
because the different s t r a t a ^ f the population do not
possess the same capacity for rapid reorientation or for
reorganizing themselves with the same rhythm. The tradi
tional ruling class which had a numerous trained personnel,
changes men and programmes and reabsorbs the control which
was escaping it with a greater speed than occurs in the
subordinate classes; it makes sacrifices, exposes itself
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to an uncertain power, strengthens it for the moment and
makes use of it in order to crush its opponent and dis
pose its leading personnel which cannot be very numerous
or well-trained,1^
Thus it happened in specific historical instances,
such as after world tfar I in Italy, that the ruling group(s)
could not make the changes quickly or well enough to maintain
power in its own hands, i.e., in the hands of its traditional
political parties and/or spokesmen.

Seeing the handwriting

on the wall, it therefore places its confidence (and its
interests) in the hands of a single leader.

The Leader, heading

a party with a heterogeneous social base, succeeds in convinc
ing a whole range of social classes of diverse or even opposed
interests that he possesses the theoretical and practical solu
tion of likely disastrous social, political and economic rival
ries.

Mussolini, in his ideology Fascism, claimed to have solved

the problem of the class struggle with the concept of the
"corporate state":
V/hen thg crisis does not find.. , / t he7«,.organic solution,
but.../finds/...the solution of a divine leader, it means
that there exists a static equilibrium (whose factors may
be unequal, but in which the immaturity of the progressive
forces is decisive); that no group either conservative or
progressive had the force for victory and that even the
conservative group needs a master,11

10.

Gramsci "The Modern Prince" In Socialist Thought: A Docu 
mentary History, A. Fried and R , Sanders Eds. (Chicago 71^64),
pp. 521-p22

11.

Gramsci, ibid. p. 522
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After World. War I I , resorting to the solution of the
Leader, il Puce, was out of the question:

not only were the

conservative leaders not prepared to capitulate again, but
Italy was now reaping the harvest of having chosen this solu
tion twenty years earlier.
Thus, in arriving at its postwar policy decisions,
the Italian Communist Party v/eighed not only the practicality
of the available choices on the basis of a gauge known as
possibilismo:

it did have a theoretical framework from which

concrete policies could be deduced and justified.

Such con

clusions, moreover, were not based upon irrelevant theoretical
fabrications.

They were based upon the cogitations of a first

class mind which was contemplating a situation with which it
was intimately familiar.

Gramsci*s Marxism was not revisionism:

in its emphasis on the voluntaristic side of Marxist philosophy,
that is, in not insisting upon the rigidly supine relationship
of politics to economics, Gramsci and Lenin shared a similar
view.

That Grarusci,s thought was an Italian variant of Marxism-

Leninism was a source of encouragement and legitimation for
the PCI to pursue the policies it laid out for itself, because
for Gramsci:
Politics will always have a philosophical dimension, and
revolution will always include cultural creativeness.
In
plainer terms, the simplification of revolutionary action
by (or at least since Lenin), to the stretegy and tactics
of a minority intent on seizing power is a dangerous
approach to the vast work of liberation which must begin
\\rith a revolution of ideas, progress through the adoption
of a new morality by the masses, and culminate in the
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social hegemony of that new ethic.***2
If, therefore, the PCI was to make a truly enduring
impression on Italian society it must seek to make its ideals
permeate the social and economic, intellectual and cultural
institutions of this society so deeply that the presence of
its ideology, throughout the social fabric became almost pal
pable.

Only in this way could the ultimate hegemony be realized

within "civil society," and, consequent to this, be reflected
in its political institutions.

And, to follow this method meant

not to misunderstand the real meaning of revolution:

revolution

is not a panacean coup d fetat, a "thaumaturgical act" as Gramsci
would say, in which the degree of success is confused with the
amount of violence.

Violence per se is a chimera.

It has

value if it brings about the changes desired but there is no
reason to prefer it to less painful but equally effective means.
There should above all be no prejudice against participating in
parliament.
It was true that, in the shadow of an impending up
heaval in Russia, Lenin could excoriate "revisionists" and
"renegades" who would hold back from demolishing a bourgeois

12.

"Hegemony" is a key word in Gramsci, implying opposition
to "dictatorship" in the sense that cultural predominance
can be distinguished from political power. When they
coincide, that is revolution. 121aJ

12(a) Meil Mclnnes "Antonio Gramsci" Survey, Ho.
p. 11 and p. 11 footnote

53,
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state by revolution on the grounds that it was necessary to
wait until Capitalism matured mechanically and collapsed under
the weight of its own insoluble economic, social and political
contradictions.
how long?

In Russia, this would have taken who knows

Furthermore, the possibility of realizing structural

reforms within a Russia of which Gramsci had written that "the
State is everything and civil society nothing” was not encour
aging.

Russia lacked the well-rooted, tested public institutions

and organizations through which formal political action, antag
onistic to the existing State power structure, could legitimately
be articulated and projected.
Russia was not an England or a Germany equipped with
highly developed legislative bodies; an all-powerful Parliament,
control of which was theoretically accessible to a mass-based
working-class party; a system of regional self-legislating
Lander whose measure of political autonomy was a countervailing
force to the central authority; widespread suffrage, giving
such bodies a relevance to organized Labour and Social Democra
tic parties; large, militant and powerful trade union movements
to win steady concessions from the Capitalist owners of industry:
all these things in centralized, bureaucratic Russia remained
in what Gramsci had called a "gelatinous stage."

Lenin could

not be impressed by the transform!st promises of parliament
as constituted:
Take any parliamentary country, from America to Switzer
land from France to Britain, Norway and so forth— in these
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countries the real business of "state" is performed behind
the scenes and is carried on by the departments) chancel
lories and General Staff. Parliament is given up to talk
for the special purpose of fooling the "common people.”
This is so true that even in the Russian republic, a bour
geois democratic republic, all these signs of parliamentarism
came out at once, even before it managed to set up a real
parliament.13
But, stated Lenin:
The way out of parliamentarism is not, of course, the
abolition of representative institutions and the elective
principle but the conversion of the representative insti
tutions from talking shops into working bodies, *
The "working bodies" were the Soviets.

However, the

existing Russian republic was nothing but the oppressive ruling
apparatus of the bourgeois classes.

It could not be transformed

"legally" from within itself, and, therefore there was not any
alternative but to attack and smash it "illegally" from without.
Having done this the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie would be
replaced by the "dictatorship of the proletariat" organised in
the system of Soviets.

In State and Revolution such was Lenin*s

conviction that he insisted that:
A Marxist is solely someone who extends the recognition of
the class struggle to the recognition of the dictatorship
of the proletariat.15
Lenin did not finish State and Revolution.
he went from v/rit±ng about revolution to leading one.

13.

State and Revolution, p . 74

14.

Ibid.

15.

Ibid.
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three years later, on the eve of the Second Congress of Comin
tern, be returned to the subject of proper revolutionary tactics:
on t h o c c a s i o n ,

however, he directed all his polemical skill

against certain leaders of '.Vest European Socialist parties who
had adopted extreme revolutionary postures in emulation of what
they understood to be the characteristic attitude which brought
triumph to thejr Bolshevik comrades:
In "Left Y/ing" Communism. An Infantile Disorder
Lenin directed some of his words specifically to the extremist
Italian socialist leaders to consider:
...Comrade Bordiga and his "Left" friends draw from their
correct criticism of ilessrs. Turati and Co. the wrong con
clusion that participation in parliament is harmful in
general.,.They simply cannot conceive of a "new" method of
utilizing parliament...
The childishness of those who "repudiate" participation in
parliament consists precisely in the fact that they think
it possible to "solve" the difficult problem of combatting
bourgeois democratic influences within the working class
movement by such a "simple" "easy," supposedly revolution
ary method, when in reality they are only running away
from their own shadow..
While admitting that a bourgeois institution such as
parliament can embourgeo?s working-class participants, Lenin
warned that even successful Communist parties such as his own
v/ould be "invaded by a still larger number of bourgeois intel
lectuals."

16.

And since Communism could not be built without the

Lenin, "Left Wing" Communism, An Infantile Disorder.
{Moscow, 1947)1 P* lid, 119
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!faid of the human materiel created by capitalism" this human
materiel,

(particularly the intellectuals) must be "vanquished,

remolded, assimilated and re-educated," just as it would be
"necessary to reeducate the proletarians themselves."

This

would not be an easy think to do but sooner or later it must
be done.

Such problems could not be ignored as trifling, to

be brushed aside with an easy wave of the hand.

Communists

by no means must consider themselves to be above this task,
immune and uncontaminated by bourgeois parliamentarianism,
to consider themselves somehow "pure" in their utter dedication
to the proletarian revolution:
You think, my dear boycottists and anti-parliamentarians
that you are "terribly revolutionary" but in reality you
are frightened by the comparatively small difficulties
of the struggles against bourgeois influences within the
working-class movement... Like children you are frightened
by a small difficulty vfhich confronts you today, not under
standing that tomrrow and the day after you will anyhow have
to learn, and learn throughly, to overcome thensame diffi
culties only on an immeasurably greater scale. 1
The immediate

audience to which Lenin directed State

and Revolution one month before the October Revolution was not
the same audience he had foremost in mind when, one month before
the Second Comintern Congress, he wrote Left Wing Communism.
In the latter work he made it clear to a ivorld wide audience,
parts of which he named specifically, that this was a work to
which they must pay close attention.

17.

It was this Leninism of

op.cit.p. 120
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Left-Wing Communism which contained elements close to Gramsci’s
own thinking and it was this Leninism which had most validity
for the PCI in the situation in which it operated after World
War II,
It would do irjustice to Lenin, Togliatti wrote in
Rinascita. the PCI weekly:
to retain his direction and guidance applicable to the
tzarist or Kerensky regime and use it in present da.y
situations of the advance capitalist countries or newly
liberated nations. s
To be sure Italian Communists considered themselves
to be Leninists but this was not to say that the Russian P.evolutionary had said everything that was to be said on every
problem to be faced by Communists f oreverinore.

To believe

this would be a false kind of loyalty and was certainly not
Marxism.

From Gramsci, Italian Communists inherited an

essential lesson that Marxism, ,rthe philosophy of praxis,"
rather than being an already codified body of canonical dogma,
was instead a creative method of dialectical analysis.

It was

a theoretical instrument by which complex social-political-

18.

Quoted by E. Demaitre "Italian Communism., Debate and
Dilemma" Communist Affairs, Vol. Ill, No. 4, (Aug. 11,
1965), p.'“5
From this statement Demaitre draws the conclusion that
"the destruction of the bourgeois-capitalist state and
the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat
wore no longer indispensible for attaining the goals to
which ’the Italian road to socialism’ was expected to
lead."18(a)

lo(a) Ibid.
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economic realities could be .reduced to their basic factors,
be studied in their particulars, be understood in their chang
ing relationships and be re-synthesized into their macrocosmic
pattern.

Thus it was not only possible but foreseeable that

any given situation ’
would change enough in time to warrant neiy
relationships for previously discerned factors as they
acquired differing relative importance to each other and there
fore required that different emphasis be placed on them.
Ho one had demonstrated the truth of this better
than the last survivor of the duumvirs of pristine Marxism,
Engels,

Engels lived almost into the twentieth century, sur

viving Marx who died in 1383 by twelve years.

Much had taken

place since the two men collaborated in writing the Manifesto
almost half a century earlier.

In March 1895 Engels wrote a

preface to Marx*s Class Struggles in France 1843-1850.

Since

he died within a few months of its v/riting. the preface has
sometimes been considered to be Engels* "political testament."
It is an important document containing a number of striking
statements.

It reveals Engels* unsubdued ability to analyze

Incisively the actual political scene to the extent of realizing
how much changed conditions had opened up new horizons for the
political advancement of the working class and led him to admit
honestly that some earlier conclusions about the revolution
had to be reevaluated.
According to their original analyses, revolution had
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always boon tho work of a minority, wrote Engels, "tho ruled
majority either participated in tho revolution for tho benefit
of tho f o m o r or Glee calmly acquiesced in it.":
but history#..has coiaplotely transformed the conditions
under which tho proletariat lias to fight. Tho mode of
struggle of lb4£ is today obsolete in every respect and
this is a point which deserves close examination on tho
present occasion, y
Tho factor which had undergone such a profound trans
formation was tho question of the utility of universal suffrage
to worker parties.

The power of the franchise had long been

underestimated by Marxist political leaders.

Suffrage was

a "snaro" an "instrument of government trickery."

As consti

tuted . bourgeois parliament t: wora polito charades where tho
hypocritical bourgeoisie engaged in games of "parliamentary
skittles."

It was common knowledge that the roal lovers e m 

power lay elsewhere.

Lenin was particularly vehement in

denouncing the "venal," "rotten," "disgusting" "pigsty" of
"bourgeois parliamentarianism" and, according to hja own
exportonco, those words v;ero not too strong.
In Germany, wrote Engels in 1692 •

It was othorwiso

After bisr.mrk*s anti-

:ocialist laws were repealed and the Gorman GPD could openly
resume its political activities and rocap tho votes of tho
huge German proletariat, it
...used the franchise in a way which had paid thoiv. a
thousandfold and lias served as a model to the workers
of all countries. Tho franchise had boon...transformed
by them from a moans of docoption v/nich it was before,
into an instrument of emancipation
.../thus7.••
19.

Marx and Engels Selected Works. Vol. 1 (Moscow, 1962) p. 123
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With this successful utilization of universal suffrage...
an entirely new method of proletarian struggle came into
operation, and this method quickly developed further. It
was found that the state institutions, in which the rule
of the bourgeoisie is organized, offer the working class
still further opportunities to fight these very state
institutions.
The workers took part in e l e c t i ons.( a n d )
so it happened that the bourgeoisie and the government
came to be much more afraid of the legal than of the
illegal action of the worker*s party, of the results of
elections than of those of rebellion.20
Rebellion itself "in the old style" had become to a
great extent "obsolete."

It had become painfully clear in

worker insurrections all over Europe that raising the barricades
was a brave but futile act.

The spontaneity and determination

of angry proletarians was still no match against well-equipped,
highly trained and disciplined troops who obeyed orders to
fire on the insurgents.

The weapons of military suppression

were being more and more refined:
even the newly-built quarters of the big cities have been
laid out in long, straight, broad streets, as though made
to give full effect to the new cannon and rifles. The
revolutionist would have to be mad who himself chose the
new working class districts in,the North and East of
Berlin for a
barricade fight.
Still, the "right

to

revolution"

asthe only "really

historical right"

could not be

denied, and

resorting to rebel

lion could not in

principle be

cast aside if,in a given

situation, the chances of success were clearly favourable.

20.

op. cit., p. 129

21.

op. cit., p. 133
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The experience of the Paris Codamine of 1870, however, had shorn
how appallingly dreadful a condition a proletarian insurrection
could be driven into by a superior military force.

By 1895,

few workers could remember, much less have participated in, a
raising of the barricades in the streets.

No, even in nthe

Latin countries" more and more was it being realized that "the
old tactics must be revised."

Nov/ that the capitalist bour

geoisie had armed its guards to the teeth and perfected its
methods of suppression the latter could only hope the prole
tariat would mechanically resort to the old methods of insur
rection so that it would be crushed in the streets.

But, "to

shoot a party which numbers millions out of existence is too
much even for all the magazine rifles of Europe and America.”
Engels at seventy-five, looking back on his ovm lifespan,
could well write:
The irony of world history turns everything upside down.
VJe, the "revolutionists," the "overthrowers”— we are
thriving far better on legal methods than on illegal
methods and overthrow. The parties of Order, as they
call themselves, are perishing under the legal conditions
created by themselves. They cry despairingly with Odilon
Barrot: la legalite nous tue. legality is the death of
us; whereas we, under this legality, get firm muscles and
rosy cheeks and look like life eternal. And if we are
not so crazy as to let ourselves be driven to street
fighting in order to please them, then in the end there
is nothing left for them to do but themselves break through
this fatal legality,22
To break "this fatal legality"

was not

as simple as

it might seem, for to do so would negate the very "logic" of tho

22.

op. cit.. p. 136

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

117

liberal-bourgeois-capitalist state.

It would be a step back

wards for the bourgeoisie as much as for the proletariat.

The

liberal state, in dialectical terras, was the superstructural
reflection of its economic base, Capitalism.

Manufacturing,

with its greater efficiency and increased productivity had
come to supplant the economic basis of feudalism which rested
upon land ownership for agricultural exploitation and on a
static system of limited guild production which was not res
ponsive to the market.
But, although the economic foundation had radically
changed, the political order did not respond to the needs of
the new economic system.

The capitalist market economy could

not function efficiently, much less expand, if it was required
to obey the laws, pay the taxes and tariffs and use the out
dated state services created for the benefit of the politically
entrenched feudal nobility.

The hierarchical autocracy charac

teristic of feudalism would not do:

government had to be made

to respond to the needs of the new economic order.

It must be

open to the influence and control of the new economic Establish
ment, the bourgeoisie, -which had become the richest, most
dynamic and most ambitious part of the population.

To promote

its own interests the capitalist bourgeoisie, socially still
part of the "Commons," had to wrench certain freedoms or rights
from the "First and Second Estates."

It demanded to be

represented in the legislating organs of the state which must
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be made subject to periodic elections.

It must be granted cer

tain rights so that its participation in the parliaments could
be facilitated; be free to organize groups to put pressure on
government; have the rights of free speech and free press to
fortify the complimentary right of assembly and make it mean
ingful :
These freedoms could not very well be limited to the men
of the directing class.
They had to be demanded in prin
ciple for everybody. The risk that the others would use
them to get a political voice was a risk that had to be
taken.^3
If the MThird Estate" should be granted these new
liberties because all men deserved them, although at the time
the demands were made only a part of the "Third Estate" really
needed them, this could lead to consequences the bourgoisie was
unprepared to tolerate.

Universal rights could not "logically"

be restricted to a limited class otherwise there was no reason
for even the bourgeoisie to have them anymore than anyone else.
Such was the "fatal legality" which Odilon Barrot decried.

Thus,

out of the capitalist economy rose the liberal state and from
its inception the liberal state carried within itself the seed
of the democratic state which inexorably must germinate and
bear its own fruit.

It was in the impossibility of reconciling

itself to the two concepts that the nineteenth century bour
geoisie appeared to

23.

deceitful and hypocritical in its loyalty

C.B. Macpherson, The Real
1965), p. 9

IvorId of Democracy (Toronto:
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to the legal "pigsty” of parliamentarianisrn.

It could not

repress the pressure for full democracy yet it could not
willingly accede to them.

Conservatism and Reaction ruled in

the name of freedom:
Thus society was left to its own devices which caused pro
gress to be made by degrees and in waves. The assumptions
of the proceeding (eighteenth) century were taken up by
the democratic movement.. The latter upheld an ideal and
this ideal was of a new society based on the principles
of distributive justice and equality before the l a w ; and,
for those holding the most advanced views, upon equality
in fact. Out of the concept of equality was b o m the
concept of "the people;" coupled then to the concept of
the people was that of freedom, and in this way freedom
was no longer that of procedure or method but that of
substance,^4
Togliatti’s "democratic movement" was not specifically
synonymous with the Marxist school; it embraced the whole spec
trum of the Socialist movements which were of such great impor
tance to the development of nineteenth century thought.

It

was the "democratic movement" which grew, under the political
and economic hegemony of bourgeois liberal-capitalism, to form
the new intellectual and moral hegemony which was so profoundly
to transform pristine capitalism in the twentieth century and
in fact to culminate in the establishment of societies where
the early nineteenth century bourgeois concept of liberal

24.

Togliatti, "L’Anti-fascisrao di Antonio Gramsci", op. cit.
pp. 170-171
Disputing Croce’s Liberalism, Togliatti proceeded to add:
It was not admissible, for Croce, that justice should be
placed beside liberty. It was not conceivable for him, that
from freedom as method one should attempt to proceed towards
freedom as substance, that is to claim the right to change
the social order which currently existed. This polemic can
furnish whoever wishes to study the issue in depth the ele
ments for judgments concerning the ideological foundations
of anti-Fascism.
Ibid.
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democracy was reversed.

The freedoms which the capitalist

bourgeoisie claimed for itself in the name of all were seized
from and denied to that same bourgeoisie.

The "dictatorship

of the capitalists," liberal-democracy, was replaced with the
"dictatorship of the proletariat," popular or "people's demo
cracy," which was to last until the elimination of economic
classes under Communism made the state itself a worthless ana
chronism:
This period of proletarian rule Marx called democracy. We
are so used to thinking of dictatorship and democracy as
opposites that to call this democracy strikes us as out
rageous. To call it liberal-democracy would be outrageous,
for there was intended to be nothing liberal about it.
But to call it democracy was not outrageous at all: it
was simply to use the word in its original and then normal
sense. This was Marx's meaning when he wrote in the
Communist Manifesto in 184# that the first step in the
revolution of the working class is to raise the proletariat
to the position of ruling class, to win the battle of demo
cracy. Democracy was to be a class state, it was to use
its power to abolish the legal basis of capitalism and put
its productive powers of the whole society, including its
accumulated capital at the service of the whole society.*?
But, to return to the original consideration:
was the transformation to be brought about?
necessarily to be a violent upheaval?
Engels thought so.

how

Was the revolution

Originally Marx and

In 1848 it seemed to Communists that "their

ends can be attained only (my italics) by the forceable over
throw of all existing social conditions."

Forty-seven years

later Engels was to write, however, that "Rebellion in the old

25.

Macpherson, op. cit. pp. 14, 15
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style...which decided the issue everywhere up to 1848, was to a
considerable extent obsolete.”
Engels took enough care not to rule out violent
struggle for all cases and thus Lenin could write in 1917 that
the oppressed classes could not be free "without a violent revo
lution."

But Lenin too found it necessary by 1920 to rebuke

certain "childish” revolutionaries who would not on principle
utilize bourgeois political institutions to further communist
aims.

As for Gramsci, revolution began when the hegemony of

the ruling class suffered a crisis which deterioriated the
fusion of dominlo and direzione.

The crisis in hegemony could

be aggravated if "vast masses" began to exercise their political
power and, passing "suddenly from poltical passivity" to a
certain activity, succeeded in advancing their political
interests.

Such a transformation in its "disorganic complex"

constituted in fact "a revolution."

But, even Gramsci admitted

that when such crises occur the situation could be "open to
solutions of force."
What happened in the latter part of the nineteenth
and early twentieth century, when universal suffrage was finally
granted and the working-class parties, rather than being classed
as subversive, were recognized as legitimate and were allowed
to carry on legal political action resulting in the victories
which had so impressed Engels by their potential, was to use
Gramsci*s terms, the beginning of a crisis in the hegemony of
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the capitalist bourgeoisie.

The dominio which it had exercised

exclusively began to slip away.
V/hen the liberal state became subject to the open
competition for political power among parties which, in the
economic sphere of the market economy, was related to the
competition for economic profits among individuals, not only
the power and predominance of the bourgeoisie was threatened:
the liberal state itself was exposed to the legal, and con
stitutionally deferential, as opposed to extra-legal revolu
tionary, attack of political movements which had as their
fundamental programme the utter abolition of both the capi
talist system, and its political framework, the liberal demo
cratic state.

The irony lay in the fact that such movements

could not be denied their right to do so because of the very
principles with which the liberal state had been justified.
If the right were denied, the existing order could properly be
considered subject to violent revolutionary assault:

if the

right was granted, revolutionary violence became unnecessary
to achieve the same ains.

With their own creation, the liberal,

then liberal-democratic state, the bourgeoisie placed itself
in the fork of a dilemma.

11La legalite nous tue,” wailed

Barrot.
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Groomlng-Up
Although PCI policy in the post W.W, II period has
been described as amounting to a stifling of "any reiteration
-

of long term revolutionary objectives,"

*

such a judgment

cannot be swallowed without a pinch of salt.

There was no need

for the PCI to apologize for Its political decisions on a
theoretical basis if by a stifling of "revolutionary objec
tives" was meant the party*s decision not to stage an insur
rection.

As it has been pointed out above the equation, revo

lution *= violence, was both a simplification of the meaning
of the word revolution and an overrating of the potentially
positive consequences of violence.

The course the party chose

to follow was not guaranteed to bring success but it seemed
at the time to be the most likely to.

Had violence been

attempted "total disaster would have faced not just whoever had
risked it but the country itself."2?
As Togliatti wrote later:
The road to follow was that of maintaining and defending
for as long as possible the unity which was created during
the Resistance and of setting up for this unity a combina
tion of objectives which would be attainable by a mass
movement, starting with the achievement of a republic up
to tho realization of the pressing economic, political and

20.

G. Galli "The Italian C.P.: The Road Toward a Dilemma,
1945-56" Problems of Communism, Vol. V, No. 3 (May-June 1956)

27.

Togliatti, II partito comunista italiano. p. 94
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social reforms which were necessary for the^country and
which were claimed by the working classes*
In January, 1946 the PCI held its Fifth Congress, the
first in fifteen years.

Within a few months of its meeting

Italians were to go to the polls to make important decisions
for the future of the country.

Thus the policy statement by

the Congress was one which sought to clarify to the voting
public communist intentions for Italy and articulate in general
terms the programme the party would try to implement*

The pro

gramme declared that a mere restoration of a democratic parlia
mentary type regime "in the old style” would not be enough to
solve Italy’s problems,

Italy’s problems were equally or rather

more of an economic nature than of a political nature and what
ever reforms were made in the structure of the state they would
have to oe ones vrhich would promote social justice and economic
improvement for the masses of people which had never experienced
either:
T h i s , c a n n o t yet be a socialist State, but it must no
longer be a bourgeois State dominated by big property and
by the capitalist monopolies. We must be dealing with
a new power which is based on the working classes, on the
peasantry and on the working middle class, which will des
troy themmonopoly of the great l a n d o m e r s . which will aim
its blows at the monopolies of industry, will transform
the structures of the economy,,.destroy the incrustations
of the bureaucracy,,.and give to the democratic order a
new content, vrhich is that of the advancement towards a
profound transformation of the economic and social order . ^

28.

Ibid.

29.

Ibid.
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This procedure was represented as being the Italian road to
Socialism, one which nhas objectives which are basically attain
able through the application of the democratic method.”
Despite the party*s earlier willingness to enter the
king's government It officially demanded the abolition of mon
archy and its replacement by a republic having a representative
parliamentary system and which constitutionally v;ould guarantee
and defend:
the fundamental liberties of the citizen, freedom of speech
of conscience, of the press, or religion, of political,
syndical and religious association and propaganda {the
equal status of women),-the right to work, rest, education
and to social security.
The new State must extent special autonomy to certain
specific Regions, notably Sicily and Sardinia, and allow all the
Regions substantial administrative, economic and agricultural
self-regulation.

Cities, towns and other local administrative

organs must also be extended greater freedom.
depended upon achieving one basic goal:
prefectures.

All of this

the abolition of the

Prefects were the all-powerful agents of the

Ministry of the Interior and held the ultimate power in each
particular territory in which they resided.

In this situation

they represented the single greatest impediment to lively local
democracy.

The selection of individuals to comprise the judiciary

liras also to be made more democratic, less arbitrary and to be
based upon demonstrable merit.

30.

Ibid.
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Beneath all of the Communists* demands for democra
tization of the political apparatus of the state rested unmo
dified the almost metaphysical conviction that it would be
meaningless without a "democratization” of the economic sector
as wellj that is, without sub.jecting the economy to public
control and preventing it from being manipulated by the pluto
crats:
In the industrial sector the Italian Communist Party pro
poses the nationalization of the large industrial combines,
of the large banks and insurance companies, a beginning
of national planning and the installation of a system of
national control of production whose first task will be
the general implementation and recognition of the manage
ment Councils,
(Factory Councils)
In the agricultural cector the Italian Communist Party
proposes the liquidation of the large absentee-owned landed
estates (latifcndi) the limitation of large capitalistic
ownership, with the starting and stimulation of forms
cooperative tenure, a profound reform of agricultural con
tracts (and) the consequent protection of small and
medium property holdings.31
The policy declaration also contained other proposals
regarding education and the southern problem all of which were
intended to document tho official position of the PCI,
With this done tho party prepared itself for the
upcoming matches.

31,

Togliatti, o p . cit. p. 97-96

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

C H A P T E R

XV

ITALIAN C0M4UNISI.; IN

THE POST 'VAR PERIOD

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

127

Reconstruction
As political life in Italy was normalized in the
aftermath of war, PCI attitudes and formal policies with regard
to a number of particular issues, such as those already men
tioned, appeared at first to have been rightly chosen for they
resulted in encouraging political advances for the party.

In

March, 1946, the first open and unobstructed campaign for public
support at the urns was carried out among rival parties during
partial local elections held throughout the peninsula.

This

was the first such experience in twenty years and some eightyfive per cent of the electorate chose to participate in it.
The results were heartening for the PCI, verifying the party*s
untested contention that the three major forces to be reckoned
with in Italian politics would be the Communist, Socialist, and
Christian Democrat.

Out of 5)596 communes where elections took

place in March, Communist and Socialist candidates running on
joint lists won 1,976.

Singly, each party won another 140, thus

giving the extreme Left control of 2,256 communes altogether.
The DC alone won 1,907 while the various smaller parties won,
either alone or in combinations, the other 1,433.
But, as important as were the local elections, the
March polling was really a dress rehearsal for the far more
important national elections which were to follow in June.
On June 2, 1946 the first of a series of very important post
war national elections took place:

voters, Including women

for the first time, were to decide not only the composition of
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the Constituent Assembly which would draw up a new constitution
for Italy, they were to decide also on the settlement of "the
institutional q u e s t i o n t h a t is, the choice between continu
ing with the monarchy or abolishing it in favour of a republic.
The Left-wing parties opposed a referendum on this question and
insisted that it should be settled by the Constituent Assembly
once convened:

monarchist groups on the other hand counted on

public sentiment for the glamour of royalty to swing the vote
in favour of retaining the Savoys on the throne.
a vain hope.

It was to be

Although on the eve of the election powerful

voices were raised on behalf of the monarchy as a Christian
bulwark against the subversive forces of Atheism,^ the Italian
electorate chose all the same to do away with it.
The voting was significant for the manner in which
political sentiment broke down to fit distinct geographical
patterns.

1,

The North, where the Resistance had taken place,

"What is the problem?" asked Pius XII,
"The problem is
whether one or another of those nations, of those two
Latin sisters (the Pope*s speech referred also to poli
tical elections taking place in France the same day)
with several thousand years of civilisation will continue
to lean against the sc.ld rock of Christianity,. .or on the
contrary do they want to hand over the fate of their future
to the impossible omnipotence of a material state wihout
extra-terrestrial ideals without religion and without God.
One of these two alternatives shall occur according to
whether the names of the champions or the destroyers of
Christian civilisation emerge victorious from the urns."
Quoted by Mammarella, op. cit., p. 114
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went solidly for the Republic while the South where the king
had settled after fleeing Rome and xvhich had fallen early to
Allied control voted heavily in favour of the monarchy.
2
the majority vote was against the monarchy.

Still,

The June 2 election results for the Constituent
Assembly, were also advantageous to the Left.

The popular

vote for Communist and Socialist candidates together exceeded
that for Christian Democrats by over one million.

This com

bined strength helped further to clear the way for the formal
renewal of the "Unity of Action" pact which had united the
two Marxist parties in the late Thirties, although, for the
only time in the history of postwar elections, the Socialist
Party won a larger vote than the Communists.
219 seats, the Socialists controlled 115.

Of their combined

Other parties,

excluding the DC with its 207 seats, averaged some twenty each
while the Action Party barely survived with only 7 seats.
The pattern of voting for the Constituent Assembly
paralleled that of the referendum.

The northern industrial

areas voted Social-Communist as did the traditionally radical
agricultural regions of Worth-Central Italy,

The DC gained

support from middle-classes and from the very Catholic WorthEast.

2,

Conservative parties prevailed in the South.

12 717i923 votes in favour of a Republic and 1 0 ;719)2S4
for the monarchy.
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With the two Left-wing parties commanding just under
40$ of the votes and pledged to joint political action, the DC
with its 35/"' of the vote had either to come to terras with them
or look to the various parties of the Eight for allies.

To

promote the former course was already part of PCI policy but
its success in achieving it was not resounding.

Nevertheless,

the capacity of the extreme Left to influence the content of
the constitution was real and this was evident in the final
document produced by the Costituente.

One of the three official

signatories to the constitution, including the provisional
president of the Republic, Enrico de Nicola, and the President
of the Council of Ministers, Alcide De Gasperi was the Presi
dent of the Constituent Assembly, the veteran Communist and
Ordinovista, Umberto Terracini.
The document, despite Terracini1s signature, was not
a blueprint for a socialist society.

It did, however, contain

a number of carefully -worded articles especially concerning
economic relationships which made tho constitution quite
acceptable to the PCI.^

These articles could be implemented

by a reform-minded government to carry out profound structural
changes throughout the economy.

The constitution of republican

Italy was in potentia the constitution of socialist Italy as
well.

The constitution as finally approved was not on the

Soviet model but all the same it did recognize:

3.

i-ee Appendix I
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.. .in a concrete way the right of vrorkers to accede to
the management of the State and poses certain conditions
which can, wherever they be realized, favour this accession
and allow for a noteworthy transformation of national
society in a socialist s e n s e d
With the constitution written, the Italian Communist
Party found itself part of a political framework which was not
disagreeable since it was partly responsible for producing it.
But this was only one goal which the party had set for itself.
It was elementary to expect the PCI to pursue policies which
would lead to its participation in the direction of the economy
of the country.

This could occur first by winning real poli

tical power by legitimate means in elections and then by
exercising this political power constitutionally to undertake
reforms in the economy.

The tone of restrained confidence in

the above quotation was rooted in an appreciation of certain
realities which made the statement an expression of fact.
Because of historical circumstances the economic
structure which the Italian republic received from Fascism
allowed the State, if it so chose, to exercise a potentially
dominant managerial role in the national economy, although so
far the economy had remained basically capitalist.

During the

depression of the Thirties, the Fascist regime had intervened
to prevent the collapse of numerous enterprises which were on
the verge of bankruptcy.

4.

The State simply bought up shares

Togliatti, op. cit. p. 103
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v/hich had greatly diminished in value and thus became the
majority stockholder in many companies:
financial institutions.

banks, industries and

In order to administer the shares a

special state agency, The Institute for Industrial Reconstruction
(ITII) was created.

The IRI’s intervention was by no means

limited or insignificant.
Today, the Italian State owns or controls through
IRI the iron and steel industry, ship building

naval and air

transportation concerns, telephone and utility companies, auto
tool and machinery manufacturing companies, textile, glass and
chemical firms, road-building firms and broadcast media among
many others, 5

Under Fascism, the State, rather than actively

manage "its" enterprises, remained instead a passive partner
with private capitalists who continued to run their affairs
along the old lines.
The arrangement was a very happy one for the latter;
in prosperous times, private stockholders continued to receive
their dividends; if times were unfavourable, the State acted
as guarantor against the collapse of its own enterprise.

Thus

the industrialists of the country, united in Confindustria,
exercised an enormous poitfer in both private and semi-public
sectors of the economy.

5,

Under a regime such as Fascism, which

After the war, another entity, the Italian Hydrocarbons
Agency (EWI) drew the Italian State broadly and massively
into the petrochemical industry also and has indirectly
made the former a protagonist In the international rivalry
of giant oil corporations competing for oil exploration
rights in many emerging countries.
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was not inimical to its interests, Confindustrla became a
pressure group with immense influence over government policy.
To restrict severely or break entirely the economic
and political power of Italian monopoly capitalism thus became
part of the programme of all of the Left.

The moderate Left

projected a programme of anti-combine legislation leading to
a type of mixed economy; the radical Left intended outright
nationalization of the basic means of production to achieve a
fundamental reorientation of the economy along socialist lines.
If, furthermore, the lobbying influence of the powerful indus
trialists could be weakened, by a curtailing of their economic
power, an important obstacle barring introduction and implemen
tation of further Left-wing policies could be removed.

The

extreme Left was convinced that it had been the enthusiastic
support and prompting of the Italian Capitalists which had
allowed Mussolini to wield his unlimited power with the special
ferocity he reserved for Socialists and Communists especially
in the early years of the fascist regime when he consolidated
his power.
Another way by which the power of the industrialists
could be curtailed, a method favoured by the PCI especially,
was the system of "Management Councils" (con s i g n di gestione)
which had been already implemented by the CLNAI in early 1945*
In the eyes of the Resistance leaders this system was eminently
just.

The factories had been protected and saved from destruc-
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tion by the retreating German armies by workers who had them
selves taken up arms, and it was right that these workers
should participate in running the factories they had risked
their lives to save.

As conceived, the management councils

were bodies composed of representatives of management as well
as of workers who were in the latter case elected by and from
the workers of the particular factory.

In this system of dual

control the councils could settle problems of production, use
of manpower and any other technical difficulties impeding
efficient productivity.
It v/as in fact a moderate proposal.

The private

entrepreneui-s did not necessarily have to face expropriation;
on the other hand, employees could play a significant role in
the management of their ovm places of work.

The importance

attached to facilitating increased productivity was a partial
explanation for PCI moderation.

Italy was economically pros

trate and in no condition to sustain any postponement of
economic reconstruction.

The creation of jobs to absorb the

huge number of unemployed and underemployed was imperative.

If

the PCI adopted positions which would appear to aggravate
unemployment the blame for the plight of the workers could be
placed on it.
Needless to add the factory owners did not receive the
idea of management councils with boundless enthusiasm; it v/as
seen to be merely another indirect attempt by the Social-
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Communists to confiscate private property.

In fact, this

opposition to the installation of the councils hardened and
legal recognition was never granted them.

The decline of the

councils paralleled the rebuilding of the Italian economy along
old lines.

The outcome of the struggle over what direction

economic reconstruction would take v/as of crucial importance
to both the Left and Right.
The electoral successes of the Social-Cornmunists were
real enough and their influence in the Constituent Assembly was
revealed in the constitution which came out of Its deliberations.
But there were increasing points of contrast and conflict between
the Left and Right which hindered the tripartite government
collaboration sought by the PCI.

Soon after his assuming the

reins of government, Alcide Do Gasperi set about to undo some
of the actions undertaken by the CLR particularly in Northern
Italy where CLNAI control had been more or less exclusive
during the Resistance.

Specifically, De Gasperi removed CLN

appointees in local administration and replaced them with
functionaries from the old prefectures which had been the
authoritarian administrative apparatus of Fascism in the pro
vinces.
The individuals chosen frequently were of distinctly
conservative and anti-communist outlook.

For the Left-wing

parties of the CLN*s (who formed a majority in them) this was
as if the Resistance had been fought to no avail since one of
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the first acts of the CLM leadership had been precisely the
replacement of local officials,

De Gasperi»s actions with

regard to local government were tied to another decision; that
of ending the general purge of important Fascist officials within
government and industry.

This too vras to contradict much for

which the CLW*s had worked.

Wherever the latter had been in

control, purges against collaborators and willing accomplices
of the Fascist regime in both public and private institutions
were carried out.

The purges were intended to weed out those

elements in administrative capacities which had compromised with
Fascism and particularly those who personally profited at
public expense from this collaboration.
The Italian bureaucracy, which at its worst can be
shamelessly venal and arrogant, sheltered many such accomplices.
The parties of the Left wished to carry out a broad shake-up of
the administrative apparatus of the State and the economy.
That many minor functionaries who had passively joined the
Fascist party out of practical necessity to secure their jobs
could be hurt was seen as an unpleasant necessity.

If funda

mental reforms in the structure of the Italian State were to
be carried out, the old governing class retaining the mental
habits of Fascism had to be eliminated for it would only hinder
the changes envisaged by the Loft.

Hence, the parties of this

orientation insisted on extensive purges.

The moderate and

conservative parties in the CLN's (DC and Liberal) were far less
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enthusiastic or radical in this natter.

The classes from which

they expected to receive considerable support would be the
principal targets of the purges and, in the eventuality of
assuming power in the Italian government after the vrar, their
political power would be severely ’weakened if they could not
rely on the cooperation of the existing bureaucracy {minus, of
course, its Fascist hierarchs and flagrant profiteers).

This

struggle over the question of the purges rumbled on until the
purge trials were brought to a definite halt in January 1946.
Connected with this struggle over the reform of
bureaucracy there v/as a debate of far greater importance.

Deter

mination of financial and economic policies were of immediate
and essential necessity.

In order to finance economic recon

struction vast amounts of investment capital were needed.

Italy

benefitted substantially from UNRRA aid but the major source of
financing had to be from taxes levied on the savings and assets
of Italians themselves.

Two methods were proposed:

a public

loan and a special compulsory and progressive tax on property.
The question of the loan raised little opposition and was
floated successfully.

The monies it raised were insufficient

to the needs, however, and the property tax was expected to help
raise the remainder needed.
The taxation project became bound up with a third
question on financial policy, that of changing the currency.
Both plans met stiff resistance from the conservatives.
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changing the currency, sizeable amounts of money being sent
outside of Italy by those rich enough to do so could have been
blocked and at the same time, by curtailing the circulation of
money within Italy, the serious and increasing inflation could
have been checked.

Moreover, in both the levying of the tax

and the reform of the currency, the Italian government could,
as the French government had done, project a long range
economic plan to utilize the funds which would be raised.
Economic conservatives, however, wanted reconstruction
to be financed privately xirithout public controls on credit or
particularly without any hindering by a progressive property tax.
To follox* a laisser faire policy of this type would have reduced
the role of the State in determining economic priorities to a
minimum and restricted its managerial poxiers as well.

Further

more, the economic plans of the government met not only xvith
opposition from private groups but were hindered internally by
the resistance of a conservative Minister of Finance.

The

natural consequence was to delay measures which should have been
effected immediately to achieve the originally intended results.
The procrastination also allowed time for strengthening the con
servative influence on the government.

The property tax as

finally approved was proportional rather than progressive so
that large proprietors benefitted by smaller levies.
currency change v/as never put into effect.

The

By shelving this

fundamental project a basic decision was made concerning the
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economic future of the newly-formed republic.

Italy would

revert to traditional private capitalism with the State colla
borating \*ith private enterprise rather than controlling it.
Although industrial productivity was raised as the
year progressed, the increased private investment

which

accompanied the industrial recovery, greatly aggravated the
existing inflationary situation.

This was particularly burden

some to the mass of the working population which v/as either
underemployed or, in many cases, quite simply out of work.
The restoration of industry along traditionally capitalist
lines, however, reinforced itself since the rising value of
shares attracted even more investment to private industry while
less remunerative bonds, floated by the government in order to
attract capital for public financing, consequently suffered from
lack of public response.

To pay its debts the government res

orted to printing paper money.

The result was an alarming

acceleration of the inflationary trend.

In one year, June,

1946 to June, 1947) money in circulation increased from some
394.7 billion lire to 577*6 billion lire.

The Jreak-bp of Tripartism
As months passed it became more and more evident that
the chief beneficiary of the De Gasperi governments laisser
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faire attitudes was to be the economic Right and that conversely,
nothing would be done to carry out the basic structural reforms
sought by Left-wing parties.

This inclination placed the func

tioning of the tripartite Council of Ministers under increasing
strain.

It was clear to all participants that without any

basic unanimity about what programmes the government should
properly promote, decisive action of any kind by the government
was impossible.

Since the "Management Councils" failed to achieve

legal status, vrith the result that workers were barred from
any sharing of responsibility in managing their places of work,
the Social-Communists placed greater emphasis upon trying to
influence the general economic and financial policies of the
government.
It was not unreasonable that the two parties, united
in a common front, were led to expect that their views should
carry some considerable weight in influencing government policies.
Extensive successes at the polls, both locally and nationally,
r

had politically reinforced the positions of active leadership
they had assumed in the armed Resistance.

Their control of the

preponderant working-class vote was unquestionable and their
important contributions to the deliberations of the Constituent
Assembly were generally recognized.

It was indeed precisely

because of all of these things that the two parties were present
in the Council of Ministers.
When, despite the socialist presence in his cabinet,
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De Gasperi chose to promote economic conservatism at the expense
of socialist reformism, it was with the full appreciation that
such a course would meet with determined resistance by the two
Left-wing parties.

>/ith the choice once made, hoiyever, the

inevitable consequence facing the Social-Communist Ministers,
who objected to the government’s general programme, was their
eventual elimination from the government altogether.

To this,

needless to add, they were utterly opposed.
Nevertheless, the writing was already appearing on
the wall; the expulsion of CLN officials in local administra
tions and in the local police forces was the first step.

This

action was being justified on the grounds that in order to
return to "normalcy” and to restore "law and order" it was
necessary to reimposa the central administrative authority of
Rome.

The move also assured that any Red sympathizers in the

administration were deprived of whatever decision-making
functions they might have exercised.

The centrally-approved

replacements, frequently amnestied ex-Fascist bureaucrats,
were trusted by the Ministry of the Interior and could be
counted upon to crush any foreseeable anti-government demon
strations incited by extremist Left parties.
In other words, the radical parties were being dis
armed of an important political weapon, that of putting pressure
on the government by way of the piazza; protesters would be
less willing to risk injury in violent demonstrations if they
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were faced with squads of riot police equipped and determined
to quell any such disorders.

Mot without reason did De Gasperi

retain the Interior portfolio for himself or for trusted col
leagues.
Such moves against CLM-appointed officials incited
numerous protest demonstrations which in turn aggravated the
difficult and strained relations within the Council of Mn i s ters.
Conservatives, insisted even more strongly that "public order”
had to be restored and the results of the November, 1946 elec
tions sustained their conviction that the advancing Left must
be checked.

In such major centres such as Fdlan, Genoa, Florenc

Bologna and Turin the Social-Communists had won absolute major
ities on the communal councils and in numerous other centres
just failed to achieve the same results.
In the same areas,moreover, the DC lost substantially
not only to the Left but to the Right as well.

The event requires

an explanation for it signified the revival of Right-wing
influence and self assurance in the shadow of a government which
was showing tolerance toward the "small fry” of Fascism.

The

tense and still unsettled internal situation characterized by
the aggressive militancy of the lower classes and the demands
of the Left-wing parties, coupled with the inability of the
disunited central government to prevent the disruption of
"public order," posed for the propertied upper-classes and for
the lower middle-classes (who had formed the bulk of the "small
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fry") the most menacing danger to their interests and privileges.
Both nourished a deep hostility, amounting to reaction, to
the new political order which jeopardized their economic and
social security.
The hostility became vented in a political phenomenon
of transient influence the Uomo Qualunque (Average Man) party
which achieved a considerable following particularly in Rome,
Naples and the South.

The simplistic slogan of the party was

"things were better when they were worse” and with such a
battle cry the Uomo Qualunque touched a sensitive chord in the
Italian character which aroused a response in significant
sectors of the lower classes.

These politically unsophisticated

Italians, congenitally cynical and suspicious about the State*
politicians and human virtues in general, confused and unable
to grasp the fundamental struggle between the large parties,
and above all caught in a desperate economic bind (no work and
rising prices), succumbed to the Uomo Qualunque appeal.

The

party bitterly attacked the existing situation (which was easy
enough to do), criticized political leaders for their "immo bill sir.,”
denounced the Resistance as the root cause of the current mess,
jeered at its ideals, ridiculed its values, its parties
(especially the PCI), and defended nostalgically the achieve
ments of the past.

The Uomo Qualunque was soon enough to be

absorbed by the blatantly Fascist kovimento sociale italiano
(kPI) leaving exposed in its wake only a disturbing element in
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public opinion and bequeathing a new word to the Italian voca
bulary which is still frequently invoked to describe its parti
cular mentality:

qualunquismo.^

Besieged, as it was, on all sides, the DC could not
survive very long.
its expense.

6.

Both Left and Right were making gains at

In January, 1947, Prime Minister De Gasperi

Alberto Moravia, for example, in the context of a recent
film criticism tried to give qualunquismo a cultural defini
tion: The putrefaction of the old Italian Humanism of
Guicciardini and the Renaissance.*
Humanism was probably the last free, original ideology of
Italy and hence deep down qualunquismo is the kind of men
tality which distinguishes Italians from other people. An
Italian is Qualunquist as an American is Puritan, as a
Frenchman, a Cartesian.
...qualunquismo has nothing at all in common with wiseness
but is rather a peculiar kind of regressive common sense...
Naturally, these definitions are worth what they are worth,
that is little or nothing.
"In giacca rossa e parucca beatnik" L tEspresso (Rome) XII,
No. 11, (March 13, 1966) p. 23

*

Francesco Guicciardini (14^3-1540) Renaissance diplomat and
historian, was: a man whose moral nature inspires a sentiment
of liveliest repugnance. It is not merely that he was ambi
tious, cruel, revengeful and avaricious, for these vices
have existed in men far less antipathetic than Guicciardini.
Over and above these faults, which made him odious to his
fellow citizens, we trace in him a meanness that our century
is less willing to condone. His phlegmatic and persistent
egotism, his sacrifice of truth and honour to self interest,
his acquiescence to them for his own advantage, combined with
the glaring discord between his opinions and his practice
form a character which would be contemptible in our eyes were
it not so sinister.
John Addington Symonds, quoted in
"Guicciardini," Edited by John R, Hale, (New York: 1964) PP* 6, 9
Evidently, Guicciardini is the arch Qualunquist of Italian
history. His twentieth century imitators unfortunately have
only his faults without any of his redeeming intellectual
talents.
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visited the United States.

The trip was an ostensible good

will mission and symbolised Italy1s restoration to full status
in international affairs on the eve of the signing of the
Peace Treaty with the Allies.

The United States had been, of

all the Allies, the most sympathetic toward Italy during the
treaty negotiations.

This treatment contrasted sharply with

the s t e m attitudes of the Soviet Union which insisted on
receiving war reparations in full.

Against the background of

the tense international situation, characterized chiefly by
the increasingly gelid relationship between the two great rival
power blocs, the cordiality shown toward De Gasperi by the
Americans acquired greater significance than otherwise might
have been the case.
Moreover, without denying the Italian Prime Minister*s
sincere desire to cultivate good will and reconciliation between
two ex-belligerents, his visit to Washington had certain other,
more specific goals; namely, to ask for economic aid.

De Gas-

peri*s petitions were received with sympathetic attention.

The

Americans extended a $100 million loan from the Export-Import
Bank, released Italian property in the United States, which had
been frozen during the war, and promised further efforts to
help finance Italian industry.^

7.

Under the UNItRA programme, which was largely American financed,
Italy was to receive over $5&9 million worth of aid before its
termination in June, 1947*
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The alacrity with which economic assistance was
extended to the Italians did not conceal the string which
attached the aid to the expressed American desire that its
financial help should aid "the stability and consolidation of
the Italian democratic regime."**

In the context of the period

the meaning of this statement was quite clear.

About a month

after De Gasperi*s visit, the Truman Doctrine was enunciated in
the American Congress by which the United States pledged itself
to "support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation
by armed minorities or by outside pressure" and to assist "those
free peoples,,.against the aggressive movements which seek to
impose their own totalitarian regimes."

This was no more than

a "frank recognition" that failure to extend assistance would
"undermine.*.the security of the United States,"9
Truman*s declaration 'was specifically designed to
justify American military intervention in the Greek civil war
but its implications were applicable to the situation in Italy
as well.

During the expulsion of CLN-appointed officials from

the local administration, the new appointees carried out wides
pread searches for arms-caches known or suspected to have been
hidden by Red-sympathizing ex-partisans especially in the "Red

ci.

Quoted in Qammarella, op. cit. p. 141

9.

President Truman, quoted by John V/. Spanier, American Foreign
Policy Since World War I I . (New York: i960), pp. 31 and 32,
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Belt" in North-Central Italy.

The actual discoveries of such

caches were seized by the Right-Wing and Qualunquist parties
and press as irrefutable proof of a subversive, communistinspired conspiracy to stage an insurrection against the demo
cratic order (the same order which they never hesitated to
denounce violently).
The clean-up hunt, which v/as carried on for months,
further aggravated the already inflamed political climate in the
country and intensified the basic division of public opinion into
two hostile camps.

It also strengthened De Gasperifs public

position vis-a-vis the Left arming him with further pretexts
for his next major move which concerned ridding his government
of its Social-Communist participants.
A turn of events in Italy seemed almost to fulfill
De Gasperi’s tactical designs.

While he had been in Washington,

the Socialist Party was holding its National Congress in Rome.
The two old wings of the party, Maximalist and Gradualist, which
had been reunited in exile, were again at odds over what direc
tion the party was and should be taking and precisely over the
political collaboration with the PCI which had been formalized
the previous October.

10.

The November local elections had revealed

"On a visit to the United States /be Gasperi7 had received
assurances that his government would enjoy still greater
favour in Washington if the Communists were no longer in it.”
H. Stuart Hughes. The United States and Italy (revised ed.),
(Cambridge: 1965), p V 145
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that Focialist candidates were losing votes to Communists.
This factor alarmed the Right-i.ri.ng of the PSI which was hostile
to the PCI for its long identification with Soviet ideology
and particularly with the more objectionable aspects of Stalinist
politics both domestic and international.
The Unity of Action Pact, in turn, bound together the
Socialist and the Communist parties and blurred their differences
to the public.

Officially, the Socialist party maintained

neutrality with regard to the rivalry between the power blocs,
but in practise this amounted to antipathy for Western capi
talists and sympathy for the Soviet Union,

In tho tense atmos

phere of the Cold War, which was becoming daily more frigid,
this ambiguous attitude toward East and West v/as intolerable
for the "autonomist" Right-wing Socialists whose fundamental
political, ideological and cultural preferences were decidedly
pro-Western.

As a result of this irreconciliable division

between the two wings, the "autonomist" wing led by Giuseppe
Saragat walked out of the Congress to form v/hat v/as later to
become the Italian focial Democratic Party (PSDI).

With Saragat

went 50 of the 115 Socialist members of the Constituent Assembly,
Pietro .Uenni, leader of the "fusionist" (Maximalist)
wing of the party, and De Gasperi*s Foreign Minister, subsequently
submitted his resignation to the Prime Minister.

Since other

Socialist ministers followed suit, De Gasperi was given the
opportunity to form a new government.

Although Communists and
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Socialists were not yet eliminated, the opportunity was taken
to assure greater Christian Democrat control of the most impor
tant portfolios.

De Gasperi*s tactics were well thought out

for the Socialist and Communists were placed in the uncomfortable
position of sharing government responsibility for the signing
of the Peace Treaty (on February 10) which retained all the
rigorous (and unpopular) exactions demanded by the USSR but
renounced by the UFA and Great Britain.
the Truman Doctrine was proclaimed.

About one month later

Although the doctrine was

denounced as "imperialist” in the Social-Communist press it
v/as applauded by those sectors of the Italian public which felt
threatened by the Red bloc.
Despite the implications of the Truman Doctrine,
De Gasperifs skillful political strategy may not have been
veil perceived by Togliatti and the Social-Communist group.
The PCI still pushed its determination to participate in the
government and to cultivate a lasting collaboration with the
Catholics to surprising ends.

Shortly after the signing of the

Peace Treaty the controversial Article V I I ^ came before the
Constituent Assembly for a vote.

In an astonishing break with

the Socialists and the anti-clerical "lay” parties, the PCI
voted to include Article VII in the constitution.
The party justified its vote by what it maintained

11.

See Appendix II
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was a correct appraisal of the cultural imperatives of the
Italian situation.

Neither of the two "mass” Left-wing parties

(PCI and Pf>I) could claim, either alone or jointly, to have a
monopoly of political support of the lower or "popular" classes.
The DC received most of its support from these same classes
as well.
In Marxist terms political parties were the organized
reflection of the conflicting political interests of differing
socio-economic classes.

But, a plurality of parties could still

draw their majority support from the same common class.

In

Italy two such parties, the PCI and PPI, were collaborating on
the general basis of a shared ideology.

Because it was desirable

that this collaboration be extended to embrace the rest of the
“popular” classes, it was essential not to rupture the funda
mental unity of "the working classes" by offending the religious
sensibilities of the third, or Catholic, element.
Undeniably, substantial segments of the industrial
workers, of the peasantry and, above all, of the mass of newlyenfranchised women ware moved by a profound attachment to
what was an intimate part cf their personal and social culture,
that is, to their religion, with all its demotic traditions
and popular manifestations, to its endless hagiolatry and,
above all, to la Madonna.

Simultaneously, these same people

could be hostile or resentful towards the Church as an institution
and to its paladins, i preti.

To many of these individuals
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there -was no contradiction in going to mass and voting for
Communists.

Others could not ignore the nonit ions of 11 pane

and honco voted for the party which was both Christian and
Democratic.
If the Communist Party wore to cultivate the support
of these masses who voted DC, or even seek not to offend those
militants in its ovm ranks who, though anti-Vatican, were
religiously inclined, it could not be aggressively anti-clerical
or anti-Catholic.

As for the DC itself, though its leaders

often voiced the interests of higher socio-economic classes,
its mass political support ‘.rue still heavily based in the popu
lar classes.

The needs of these Catholic voters remained the

same as those of voters who supported the Social-Communists.
In the long run populist Left-wing Catholic leaders, currently
overshadovted in their own party, v/ould be forced to articulate
the unsatisfied claims of this social-economic base both within
the DC and in the larger forum of national politics.12

12.

Some of the most prominent of those Loft-ving Catholic
figures are:
Giovanni Gronchi ex-President of Italy; Amintore Fanfani,
sometime Prime Minister and currently minister of foreign
Affairs, Giorgio La Fira, ex-mayor of Florence and Giuseppe
Dosetti, now a Catholic priest, one time leader of the
Left-wing Social-Catholic current within the DC.
De Gasperi himself was a "centrist" in his ovm party and
was constantly absorbed in the wearying task of balancing
all the various party factions jostling for power in the
party.
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Ineluctably, this would necessitate a dialogue with
the Communists and with the entire non-Catholic Left.

In

supporting the inclusion of Article VII, the PCI hoped to avoid
jeopardizing this eventuality by demonstrating to its future
interlocutors its lack of prejudice and its good intentions.
Regardless of the reasoning behind the PCI action, it
was not convenient at the time for the clerical DC to risk a
negative communist vote in retaliation for the latter*s elimina
tion in a cabinet reshuffling.

Thus De Gasperi waited until

Iiay, just three months after forming his last tripartite govern
ment , two months after the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine
and one month after the vote on Article VII to submit his resig
nation on the grounds that his government could not continue
in the absence of any ’'solidarity" on the part of Communists
and Socialists on questions of administration or public legisla
tion and intthe face of persistent attacks on him in the SocialCommunist press.
De Gasperi’s resignation touched off a long political
crisis in which two prestigious pre-Kascist Prime ministers
tried to form a government without a major party base.

This

was impossible and the charge naturally fell back to De
Gasperi who began exhaustive negotiations with other parties
to form a coalition.

He failed on the Right and on the Left.

focial-Democrats, Actionists and Republicans refused to enter
a government which would leave out important working class
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representation as manifested by the Social-Communists.

Liberals

refused to enter a government with even token Communist represen
tation.

Thus De Gasperi decided to form a minority government

composed of Christian Democrats with a few "experts" thrown in.
The government was still dependent upon other non-DC votes in
the Assembly to obtain majority support.
On June 21 this solution v/as presented to the Assembly
for a vote of confidence and with the support of Liberal. Qualun
quist and Monarchist votes, De Gasperi successfully evicted the
extreme Left from their occupancy of any position in the govern
ment.

The government which emerged from these manoeuvres was

then described to the public as "the government of rebirth and
salvation of the country."

During the same weeks in France,

political developments, which since the days of the 'iV- II
Resistance, followed a pattern similar to that in Italy, were
climaxed by the identical result:

Communist ministers in the

French cabinet were forced out of office ending the French
experience of tripartite government.

Towards A Day of Reckoning
Im simpler terms, "salvation of the country" meant
that Communists were now barred from exercising any control over
the levers of government power.

This much was a fait accompli.
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There remained for the proximate future an even more decisive
political showdovm and the struggle leading up to it was to
unfold over the next several months culminating in the momen
tous elections of April 18, 194&.
During these eventful months Italians were to be
absorbed not only in the drama of their own domestic politics,
but, ineluctably, were to be participants in the succession of
international episodes which initiated what cumulatively would
become known as the "Cold War."

As early as March, 1946, the

realist Churchill, in his celebrated speech at Fulton, Missouri
had declared that the alliances which had served during the war
to defeat the Axis were already terminated and now had been
formed into two new power blocs separated by an "Iron Curtain.”
Among the first installments in the catalogue recording the
actual progress of the "Cold War" must be included the 1947
ministerial purges in Italy and France.

Indeed, Italian politics

in this period were, to a remarkable degree, international
politics and Italy one of the "fronts" of the Cold War.

On this

"front" the PCI would sustain considerable casualties.
World War II had been a catastrophe for Europe, a
disaster for its economy and a shock to its political institutions.
This was even more true for those countries where the fighting
had been greatest and Italy was among the latter.

Even for a

victorious country such as Britain, not to speak of France, the
near economic collapse caused by the war so severely reduced its
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international political and economic power that at w a r ’s end
only two states could really be called "Great Powers,"

In

Europe both of these great powers had an immense stake in the
direction European nations would cast their political lot and
neither hesitated in actively trying to influence a choice
favourable to its own interests.
Europe, even devastated and prostrate, held the
balance of world power.

Thus, as a prize, it became divided

by the proverbial Iron Curtain and nations falling on either
side of it had their destinies bound to one or the other of the
two super states.

In a few cases the choice was not immediately

clear and the final decision hung in the balance until a decisive
move was made.
1948,

This is what happened in Italy on April 18,

Po significant is this date in contemporary Italian his

tory that any reference to "il diciotto aprile" is immediately
understood by all politically conscious Italians,
date "which way Italy would go" was uncertain.

(ip to this

After this date

no question remained.
The Truman Doctrine and its implications have already
been referred to.

This policy, however, formed but one aspect

of the American commitment to assure for itself a Europe whose
political-economic orientation would be complementary to that
of the United States:
Europe's collapse...posed
United States: Is Europe
The answer was never in d
the sea gateways vital to

a fundamental question to the
vital to American security?
o u b t .Western Europe controlled
American security.,.possessed
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the largest aggregation of skilled workers, technicians
and managers outside the United States...maintained the
second greatest concentration of industrial power in the
world...exercised control over many of the strategic raw
materials which the United States needed to maintain its
military strength and its capacity to wage war. American
security demanded a healthy and strong Europe which could
help tip the balance of p o w e r . ^
If all of this was true for the United States it was
no less true for the USSR.

Indeed, the latter could only trust

that in at least two important countries in Western Europe
national communist parties would win the power necessary to
prevent their respective governments from responding to the
attractive American offers which were being blandished.

These

offers were contained in the European Recovery Programme, more
commonly known as the Marshall Plan, which was announced on the
heels of the Truman Doctrine in June 1947.

The De Gasperi

government accepted the American offer immediately and of the
$12 billion dollars put into ERP by the Americans between 194b
and 1952, Italy received $1,515 million of them.
It was in part-fear that the Communist alternative might
gain strength which prompted the United States to extend
lavish aid to Italy throughout the years of the Marshall
Plan*s operation— and without that aid the story of the past
few years might have been a very different o n e . ^

13.

John 17, Cpanier, American Foreign Policy Since 7/orld War I X ,
{New York: I960), p. 40

14.

Muriel Grindrod, The Rebuilding of Italy: Politics and
Economics 1945-1955, (London: 1955), p. 45
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The Marshall Plan was denounced hy the PCI, now
growing more militant in the wake of its expulsion from the
government.
USSR.

In this, its attitude was identical to that of the

The Marshall Plan was originally offered to all of Europe,

including the USSR, since the basic condition of the plan was
that European States coordinate their recovery programmes lead
ing to eventual economic integration.

This was the instigation

for the Organization of European Economic Cooperation (OEEC).
For the Soviet Union {or the states in its sphere of control)
to have accepted this condition would have meant first, that it
permit some United States (i.e. capitalist) participation in
planning its economy, and secondly, that in contributing food
and raw materials as its share in the effort it would be contri
buting in the reestablishment of capitalism in Western Europe.
As for the Americans, extending the ERP to include the
Ur;SR was a "risk" which had to be accepted:

it had to be the

Russians who by their rejection of Marshall Plan aid, would be
responsible for the division of Europe.

The masterly stroke of

tactical genius would have been for the Soviets to have accepted
the plan with eagerness, assuring, by the consequent soar in
estimated cost to the United States, almost certain rejection
of the Plan by the American Congress.

"Actually...Molotov did

arrive in Paris with a large delegation of experts and he gave
American policy makers a momentary

15*

s c a r e . ,rl5

Spanier, op. cit. p. A3
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However, suspicion of western schemes led the USSR to
reject the plan (for itself as well as for East Europe) thus
taking the blame for aggravating the Cold War and assuring
passage of the programme in Congress:
...the Marshall Plan became transformed into an instrument
of the Cold VJar...The American President and his advisers
were now free to continue the distortion of the original
proposal by presenting it to Congress as the economic com
plement to the military programme of the Truman Doctrine. 16
Consequently the entire programme became not just a
Western European affair but rather a liberal democratic, neoCapitalist affair.

In joining it

the De Gasperi government

was only extending to the international plane the choices it
had already made in its domestic policies*
tvas the PCI able to prevent the choice.

In neither case

The critical importance

of the impending general elections, the first to be held under
the new constitution, lay therefore in the still very real
possibility that the PCI-PSI alliance would achieve a victory
at the polls or at least capture a large enough share of the
vote to prevent the centre-right Christian Democratic government
from continuing to function without the approval of the Left.
A Social-Communist majority would at the very least
"neutralize" Italy in favour of the Soviet bloc and a substantial
victory in this direction, especially in the context of the
period, possibly could move Italy right into the ,
r>oviet bloc.

16,

Hughes, op. cit. p. 430
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A legitimate electoral conquest of power, moreover, would have
incalculable repercussions since it would be the first such
achievement in history.

A Christian Democratic victory, on

the other hand, would accelerate the reconstruction of Italy
along the lines already laid down by the government (with the
promise of Marshall Plan money) and, on the international
level, place it squarely in the Western camp.
Thus, the choice placed before the Italian voter on
April 18 was not one of a routine selection from among a group
of candidates or party programmes.

The most strenuous efforts

were made, especially by the pro-government forces, to cause
the voter to realize that he was choosing between "East” and
"West", between tiiro concepts of society, economics and politics,
between two civilizations, two worlds and, not least, between
the Church and her "enemies,"

It is doubtful that many of the

voters could grasp the enormity of the decision facing them and,
realizing this, the various parties subjected Italians to the
most frenzied and acrimonious election campaigns ever staged,
one which was to become a classic study in the art of propaganda.
Despite Saragat*s defection from the P S I , the Nenni
Socialists unhesitatingly renewed their pact with the PCI and
in January, 1948 the creation of the "Democratic Peoples* Front"
was announced.

The DC, Social-Democrats and Republicans on

their side made an informal electoral alliance with each other,
while the Liberals and Uomo Qualunque parties formed a "National
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Bloc."

Other parties ran alone.

From the beginning, however,

the basic contest was clearly between the two great antagonis
tic parties and the systems they championed.

The DC, in fact,

used as one of its appeals the claim that, since it was the
major bulwark against Communism, any anti-Communist vote not
cast for it was a wasted voto.
From the time the PCI was expelled from the govern
ment, mass demonstrations, strikes and seizures of land were
carried out by Leftist militants throughout the summer and
fall of 1947.

In November ex-partisans and workers went as

far as seizing and occupying the Prefecture of Milan to protest
the substitution of the CLN-appointed prefect by a career
bureaucrat appointed by Rome.

The outburst of extreme rank and

file militancy, in contrast to the official moderation of the
party directorate, coincided with the creation in September,
1947 of the Cominform.
The latter was also an episode in the progress of the
Cold V/ar.

The Communist Information Bureau, as an

agency for

consultation among nine communist parties (those of East Europe
plus those of France and Italy), was a limited and much looser
resuscitation of the old Comintern.

The hardening

of attitudes,

the increase in mutual hostility and the sharpening of divisions
between the Soviet and American camps was thus marked by the
partial imitation of a previous institution which had been
created at an earlier, more adverse period when Communists had
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had deemed it necessary to decide international communist policy
from a central authority, one ttfhich, at the time of its dissolu
tion, had seemed superfluous against the prospects of communist
party successes in the future.

The creation of the Cominform

was in a sense a return to earlier patterns.
At the founding conference, Italian and French Communists
found themselves being severely critiaed for their moderation,
for not being more assertive in resisting the restoration of
reactionary groups to the control of the levers of power in
their respective countries and in preventing their countries
from slipping into the American camp.

The PCI and PCF would

need exert greater energy to prevent the existing trend from
worsening.

In Italy this meant that the party leaders need

simply to ease their restraint on the impatient rank and file.
3ut, with the elections impending the PCI chose to follow its
moderate course to its logical end.

In January, 1948, the PCI

held its Sixth Congress and in its final declaration reaffirmed
its intention to operate within the .framework of the Constitution
of the Republic despite the best efforts of reactionary classes
to put obstacles in the path of working class accession to
power and despite the threat of armed foreign intervention in
Italian affairs.1?

The declaration added that party sympathizers

should be prepared, if necessary, to fight for their rights in
the face of intimidating obstacles.

17.

Although the Peace Treaty was signed Allied troops were
still in Italy at this time.
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As the campaign moved into high gear the propaganda
mills of all the parties ground out reams of material to sway
the voter:
As the campaign began it appeared that the Front would win
more votes (about 40 per cent) than any other party or
electoral bloc...The Christian Democratic party was expec
ted to get only 30 to 35 pe*1 cent of the vote. 18
To reverse these prospects required a massive exertion
on the part of Christian Democrats and their allies.

The pro-

government campaign concentrated on a number of issues, all
basically variations on the same theme that Italy must stay
with the west, foster its advantageous alliance with the United
States and defeat communism at home.

The DC presented itself

to the electorate as the champion of freedom and bulwark
against communism whose possible victory was depicted as dis
aster for Italy.

It defended its record in the government and

its acceptance of the Marshall Plan for Italy.

Above all the

pro-government forces repeatedly emphasised that recent events
in Czechoslovakia would be the model for Italy If the Front
were to win the elections.^
18.

Wm. Caldwell "The Press and Propaganda in the 194# Italian
Election Campaign," Journalism Quarterly. Spring, 1953

19.

In February the coalition Czech government headed by Communists
(who formed the largest single party in Czechoslovakia and who
were jointed with the Socialist party in a common Popular Front)
had undergone a severe crisis.
Non-communist cabinet ministers
accused their Communist colleagues in the principal ministries
of turning the country into a police state and refused to con
tinue sitting in the communist regime. In the week-long con
frontation which ensued the non-Communist ministers were kept
out of office on communist insistence and consequently Czecho
slovakia became a purely communist People’s Democracy.
In
short what was happening in Czechoslovakia was an inversion of
the struggle for power in Italy.
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The events in Czechoslovakia formed an ideal issue
for the non-communist parties in Italy to use against the
Peoples1 Democratic Front.

The touchy questions of the Istrian

peninsula and of the City of Trieste, both of which were being
claimed by communist Yugoslavia were also played upon in stri
dently nationalistic tones.

Even the fate of some 10,000

Italian troops missing in Russia since the war was exploited
as an election issue.
At the grass roots level the most thorough anti-Front
campaigning, to benefit the Christian Democrats was carried out
by the Catholic church which spared no efforts on the latter*s
behalf.

The three million member Catholic Action was mobilized

to form "civic committees" in sorae 13,000 parishes in order to
educate the faithful in coordination with the local DC propa
ganda offices.

Churchgoing masses, overwhelmingly female,

heard about the evils of Communism from the lips of their parish
priests and were exhorted, under pain of mortal sin, to get out
and vote.

The government radio network, although officially

non-political, carried its news slanted to favour the government
and to put Communists in a bad light.

Finally, the anti-communist

crusade in Italy spilled over its borders into the United States
where millions of Italo-Americans were urged to write to their
relatives in Italy to vote against the Popular Front.
Facing this tide of anti-communist propaganda, the
Peoples* Democratic

Front aimed its own attacks against the
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sources from which the anti-communist offensives were launched,
particularly against the /atican and the United States’ State
Department.

De Gasperi and the DC were attacked as being

Fascist, a vassal of American imperialism and a tool of the
Catholic hierarchy.

The voters were urged to retaliate against

the "letters to Italy" campaign by voting for the Left.
One last card remained for the West to play.

In

March, 194S, the three Western powers declared that since no
agreement could be reached on choosing a governor for the Free
Territory of Trieste they favoured the city’s restoration to
Italy.

Since the USSR had advocated Yugoslav claims on the

city, the PCI would be put in a position of appearing to be
contrary to Italian interests if it questioned the justice of
the move.

Consequently, the Front was reduced to describing

the western proposal as an "electoral trick."
Finally, after being subject to weeks of the most
intense barrage of campaign propaganda in an extremely charged
atmosphere and against a dramatic background of international
confrontation on Italian soil, 92.1 per cent of the electorate
went to the polls to make their choice.
The choice trades on 11 diciotto aprile is wall known.
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II Secondo Dopoguerra:

1945 - 1953

When the ballots were counted in the days following
April IB a number of conclusions were to be drawn.

First and

most important of these was the fact that the actual results
of the elections turned out to be the inverse of what had been
predicted:

it was the DC which walked away with 43‘
a< of the

vote \<rhile the Social-Communist Front was kept to 31>j of the
total.

The Front did lose some two million votes to the break

away Social-Democrats but, even combined, this "socialist" vote
would have amounted to only 3b. 1^ of the total, still 10;.i less
than the DC.

Italian politics nevertheless remained, fundamen

tally, a three party affair.
Post-election voting analyses revealed that the DC
had made its gains basically in two wa y s :

it had picked up

three million votes from the smaller Right-wing parties, which
fared poorly in the voting, and had gained another two million
"new" votes from women balloters.

The frantic crusade to have

all anti-communist votes concentrate on the "bulwark" of
Christian Democracy was, therefore, a very real success and,
considering that the DC, with a relative majority of parlia
mentary seats, if it chose, could almost have governed alone
(it lacked but 3# more to have an absolute majority), the
results of April IB indicated a clear defeat for the extremeLeit led by the PCI.

It meant, above all, that there was no

chance for Communists to re-enter the government; the DC now
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had little fear Tor its parliamentary life; it need not "come to
terms" with the Communists.

The government if it pleased could

proceed full speed ahead to resuscitate Italian capitalism; bind
Italy’s destiny economically, politically and soon militarily
to that of the United States, champion the ambitions of the
Catholic Church, ignore the claims of the radical and proletarian
parties and release the controls against resurgent neo-Fascism.
To greater or lesser degree this is what would in
fact happen and, to the extent that all of these things were
utterly against what the extreme Left wanted, the focial-Couummist
defeat could be considered all the more decisive.

The PCI had

pinned all its hopes on legitimately winning enough political
power to claim a commanding voice in a coalition government.
Instead, after the 18th of April, the party found itself neither
in possession of that power nor in any position to force an
uninterested DC to ask for its collaboration.

True, about one

out of every three Italians supported the Front but almost one
out of two Italians had cast a vote against the Front by supporting
its principal rival, the DC.

The criticisms of PCI tactics

which had been levelled at the first Cominform meeting were
correct insofar as these tactics had failed to promote the PCI
into positions of real influence within government.
There did remain of course the "Greek road" to
Socialism which might have been taken instead of the "Italian
road" but, in the judgment of Luigi Longo:

"it is certain that
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had we gone the direction of Greece

we should

similar kind of counter-revolution."^of another PCI leader:

have faced a

In the concurring opinion

"The presence of the Allies can in fact

be considered to have been preclusive counter-revolution imported
into cur count 17-."2
For the PCI, April 16 represented a real setback:
it had been a crucial confrontation and the DC had emerged vic
torious as a frankly declared champion of conservatism.

If

April 16 represented a setback it was not, however, a total
defeat by any means.

The next general elections in 1953 would

prove to be much less of a triumph for the DC and more much
favourable to the Left.

In the five year interval the PCI would

bide its time in exercising its power as the major opposition
party.

Fince these same five years would mark the height of

the Cold VJar— with episodes of Hot Nar (Korea)— the role of the
PCI as a formidable pro-Soviet threat to a staunchly pro-American
government would have international as well as national overtones.

1,

Luigi Longo, "A che punto siamo?" Rinascita, (Rome), (26 i-iay,
1966), pp. 3-7
Longo adds that:
...the choice was not a simple question
of will, it could not overlook actual power relationships...
Togliatti laid great stress on the presence of the Allies as
a conditioning force on our policies. And this meant not
just military presence but also (the) economic...administra
tive presence for as long as the terms of the armistice and
the peace treaty endured.

2.

Giorgio Anendola, ibid. Hughes tends to share this view:
A decade ago it was still possible to imagine our country’s
(UPA’s) armed forces intervening in Italy to cancel the results
of a leftist electoral victory. "The New Italy and its
Politics" Commentary. No.
; October, 1964, p.
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In biding its time the party 'would not stand around
idly but neither would it embark on any rash adventures.

The

party leadership stood by its commitment to follow the consti
tutional road to power.

Had this attitude reflected expediency

alone, had the leadership simply lacked the chance to follow
another tack, the several ideal pretexts for instigating
revolutionary insurrections which did present themselves during
the course of things would not have been passed up as they were.
This restraint in exploiting explosive situations in the face
of harsh criticism from the Cominform, which increasingly
reflected Stalinist points of view, has even led some nonCommunist commentators to accuse the PCI of actually being a
party of conservatism.^
Such an opinion, however, is not without its polemical
content.

April IS had, it is true, been a verdict.

But no one

could claim that it was a verdict emanating from an atmosphere
of contemplative serenity, free from any trace of engineered
hysteria.

At least no one espousing a Gramscian point of view-

would claim this.

To refer again to one of Gramsci’s writings:

The crisis (of hegemony) creates Immediately dangerous
situations, because the different strata of the population
do not possess the same capacity for rapid reorientation
or for reorganizing theraaolvos with the same rhythm.
Tho
traditional ruling class which had a numerous trained per
sonnel, changes men and programmes and reabsorbs the control
which was escaping it with a greater speed than occurs in

3.

Giorgio Galli takes this vievr in some of his writings, e.g.
"The Italian CP: Conservatism in Disguise" Problems of
Communism VIII, Wo. 3 {May-June 1959) pp. 27-34
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the subordinate classes: it makes sacrifices exposes
itself to an uncertain power, strengthens it for the
moment and makes use of it in order to crush its opponent
and dispose its leading personnel which cannot be very
numerous or well trained.4
II diciotto aorile had inflicted its wounds, but it did
not entirely crush the opposition.

However, in the wake of

such a dispiriting electoral defeat, one which had effectively
prevented the PCI from claiming a legitimate share of govern
ment power, and in the grim international atmosphere of the
period— one of an impending clash between mast and V/est— the
PCI felt more acutely the need for the sustaining moral support
and political solidarity of its one time patron the USSR and, if
things came to the worst, to demonstrate that its ultimate loy
alties still lay with the ideals which the USSR represented.
In the aftermath of W'V II,

however, Soviet society

and government were themselves experiencing internal strains
which in later years would have far-reaching effects.

After

sustaining immense sacrifices to repel the Axis invasion of its
territories, the Soviet Union emerged from the war no longer
the solitary ’’cradle of the revolution” but as the head of an
entire bloc of states in East Europe.

The governments of these

states had in the inter-war period frequently been very antiRussian, philo-Fascist, and in some cases during the war itself,
aligned with the Axis.

4.

The communist parties in these states

Gramsci, loc. cit.
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were— if legal--usually weak, or outlawed altogether.

Hence

it was basically the gubernatorial presence of the Red Army
which had assured the postwar establishment in East Europe of
communist governments.

Quite understandably they remained

friendly and grateful to the Soviet Union.
But, rather than feel more protected, the USSR felt
even more insecure and, as the Western Alliance, in application
of the doctrine of "containment,n encircled the country with
military bases, a sense of being besieged.

The external threat

served as the pretext for the Soviet leadership, that is,
Stalin (who in his later years especially is reported to have
suffered from paranoia) to repeat the kind of behaviour prac
tised during the purges of the Thirties when Stalin ordered
the most ruthless crimes— torture, imprisonment, execution—
to be committed against numberless victims.

Again after V/V/ II

supposed enemy spies, counter-revolutionaries, plotters and
imagined traitors vrere liquidated -with the barest pretenses of
legality and with utter lack of justice.

This reversion to

police-state terrorism placed the populations of not only the
USSR but all of the East European countries under the severest
kind of psychological as well as political strain.
In the USSR the reapplication of the tight centralized
authority, necessarily weakened under wartime conditions, was
characterized by the coercive demand for the most stringent
orthodoxy on all matters; political, economic, cultural and
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idelogical.

Such orthodoxy extended to the whole Soviet bloc

and was justified and rationalized on the basis of a long culti
vated myth that of the infallible good judgment and almost
providential sagacity of Stalinfs leadership.
In the light of this demand for uncompromising singlemindedness and militant discipline within the Soviet bloc itself,
vrlth the unpleasant and oppressive atmosphere it created within
this bloc, the PCI could not expect Soviet indulgence for its
undogmatic flexibility and moderate line of action especially
when it had just emerged from a stinging electoral defeat.

Like

it or not, if the choice facing the PCI were to be reduced
ultimately to one of being either "for" the USSR or "against"
the USSR the answer, especially in 194ci, could not be equivo
cated. 5
To have chosen the latter would have negated the
political rationale of the PCI since its creation in 1921.

After

everything elso was said, the October Revolution and its issue,
the Soviet state, had been the first effort in history to begin
building Socialism, despite tlv* best efforts to "strangle it in
its cradle," against the greatest physical odds and at the cost
of immense privation and suffering on the part of the Soviet
people.

This momentous achievement, in turn, animated the

struggle of communist movements throughout the world which

5.

Vide, Rossana Rossanda "Unita politics e scelte culturall"
II Contemporaneo/Rlnascita. (Rome), (Aug. 28, 1966, pp. 19-24
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continued to be inspired by the achievements of the USSR and
to look to its prestigious leaders for support and encouragement.
If these leaders determined that the time called for militancy
and discipline, then such

t,
us

their influence that other

Coramunists could not but become more militant despite their
own judgment concerning the proper course of action.
Thus, for a short time, prior to and after the April
elections in Italy, public demonstrations by party militants were
not discouraged by the PCI.

Neither were they encouraged, how

ever, not even when it seemed that a revolution was about to
erupt spontaneously.

On duly 14, 1943, as Togliatti was leaving

the Chamber of Deputies, a fanatic and ’unstable neo-Fascist
student, evidently goaded by the violent anti“Communist campaign
in the press shot and severely wounded the Communist leader.
While Togliatti lingered near death, Italy almost erupted into
civil war.

Over the entire peninsula riots occurred, and

barricades were throvm up in the streets.

Industry was brought

to a halt when the CGIL called for a general strike.

In clashes

between -workers and police, several persons were killed.

To

have touched off a full blown insurrection iirould have required
only a word from the PCI leadership.

Although there were those

in the party who urged this very course, Togliatti
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restrained such action.^

The forces aliened against the party—

the army (Italian and foreign) and the national police brigades—
were too clearly overwhelming to risk the useless bloodshed and
inevitable defeat which would have ensued from such an armed
clash:
After the events of July 1943, the Italian Cor.imunist Party
became an opposition party as indeed it had to be within
the conditions of the Gold t/ar. 3ut: even so, it avoided
any frontal clashes with the government which might have
caused it to be outlawed and Togliatti pursued his goal
of making the Party the foremost democratic force in
Italy.7
To some; for whom "Communism" and "Democracy11 remain
quite incompatible ideals, the goal of making the PCI "the
foremost democratic force in Italy" would seen; to be a contra
diction and an impossibility.

Gut, the quadripartite government

which would rule Italy for the next five years was to og formed
by parties either dedicated to perpetuating the economic status
quo (Liberals) or by parties which, if reform-minded at all,
sought reforms without tears {focial-Democrats and Republicans.)

6.

Togliatti*s personal sentiments on this fundamental problem
facing the PCI (referred to by Longo in a previous quotation
(vide p.I67) are revealed in this quotation: Had we ux'oused
the masses to an insurrection...we should have detached from
these masses but a small vanguard. The latter would have
bean met with a fusillade and the rest would have fallen
under the influence of conservative and reactionary groups.
The entire evolution of our country would have been different.
Instead of bringing ourselves closer to a socialist perspec
tive we should have made it more remote. Quoted by Georges
Jarlot "Le Neo-Marxism© Italian", Etudes. No, 324, (JanvierJuin 1964) pp. 32-46. This is the kind of "conservatism"
to which Galli seems to allude.

7.

Robert v/ohl, "Togliatti: Master of I'ianoeuvre" Communist
Affairs,I. Wo. 9, (Nov. -Dec. 1963), pp. 21-26
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The DC itself contained currents which went both further Right
and further Left than any of its coalition partners but, as
long as De Gasperi held the reins, the DC kept a steady course
just to the Right of Centre.

Thus, under these circumstances,

it was the opposition parties of the Left, and, of these,
principally the PCI, which articulated most forcefully the
popular demands for reforms and represented the most powerful
challenge to the power of the propertied and privileged.
Faithful to its commitments, the De Gasperi government
utilized its electoral power to proceed with its policies of
financial orthodoxy.

The arrival of economic aid under the

ERP assisted the Italian government in its goals of stabilizing
prices and restoring industrial production to its prewar levels
but it did not seek to alter the basic structure of the Italian
economy.

Unlike France, Italy was never equipped with a long

range economic plan and economic activity was revived privately
without priorities or plans.

The propertied classes, whose

wealth was based on ownership of land or industries in fact
grew richer during the post-war inflation; on the other hand,
salaried classes grew poorer.

The savings of the middle classes

were wiped out by the inflation:

the lira in 1950 had been

reduced to about one-fiftieth of its value of 193S.

Consequently,

it was this latter class which most frequently responded to
the appeals of neo-Fascism ("things were better...").

V/age-

earning classes were in a somewhat better position than the
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salaried middle-classes since their wages could be adjusted
upward as the rhythm of industrial production increased and
particularly since the vote of these working-classes remained
a powerful threat to the industrialists.
A major irony in the political arrangement which
resulted from the vote of April ltf was that the PCI— a party
denounced by its opponents as being utterly contemptuous of
law and order— was cast in the role of being the defender of
constitutional legality while the DC— a party whose very name
included the word Democracy— felt constricted by a constitution
which had been adopted through legal and democratic procedure
and resisted its full application.

Even today, nineteen years

after the constitution has been in existence one of its major
provisions, the institution of the Regions has not been effected
except in the case of five Regions whose demands for autonomy
could not be resisted.

Although every kind of rationalization

for this state of affairs is put forward, the real reason for
it is the fact that there exists across North-Central Italy the
famous T,Red Belt" of Tuscany, Umbria, Le Marche, and Emilia
Romagna.

Regional autonomy would place these communist strong

holds out of the grips of the Ministry of the Interior.

£.

The five are: Sicily, Sardinia, Val d fAosta, TrentinoAlto Adige, and most recently, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, all
of them either islands or Northern frontier regions with
large linguistic minorities.
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Other important democratic institutions provided for
in the constitution were also delayed as long as possible.

The

Constitutional Court and Supreme Council of the Magistrature
for example were created only eight years after the constitution
went into effect.9
These delays by the Christian Democratic regime in
making the constitution fully operative, delays which were
based upon political convenience rather than technical inoppor
tunity, consequently prevented the extension of popular partici
pation in self-government.

The field of local, provincial and

regional government remained {and remains) ultimately subject
to the centralized authority based in Rome and "Rome" increasingly
reflected the will of the DC which was consolidating its own
party hegemony over the apparatus of State.

Indeed, if there

was one issue which kept the various correnti of the DC from
pulling apart it was their common accord to use their power to
fight off the "communist menace."
The offensive against the Communists extended as well
to one of the most important of their strongholds, to the unions.

9.

It is Mammarella’s opinion that:
"In the case of the Consti
tutional Court and the Supreme Council of the Magistrature,
the government and the parties of the majority have delayed
their establishment as long as possible in order not to be
deprived of important instruments of power, such as for
instance the Fascist police laws, which the court should have
abolished— although this did occur later.
The failure to
set up the other institutions— legislation by popular initia
tive, the popular referendum and regional administration by
regular statute— can be explained by the majority’s preoccu
pation with denying an advantage to the Social-Communists."
op. cit., pp. 1C6-1S7
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Ever since the industrial strike of 1942 and 1943 which began
the process which led to Mussolini*s overthrow, the communist
influence in the unions was overwhelming.

The actual manage

ment of the postwar General Confederation of Italian Labour,
like the government, was at first tripartite, joining together
leaders affiliated with the Communist, Socialist and Christian
Democratic parties respectively.

In practice, the highly capable

Communist, Giuseppe DiVittorio, exercised his skill in organiz
ing and his forceful ability to communicate his ideas to the
rank and file as well as to the leadership to win the two other
union secretaries over to his point of view and to have the
latter, willingly or with hesitations, follow the policies he
advocated.
Since the Communists were not only more aggressive in
their promotion of worker interests and demands but better organized,
they were better able to staff lesser positions in the union
hierarchy with dedicated union workers.

Here the Christian

Democrats could not compete with the Communist*s party man for
man, as they could in the rural parishes, for unlike the latter
case the DC did not have in the factories the local clergy at its
disposal.-*-0

10.

The same situation in France led to the unsuccessful "workerpriest* experiment where priests took up jobs in factories
alongside the workers. To the chagrin of the hierarchy it
was found that, rather than workers becoming better Catholics,
priests were becoming Communists.
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Thus the only way for non-communist union leaders to
tveaken the PCX hold on the unions was to secede from the CGIL.
The pretext arose after the CGIL used the union organization
to foment worker demonstrations which were of political rather
than economic nature:

the demonstrations following the attempt

on Togliatti*s life, against the Marshall Plan, and against the
unloading of military supplies from the United States were
examples of such "political” strikes which reflected the
communist point of view.
Shortly after the events following the July 14 assassi
nation attempt, the Catholics left the CGIL to form the CISL
(Confederazione Italiana dei Sindacati Liberi— Italian Confed
eration of Free Unions) and, somewhat later, the Social-Democrats
left to form the UIL (Unione Italiana dal Lavoro) . ^

The

Socialists, however, remained and are still joined with the
Communists in the CGIL.
In July, 1949 a blow was aimed a
another direction.

he Communists frora

From the throne of St. Peter was hurled an

excommunication against all those who professed, defended, pro
pagated, published, read, diffused or collaborated by writings,
books or periodicals "the theory and practice of Communism."

11.

"These secessions, which vrere backed by moral and financial
support from American union representatives, deprived the
CGIL of perhaps a third of its membership." Hughes, op. cit.
p. 169
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Inexorably, the PCI continued its advance but, now,
the advance was achieved not by the old conspiratorial methods
but, rather, by becoming openly an enormous mass party, the
largest in the non-communist world, which achieved despite every
effort to halt its progress a membership of over two and one-half
million at its greatest extent.

Papal excommunications against

"atheistic Communism," especially from a Pope who made princes
and counts out of his nephews, convinced only those already
opposed to Communism of the need to resist it.

vfliile economic

and social disparities in Italy remained so acute and unalleviated,
pleas on behalf of the defenders of the status quo, regardless
of from how prestigious a source they emanated, could not prevent
those masses who remained victims of that same status quo from
listening to the attacks against the injustices it perpetuated.
This still does not explain the endurance of communist power in
Italy, assuming that this power depends solely upon the economic
deprivation of the population.

The PCI today is electorally

stronger than it ever was despite the effects of the much
advertised "Kiracolo Sconomico" which Italy has experienced.
Any government which

might have come to power in

1943, regardless of its political colouring, would have faced
the same socio-economic problems and would have had to have
taken some steps to solve them, even if only by accomplishing
the bare minimum.

Agriculture remained the greatest headache.

One half or more of the population still remained on the land

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

180

and of these the landless braccianti (literally "the ones with
arms" their only source of income) who worked on a day to day
basis for the owners of the latifondi. formed alone about one
quarter of the agricultural population.

These "wetbacks" lived

in the most hopeless conditions with no security of employment
and were for much of the year in fact jobless.

Emigration had

traditionally been their only escape.

II, however, the

After

braccianti in angry desperation began to occupy some of the
great estates, particularly of the South, which were semi
cultivated or completely neglected by absentee owners.

In the

face of this menacing social unrest the De Gasperi government
introduced a bill to redistribute the land (with indemnities
to the owners) to the landless peasantry.

In doing so, the

conservatives in the government (particularly the Liberals and
Right-wing Christian Democrats) fought the measure at every turn
in alliance with the bitterly opposed Federation of Agricultural
Employers, Confagricoltura.

Although almost two million acres

of land were redistributed by the land reforms, they have not
brought the resounding success which had been hoped for.
The Christian Democratic land reformers had hoped to
create a class of independent peasant farmers of the kind who
usually could be counted on to vote DC.

Therefore, going against

the trend of modern agriculture everywhere, land was distributed
to the peasants in .small uneconomic parcels instead of joining
the peasants together in larger cooperative types of agricultural
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enterprises.

The latter were particularly suitable for the

South where the land was often infertile and required modern
mechanized techniques applied xvith industrial efficiency to
achieve a suitable yield.

The not infrequent result was that

the resettled farmer, unable with his old and inefficient
techniques to make a go of his new farm and lacking the invest
ment capital to mechanize even his own small acreage, abandoned
his new cottage to return to his squalid village where at least
he could share his poverty with others.
Along with the land reform was created a new agency
La Cassa per II Kezzogiorno (The Fund for the South) which was
provided with very substantial funds to carry out sorely needed
public works projects (roads, aqueducts, power installations etc.)
which would provide an infrastructure for future economic advances
nevertheless, the South was suffering from an immediate excess
of population which neither a well-conceived land reform nor
serious regional planning of the Tennessee Valley kind could
entirely alleviate.

An industrialized South might have been

the answer, but no such condition existed.

Consequently, Italy

began to experience an entirely new social phenomenon which is
still continuing; the mass migration of millions of Southerners
seeking work in northern industrial cities.

The Two Italies

were finally to meet but not in the manner expected by economists.

12.

This dramatic confrontation between Northerner and South
erner has been cinematically depicted by the highly praised
director Luchino Visc-onti (a Communist) in his film "Rocco
and his Brothers.”
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The less than satisfactory results of the government *s
various programmes and policies both foreign and domestic soon
began to reveal themselves politically.

When NATO was officially

formed in 1949> the De Gasperi government unhesitatingly com
mitted Italy to the Alliance as a logical application of its
general political line and in very short time American military
bases were established over the Italian peninsula.

By 1953 5

Italy itself, having assumed onerous military obligations as
part of NATO, was diverting 23%of the Italian national budget
to military expenditures, an amount whose size disturbed even
Right-wing Italians.^3
It was the outbreak of the Korean War which most
deeply distressed wide sectors of the population who had had
their fill of war and were basically of neutralist leanings.

13.

In 1953, while these hundreds of billions of lire ^were
being spent to defend Free Italy from the Communist Menace,
a parliamentary commission published its findings on the
living standards of the Italian people.
In the *Vigorelli
Report» the following facts were brought to light: 11.7#
of Italian families were declared utterly destitute; a
similar number were "needy” ; 6 5 .7# lived in "modest condi
tions" (for Italy); 232,000 families lived in cellars,
attics or warehouses; 92,000 lived in caves or ’"icks and
most Italian housing lacked even elementary hygienic
plumbing facilities.
In 1952 the national census showed
that some five million Italians were still illiterate
and millions were semi-literate. There were at the same
time over two and a half million unemployed in the country.
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To these people, the military rather than the financial impli
cations of the governmentfs foreign policy were the immediate
cause for anxiety.

Nationalistic-minded Italians disliked the

governments lack of an ,findQpendent,, foreign policy and its
obsequious eagerness to please Washington while the angry
reactions of the Communists and other Left-wing sympathisers
(strikes and demonstrations) unmistakably revealed their hostile
attitudes.

These and other factors helped to diminish the

popularity of the government.

Inevitably also the practise of

the clientela and parentela, the peculiarly Italian forms of
porkbarreling, became rife in what is known as the sotto-governo
or "sub-government" of the ministries and numerous state cor
porations, all of which were usually run by DC appointees.

The

indications that all of this was not popular with the electorate
were first revealed in the local administrative elections held
in 1951 and 1952.
The results of both elections showed a substantial
decline of votes for the DC which dropped from its 1948 total
of 48.5$ to 35.9$ of the votes cast.

The four million votes

it lost were picked up mostly by the revivified H i g h . -ing
parties such as the neo-Fascist MCI and the Monarchist party,
the latter of which actually won the Naples elections.

While

the Communists held their positions, the PSI made some notable
advances which began to stir up anew the autonomist elements in
the PSI who wanted greater self-identification from the PCI.
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Social-Democrats showed gains as well.

Nevertheless the admin

istrative elections were only the prelude for the battle which
lay ahead in national elections of 1953.
The loss of votes suffered by the

DC in

the 1952 and

1953 elections, as well as losses by the Liberals and Republi
cans, indicated that the majority enjoyed by the quadripartite
coalition had been pared to a bare minimum and, if national
elections were to be held soon, even this margin might disappear
if the trend continued.

In fact, national elections were in

the offing and the prospect of losing frightened the Christian
Democratic leaders and their coalition partners into introducing
a bill in Parliament which ignited an uproar of opposition and
exposed the government to an unflattering comparison with the
Fascist government of thirty years earlier.

In 1923 the latter

had rigged the election laiys to assure for itself a parliamen
tary majority.

IVhat the Christian Democratic government proposed

was a similar electoral lav; (dubbed by the opponents as La
legge truffa (the fraud or swindle law) by which a single party
or an alliance of one or more parties (such as the four parties
of the coalition) which was able to muster at least

of the

total vote would be given a premium of eighty-five seats thus
raising the "winner’s" majority to a safe
the Chamber.

of the seats in

After chaotic scenes characterized by very

unparliamentary behaviour in both of the Italian Chambers, the
law was passed over the violent protests of the opposition parties

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

185

and automatically* became the chief issue of the 1953 election
campaign.

The election took place on June 7 xi/ith 93# of the

electorate voting.
If II diciotto aprile is memorable for the failure
of the Popular Front to vault itself into power by electoral
means, II sette giugno can be considered as the April 18th of the
Right since the coalition parties together failed to win even
50.01# of the vote.
less.

Thus the new electoral lav/ was made use

The Social-Democrats and Republicans fared very badly

although the DC improved its showing as compared with 1952-53
local elections and won 40.1# of the vote.

The PCI and PSI

ran on separate lists to emphasize their opposition to the
,rSwindle Lawlf and while the former made some gains the PSI
gained twenty-three new seats.

The other notable advances were

made on the Right by the Monarchists who successfully exploited
the political illiteracy of enough Southern peasants to jump
from three seats in 1948 to forty in 1953.
The 1953 elections form another milestone in the
political history of postwar Italy.

In a real sense they meant

that the struggle between Left and Right could be c a ^ ^ d a
"draw11:

if the Left had been barred from grasping tho power

which was just within its reach in 1948, neither could the
Right hope to monopolize it after 1953*
Italian Communists were not unused to hearing certain
accusations repeatedly levelled at them:

they were “threats to
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democracy,” "totalitarians” and even no less than "enemies of
the human race.”

Yet, when the vilifiers still posed sancti

moniously as defenders of democracy just after having failed
barely in their attempt to sabotage the representative nature
of the Italian parliament, when they continued to delay putting
important provisions of the republican constitution into effect
in order to profit politically and especially when they eagerly
utilized Fascist police lavra against political enemies while
posing as anti-Fascists the accusations tended, after the elec
tions of 1953, to emit an odour of mendacity.

To these

hypocrites the Communists might well have repeated Higoletto,s
contemptuous epithet with regard to the assassin Sparafucile:
Pari siamo (We are both alike).

The Third Quinquennium:

1953-195b

In 1916 Gramsci wrote:
Every revolution has been preceeded by an intense labour
of criticism, of cultural penetration, or permeation of
ideas through groups of men initially refractory and en
grossed with solving day by day their own political and
economic problem.14
Attention has already been made concerning Gramsci*s
thoughts on the competition which exists between groups or

14.

Quoted by Neil l-lclnnes "Antonio Gramsci" Survey. No. 53 >
(Oct. 19o4)> PP. 3-15
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classes for the position of "hegemony” in any given society;
and reference has also been made to the considerable political
power and influence achieved by the PCX after it returned to
public activity in Italy after I’Atf II, a power and influence
which the party continues to retain and in fact has succeeded
in increasing.

Communist power in Italy, however, cannot be

measured strictly in terms of percentages of the popular vote
in elections, in numbers of parliamentary seats or in numbers
of city or town councils controlled by the PCI.
This is not intended to mean that one must not forget,
when calculating communist power in Italy, to include other
institutions in which communist participation is significant,
that is, in the unions, in the extensive system of cooperative
businesses, in import-export businesses or in other enterprises
such as publishing.

These, of course, are very important but

in gauging the true extent of the influence of the PCI in Italy
such yardsticks do not suffice.

They do not cover what is

immeasurable, that is to say, the extent of the ideological
attraction which the Italian variant of Communism has on
Italians.

They cannot appreciate, in a word, the extent of the

"hegemony" of communist ideology in Italian society for the
latter is not strictly identifiable with the political institu
tion which is the PCI.

The incalculable attraction of Gramsci

lies at the centre of the issue, for his posthumous influence
extends far beyond those circles which would be willing to be
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identified as communist or at least as supporters of the PCI
as a party.
The years after 1953 are profoundly important in
Italian political history because they are years in which another
svolta in the course of Italian politics began to take place.
To use Amintore Fanfani’s phrase, the period between 1953 and
195S were "difficult but not sterile years,"

This could be

said for European or international affairs as well but, for
Italy, it signified particularly the period when the groundwork
was first being laid for the "opening to the Left" on the part
of the Right and indeed for the "opening to the Right" on the
part of the Left,

Much of this preparation was achieved not so

much on the purely political level as on the cultural/ideological
level where the Italian intelligentsia, regardless of political
leanings, spoke the same intellectual language.
The pre-Fascist culture of Italy, so deeply influenced
by Crooaan idealism, did not suffer the same fate as pre-Fascist
politics which were thoroughly eliminated during the twenty year
long regime.

To a great extent the former emerged intact

because even the "official" Fascist culture and ideology had
been created with the same intellectual tools which lay at the
disposition of all intellectuals trained in the classical tradi
tion of Italian scholarship,
Giovanni Gentile, the most distinguished ideologist and
apologist of Fascism, had once been an intimate collaborator of
Croce’s until the two parted ways and the latter, as a Liberal,

UNIVERSITY OF WINDSOR LIBRARY
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assumed his "quietist" opposition to the regime.

Croce*s intel

lectual opposition was tolerated by the regime not simply
because it served as convenient proof that "opposition" was
allowed in Fascist Italy, nor simply because this opposition,
limited as it was to the tiny elite of scholars conversant with
Crocean thought, was quite ineffectual, but also because Croce’s
immense prestige as the doyen of an entire cultural tradition,
shared by Gentile and Gramsci alike, mad© his suppression
unthinkable.

When the old man emerged from Fascism with his

intellectual integrity uncompromised his prestige was oven more
widespread among the cultured classes:
The immediate effect of Mussolini’s fall, then, was to
strengthen the hold of Croceanisia on Italian literary
and social thought; the position of pre-erainence that the
Neopolitan philosopher had achieved in the past forty
years seemed only to be confirmed by the destruction of
the Fascist tyranny. Yet this leadership was more pre
carious than it appeared: in most cases it rested on
vague respect rather than on true understanding and Croce
was by now too old to adapt to the new Italy that was
emerging from the ruins of war.15
Croce’s thought, while exercising an undeniably wide
spread and profound influence on Italian culture, had, at the
same time, a smothering effect.

It was almost as effective as

the Fascist intolerance for the non-Fascist ideas which were
common currency in the rest of v / e stern Europe and North America
not to speak of the USSR.

15.

Between Croce and Fascism nothing

Hughes, op. cit., p. 238
Hughes gives a very informative while concise account of
the intellectual realignments in post v/W II Italy in his
book The United States and Italy. Chapter 11, For a deeper
exposition of Croce’s thought see the same author, Con
sclousness and Society (Chapters 2, 3 and 6 particularly).
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could grow:
Thus Croccanism in the immediate post-Fascist era exerted
an influence almost diametrically opposed to what it had
stood for a generation earlier. In the first two decades
of the twentieth century Croce’s historical and literary
idealism had come as a breath of renewal; in the 1940’s
it figured as a solidly established cult whose aesthetic
formulations masked rather than illuminated the harsher
features of contemporary Italian life. It was only a
question of time before some new approach to reality would
shake up Italy’s intellectual world and-.almost overnight
release it from Croce’s hypnotic spell. 1
Enter Antonio Gramsci.

While the PCI was conducting

its struggles on the political plane, with the degree of success
and failure already described, the body of Gramscian thought
began to permeate Italian intellectual life.

In it were syn

thesized the traditions of Crocean philosophical culture,
Marxist criteria of socio-economic analysis, and an acute and
profoundly humane personal consciousness of the squalor and
backwardness which formed so large a part of the Italian reality,
a reality which was all the more glaring when no longer veiled
by the veneer of Fascist rhetoric.
Artistically, the first reactions were to be seen in
the wave of postwar films now known under the generic name of
"Neo-realist," films such as Rossellini’s "Rome, Open City,"
-"Paisa," and Do Sica’s "Sciuscia" and "Bicycle Thief" which are
regarded as classics and which hid nothing of the truth of

16.

Hughes, ibid.
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Italian life from the camera lenses.

In literature, the

writings of Cesare Pavese, Alberto Moravia, Elio Vittorini,
Carlo Levi, Vasco Pratolini, Pier Paolo Pasolini and others all
reflected a preoccupation with the interaction between the
characters in the novels and the social situation.

Usually the

protagonists were simple people of poor station or else wellto-do characters bored and corrupted by the hollowness of their
easeful lives.

But, while these engage*creations could and did

express a deep sympathy for the poor and oppressed they could
not be ’’political" as such.
Gramsci*s own work was more immediately connected with
political and social theory, even if his aim was to relate this
theory to the needs of the same masses from which the neo-ralists
took their characters.

Gramscifs desire was to create a pro

letarian ethic which would overcome all other rival ideologies
and raise the working classes to a ^position where they could
exercise the cultural as well as social, economic and political
hegemony over society.

To achieve this in the Italian context,

Gramsci thought., required that he come to grips with Croce:
It is necessary to practise on the philosophy of Croce the
same reduction that {Marx and Engels) practised on the
Hegelian philosophy. This is the only historically fruit
ful way of bringing about an adequate renovation of the
philosophy of praxis (i.e. 24arxism), of elevating that
philosophy, which has been "vulgarized" for the immediate
needs of practical life, to the level it must attain...
(namely) the creation of a new integral culture which will
have the mass-character of the Protestant Reformation and
the French Enlightenment as well as the character of Greek
culture and the Italian Renaissance, a culture that will..,
synthesize...politics and philosophy in a dialectical
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unity...For us Italians, to be the heirs of German philo
sophy means being the heirs of the Crocean philosophy . . ,^-f
The above statement, has been explained as arising
from Gramsci’s conviction that marxism "had suffered a ’materia
list’ degeneration in his time."^5
caused in three ways:

This degeneration had been

firstly, Stalinism had reduced its

(Marxism’s) metaphysics to a "mechanical materialism;” secondly,
cultural, social and ethical factors in social change had been
reduced to a "narrow political interpretation” in Leninism; and.
thirdly, in order ”to van the support of the plebs whose intel
lectual capacity

or incapacity, reflected merely vulgar

prejudice and naive realism" Marxism had been simplified for
purposes of mass indoctrination.

Political practice and

speculative idealism had to be fused, not one time for all but
"by each generation at higher levels."

Gramsci’s immediate task

then was to achieve such a fusion which for Italy would "take
the form of an anti-Croce written by a Marxist."
Such a concept does not indicate a totalitarian,
ideological or political order.
Jesuit,

As suggested by a French

Italian Communism refuses to assume a strictly

17.

Gramsci’s "11 matarialisiiao storico e la filosofia di
Benedetto Croce"quoted by Neil Mclnness in "Antonio Gramsci"
p. lO. Mclnness gives a good short summary of Gramsci’s
thought in his article relating it to other Marxist thought
and to the PCI’s position today.

1C.

Mclnness ibid.
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proletarian colouring for it seeks to attract to itself not
only the masses but the elites as well.

Hence, according to

the same writer "pluralism is necessary" to the PCI not simply
because of the numerical realities of Italian politics but
"doctrinally as well":
Marxism necessitates, in order that it purify itself both
dialogue and dialectic.
Hence, praxis. For the latter,
thought is action and action is thought: the dialectical
progression does not consist of destroying the thesis by
means of the antithesis, but of saving all that is posi
tive furnished by one and the other, and to raise both one
and the other to a synthesis which is entirely positive.
(Aufhebung)19
Thus, with regard to the "narrow" or political Leninist
version of Marxism, despite its historical indispensibility,
Gramsci felt about the same way "a theologian does about simple
minded ^popular religion1."20

^his did not diminish the impor

tance of the Leninist type party because the latter remained the
most important instrument of political action.

Even a revolu

tionary movement of mass participation whose goals are cultural
and ethical must be subject to the discipline of organization
and leadership which is provided by a party.
that the party will be authoritarian.

This is not to say

There must be a reciprocity,

almost a dialectic, between the leadership, which must remain
sensitive and responsive to the aspirations oi' the mass base,
and this same base whose self-consciousness is concentrated in

19.

Georges Jarlot, "Le Neo-marxisme Italien" Etudes, No. 324, p.35

20.

Mclnness, op. cit. p. 11
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its leadership.

In such a praxis the party becomes the medium

through which thought, which ideally exists in individual minds
•'becomes actual, lives historically, that is

s o c i a l l y ."21

A philosophy such as Marxism must seek its •’proof’* by
conquering mass support as a way of living.

And at a crucial

point in that effort "it will need a Machiavellian Prince to
incarnate the collective will that has opted for its morality."22
To use Gramsci’s own words:
The modern Prince, the myth-prince cannot be a real person,
a concrete individual; it can only be an organism, a com
plex element of society in which the cementing of a collec
tive will, recognized and partially asserted in action has
already begun. This organism is already provided by his
torical development and it is the political party:...It is
necessary to define collective will and political will in
general, in the modern sense: will as working conscious
ness of historical necessity, as protagonist of a real and
effective historical drama.
One of the first parts (of a
study of modern revolution) ought in fact to be dedicated
to the "collective will" posing the question in this way:
"When can the conditions for the arousing and development
of the national popular collective will be said to exist?’.'..
The Modern Prince must, and cannot but, be the preacher
and organizer of intellectual and moral reform, which
means creating the basis for a later development of the
national-popular collective will towards the realisation
of a higher and total form of modern civilization.2’
In this notion of the party, Marxism is anything but
a crude materialist economism.

The latter becomes rather an

21.

Ibid.

22.

Mclnness, op. cit. p. 13

23.

Gramsci, Mote sul Hachiavelli (The Modern Prince) quoted
by Mclnness, op. cit. p. 13

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

195

element of a more integrated critical consciousness which is
diffused throughout the social collective.

In seeking to

bring about a fundamental moral and intellectual regeneration
of society as well as in pursuing immediate economic social
and political reforms the myth-prince becomes the instrument
or medium through which critical awareness (thought) becomes
programmatic (action).24

Through such a complete commitment

the ’’higher and more total form of modern civilization” will
be realized.
The party conceived by Gramsci remains voluntaristic
enough to be considered Leninist and didactic enough to be con
sidered Stalinist.

On the other hand Gramsci’s party seems to

go beyond purely political concerns occupying itself with the

24.

In this connection see Togliatti's comments on the obliga
tions of the party worker. Chapter I, p. 3 3 j footnote 33

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

much vaster questions of culture and civilization.25
"gout ds la. culture”26

Such a

could not but attract the attention of

the apolitical intellectual, especially in an environment such
as that of postwar Italy, where the ideals of the Resistance
were struggling bitterly with the conservatism which had been
the mainstay of the earlier regime.

25.

Gramsci has not infrequently been described as an "hereti
cal" or "open" Marxist usually by non-Communist intellec
tuals who would like to "claim" him as one of their own.
The implied sense is that had he not been isolated in
prison Gramsci would surely have broken with his party
during the Stalin years. However, the closest approxima
tion of what a profound cultural and moral, as well as
political-economic, regeneration of society seems to be
being made by no one as much as by the "Stalinist" Chinese
Communists. According to a competent and impartial obser
ver of Chinese affairs, Han Suyin, the Chinese Revolution,
with all its political, economic and social implications,
is not simply the result of the leadership of the Communist
Party willing change. The latter is convinced that social
change predicates irreversible changes in attitudes, a
self-conscious planning on a philosophical as well as
material scale. This furthermore assumes the perfectability of man through education; an education moreover to
be carried out on a mass basis otherwise the vast masses
of the population will remain untouched and unmoved by
whatever progress is achieved by the well-prepared elite.
Such a dichotomy would separate the basses and the elite
on a material as well as spiritual basis. To this may be
traced the importance attached to intellectuals doing
physical labour and perhaps some of the remoter roots of
the "Great Cultural Revolution" which seems to be as much
political as "cultural" in context.
Vide Han Suyin, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. V. XXII,
fto. 16, (June 1966), pp. 80-85

26.

Jarlot, op. cit. p. 35
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It is most apparent, therefore, that the impact of
Communism in Italy was not superficial,

nor limited to the

unhappy and dissatisfied working classes.

Its impact was broad

and deep and, until the Italian intelligentsia began later to
catch up vrlth the most advanced non-Larxist social economic
thinking, almost overwhelming.

The ideological confrontation

took place not only with the intellectuals of the "lay” tradition.
Catholics, that is to say the Catholic intelligentsia,
still exercised a profound influence in Italian society.
realized this better than Communists.

Wo one

Sut while the "lay” intel

ligentsia v/ith its traditional anti-clericalism could not (or
refused to) enter any dialogue with the "clericals," Communists
were prepared to do so on an ideological level.

The political

actions of the PCI with regard to the insertion of Article VII
in the Constitution have already been referred to.
ever, had little, if any, ideological overtones.

This, how
It was simply

a tactical effort to keep the door open for future efforts towards
achieving some understanding with the Catholics.

Such an under

standing took time to mature but the maturation did take place.
These were the "difficult but not sterile years" and the diffi
culty lay in the torturous political developments which took
place among all parties Left and Right.
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Towards the "Openings"
ifhile it would be interesting in itself to trace in
detail the political contortions which took place among the
government parties after the 1953 elections, these do not lie
within the immediate scope of this discussion.

It is, however,

necessary to indicate major developments as they relate to the
position of the PCI.
The Christian Democratic loss of its parliamentary
majority was not without its victims and the first of these
was De Gasperi himself:

after ruling the country more than

seven years he found himself unable to conjur up another 11combinazione" by which his eighth ministry could win a majority of
of parliamentary support.
The search thus began for another way out of the
political impasse with attempts to govern by monocolore (single
party) government (i.e. Christian Democratic ministries) or by
reviving the old quadripartite formula.

Until the next general

elections were held in 195d one short-lived ministry was
succeeded by another in a vain effort to find oome kind of
majority based on Centre-Eight support.

This meant that extreme

Right-wing parties usually lent their tacit support by not
voting against the government.

In turn, the government had to

be careful not to antagonize its Right-wing support by appearing
too zealous about economic and social reform.
The result was that successive governments all suffered
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from an immobilism which frustrated even non-Communists who
were sincerely interested in seeing some progress made,

For a

long while apologists of the Centre-Right were able to ration
alize this inertia by conjuring up before the antl-Communist
public an alarming vision of the only other alternative:
government of the Loft.

.Vhile the very mention of such a thing

no doubt caused some Italians to have nightmares about a Great
Dividing-Up Day in which their pockets would be emptied by the
Bolsheviks, the prospect of a government including the "demo
cratic Left” appeared to more and more people as the only
rational alternative.

The reasons were many.

While the govern

ments which succeeded each other after every few months were
distinguished by one coition feature, paralysis, on the level
of internal party politics the common characteristic cf all
parties seemed to be change
trends.

fluidity and clarification of

This was true for both Left and Right wing parties.
After De Gasperi’s fall tho phrase "apertura a sinistra11

which was coined by Pietro Hcnni. secretary of the PSI, became
one of the most frequently used terms in the Italian political
vocabulary,

VJhile -Nenni had used the phrase to mean that his

party was prepared to arrive at an understanding with the DC
if the latter were -willing to
wider significance.

collaborate, the term assumed a

The opening to the Left meant not only the

possible inclusion of Socialists in government but meant that
within the DC itself the Left-wing tendencies were beginning to
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come into their own.

This was indirectly due to a clarification

of the position of the Liberal Party which had frankly become
the spokesman for business and industrial interests, thus
stealing some important support from the DC Right.
Simultaneously in the DC personalities (such as
Amintore Fanfani) who were leaders of the Left or "popular"
currents in the party were assuming positions of power and
influence:

in 1954 Fanfani was elected secretary of his party.

Slowly the DC began to move leftwards while within the PSI
trends indicated a reciprocal move to the Right.

Such political

manoeuvrings had the effect of bringing the much thought about
"opening to the Left" closer to realization.
One of the most decisive "pushes" towards the Left
occurred in 1955 when Giovanni Gronchi x*as elected President of
Italy in succession to Luigi Einaudi.

Gronchi was a Christian

Democrat but he was not the official choice of the DC which had
chosen a conservative with good business connections as its
official candidate.

Gronchi belonged to the Left wing of the

Christian Democratic party and it was a humiliation to that
party*s Right-wing when, with Communist and Socialist support,
he was elected to the presidency of the republic.27

27.

The Italian Constitution stipulates that a president must
be elected by a two-thirds majority of both Chambers. After
the third ballot, if no one is elected, a simple majority
becomes sufficient. This makes the political weight of the
Left decisive in presidential elections since alone it con
trols more than one-third of the vote in the parliament.
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With GronchiTs election the Christian Democratic Right
lost the dominant position it had held in the party since the
end of the war.

Conversely, the DC Left began to play an

increasingly important role in deciding party policy although
as yet it was unable to dictate any policy.

On the other side

of the Right-Left dividing line the PSI continued its slow
separation from the PCI,

Part of the reason for this was the

clear possibility that Socialists might finally enter the pro
verbial "control room" and might share in shaping public policy.
But this was only part of the reason.

As attractive as parti

cipation in government appeared to the Socialists, other reasons
for the disengagement from the PCI were very decisive and per
haps most can be traced to the momentous year of 1956.

For the

international communist movement the year 1956 has profound sig
nificance especially when one considers the relationship of
one national communist movement to another.
Within the USSR, the years following WW II were
characterized on the economic level by a tremendous growth under
the Fourth and Fifth Five Tear Plans (1945-1955)*

During these

years the immense damage done to the Soviet economy during VJVJ II
v/as not only repaired but the rhythm of industrial production
was increased to such an extent that a comparatively prosperous
and comfortable life was beginning to become a reality for the
masses of Soviet citizens.

Agriculture, the perennial Soviet

victim of under-investment, lagged behind industry in produc-
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tivity, but as a consequence the agricultural problem was
increasingly to receive the close attention of Soviet planners.
But these achievements had not been without cost:
decades of privation and sacrifice had gone into building the
bases for the abundant life which was promised by the leadership.
By the early Fifties an entire generation of Soviet citizens
had been born and had grovm up under a communist regime, had been
educated to a degree which was later to surprise the world and
had sustained dreadful suffering during the war to defend what
they had collectively built.

The old rulers of the USSR, how

ever, did not develop with the economy and, after the war,
resumed the old methods of governing a modern and growing indus
trial society with a young and more sophisticated population
than that of the earlier era.

Repetition of 1930 slogans

about capitalist encirclement and internal dangers to the Revo
lution no longer carried the same weight with the younger
population straining restlessly under the limitations and
restrictions placed on personal expression.
Finally, in 1953, Stalin, the figure who came to
symbolize both the achievements as well as the despotism of the
Soviet regime, died and the ferment began.

After a series of

struggles among personalities representing currents of opinion
in the CPSU, Nikita Khrushchev emerged as the new leader, a
compromise between the "liberals" (Malenkov) and the "hard
liners" (Molotov).

To move forward Khrushchev found it necessary
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to change the old methods of ruling symbolized by the constipated
party apparat built up under Stalin.

To do so meant that

the halo which had been placed over the head of Stalin during
the long years of his reign had to be removed and this occurred
on February 25, 1956 when Khrushchev delivered a "secret" speech
to the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU.
That the speech was meant to be secret can be under
stood by its content for Khrushchev shocked and surpised even
his audience of party members by denouncing a list of crimes
which had been committed by Stalin during his life in power,
crimes which had long been the objects of accusations outside
the USSR but the subject of eloquent silence within the USSR,
The secret demystification of Stalin to Soviet Communist Party
members was probably part of a gradual long range plan to ease
further the controls on Soviet society particularly in cultural
matters {literature, the arts, etc.) which were already in the
process of a "thaw."

That the speech was intended to remain

privy to a restricted few testifies to the understanding the
Soviet leaders had about the probable consequences publication
would cause especially outside Soviet borders.

In June 1956,

however, the American State Department published what it claimed
was Khrushchev^ speech.

2b.

Events then took their own course and

The most sinister aspect of Stalinist rule, police terror
ism , personified by the chief of the Secret Police, Lavrenti
Beria, was eliminated shortly after S t a l i n g death.
Beria
himself was liquidated and the independence of the Secret
Police restricted.
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and in East Europe led to the well-known eruptions in Poland
and Hungary during October and November.
As has already been mentioned, the communist regimes
governing East Europe originally owed their establishment to
the presence of the Red Army in each of the various countries.
In some of these countries, such as Poland and Hungary, where
anti-Russian sentiment was traditional, the Soviet deus ex machina
behind the new regimes was bitter enough to accept.

But the

imposition of a stifling orthodoxy by leaders who were perhaps
more Stalinist than Stalin made the extreme social economic
and political transformations occurring in the Peoples* Demo
cracies even more indigestible.

Such leaders had built their

power on Stalin*s support and while he was alive basked in his
approval while carrying out highly unpopular measures (e.g. col
lectivization of agriculture in Poland.)
With the death of the Soviet roi soleil the hard-liners
in East Europe were already living on borrowed time.

When nev/s

of Khrushchev's astounding speech destroying Stalin’s aura of
infallibility filtered down to the ordinary people, all the
bitterness and resentment, pent-up during the hard years of
radical and ruthless change, sought expression.

While the

first eruptions occurred in Poland in October, it was in Hungary
that the most extreme reactions took place the following month.
Whereas in Poland a compromise was found and moderate "nationalcommunist" leaders (i.e. Gomulka) took over from the Stalinists,
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the Hungarian Stalinists held on tightly until popular demonstra
tions in Budapest forced the latter out and swept "liberals”
into office.
tfhile the Hungarian movement no doubt was partly
animated by Right-wing Hungarians hopeful of a reversal in the
political order, it seems most correct to characterise the Buda
pest events as a movement of nationalist and intellectual protest
by Hungarian Communists who were chafing under narrow Stalinist
tutelage (Gyorgy Lukacs, the most eminent living harxist philo
sopher, for example, sympathized with the insurrectionists).
Hungary might have been Poland excepting for two facts:

firstly,

the Hungarian regime, by pulling out of the V/arsaw Pact, was
going, or threatening to go, further than the Soviet leaders
were willing to tolerate and secondly, the crisis over Suez
diverted more world-wide attention (especially in the ex-colonial
"Third v/orld") to itself than did Hungary.

These combined cir

cumstances resulted in the quick suppression of the Budapest
uprising by Soviet tanks.

The "settlement" of its Hungarian

problem then allowed the Soviet leadership to concentrate on the
invasion of Egypt and to issue its ultimata to the Anglo-French
Israeli invaders to cease their attacks.
What, one may properly ask, has all of this to do with
Italian Communism?

The answer is:

kuch.

The consequences of

the events of 195& occurred on four levels or in four areas:
within the PCI itself, between the PCI and other Italian socialist
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parties, between the PCI and other national communist parties,
and on particular personal levels affecting mainly intellectuals.
While Khrushchev13 "deStalinization" speech will
probably remain the most famous document of the Twentieth Con
gress of the CPPU, the Congress had also adopted other resolu
tions which were of immense significance for parties such as
the PCI.

In particular one resolution seemed to reflect

Italian views exactly.
world which revealed:

Proceeding from an analysis of the
that Communism, although no longer

isolated in one country, had grown powerful enough even in the
one country to challenge the capitalist world on equal terms
and could resist "imperialist encroachments’1 on socialist
countries still too weak to resist alone; that working classes
in capitalist and colonial countries were gravitating more and
more towards communist and socialist ideas; and, that in fact,
in several countries the balance of political force was such
that national communist parties posed a real challenge to the
political status quo, the Congress inserted the following reso
lution into the party programme:
In a number of capitalist countries the working class,
headed by its vanguard, has, in present conditions, a real
opportunity to unite the overwhelming majority of the
people under its leadership and to ensure the transfer
of the basic means of production into the hands of the
people. The right-wing bourgeois parties and the govern
ments formed by them are suffering bankruptcy more fre
quently.
In these conditions the working class uniting
around itself the toiling peasantry. big sections of the
intelligentsia, all the patriotic forces and resolutely ^
rebuffing the opportunist elements, who are incapable of
giving up a policy of compromise with the capitalists and
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landlords, is in a position to win a solid majority in
parliament and turn it into a genuine instrument of the
people’s will.29
This statement could hardly have approximated the point
of view of the Italian Communist leaders more closely without
referring specifically to Italy and the PCI.

It vindicated

unequlvocably the line taken by the PCI since 194-4 and indicated
approval of the PCI’s adoption of constitutional and parliamen
tary methods of pursuing power.

The leadership of the PCI for

its part welcomed this declaration and indeed the work of the
whole Congress with understandable enthusiasm.

In his report

to the Central Committee of the PCI shortly after the end of
the Twentieth Congress, Togliatti dwelt at length on the inter
national situation and on the possibilities offered to communist
movements by what he termed the abandonment of "ideological
schematicism" and "worn slogans" in favour of net* initiatives
in thought and actions warranted by the new and favourable
conditions in which the world communist movement found itself.
It was, of course, necessary to maintain and defend the funda
mental principles which had always guided the communist move
ment but not at the risk of transforming these principles into
sterile formulae applicable for all time and all places:

"V/hat

we are doing today would have been neither right nor possible
thirty years ago."30

29.

Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism. (Moscow n.d.) p, 504

30.

Togliatti, "II XX Congresso del PCUf" in Problem! del movimento operaio internazionale (1956-1961), (Horae: 1962) p. 55
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In the same report, Togliatti also dwelt at length
on a critical examination of the life and work of Stalin in which
he sought to extract from Stalin*s achievements his positive
accomplishments while indicating the serious degenerations both
in the Soviet party and government caused by the uncritical
adulation and personal exaltation of the Soviet leader.

In

discussing the gravity of the distortions caused in the CPSU
and in the Soviet government by the cult of Stalin, Togliatti
never gave them the interpretations which arose in other quar
ters notably among Socialists and Social-Democrats.

The latter

groups sought to attribute the crimes which Stalin committed
not simply to the flaws in the character of the Soviet leader
but described them as products of a Soviet society which they
argued was so deficient in democratic guarantees that such
crimes were facilitated.

While it was just and necessary to

condemn some of Stalin's actions it was quite wrong, in Togliatti's view, to broaden this into a general condemnation
and rejection of Soviet society and the Soviet state.

Prom

his own criticisms and from the declarations of the CPSU at
its Twentieth Congress, the Italian communist leader stated
his hope that the PCI would see the lessons to be learned and
proceed towards making even greater achievements in the future
than it had in the past in searching out "an Italian road
towards Socialism."
Thus the first effect of the Twentieth Congress in
Italy was to foster a spirit of renewal, of liberalization and
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revitalization in the PCI.

The rejection of Stalinist methods

and excesses was a reassuranco to those Left-wing intellectuals
who while attracted to the PCI and its traditions hesitated
before the pai*ty»s past identification with Stalinism.

This

assertion of self identification was further emphasized a few
months later in June when Togliatti gave an interview to the
publication Nuovi Argomenti {co-edited by Alberto Moravia).
It was during this interview that Togliatti first enunciated
his famous thesis of ’’polycentrism" in the international
communist movement.

Togliatti explained that, while not dimi

nishing the importance of the CP3U and the Soviet Union, it
was no longer necessary to consider the Soviet Union as single
guide for other

socialist countries

nor the CPSU as the only

model for other

communist parties. The world had become so

diversified that to consider any one way of action as the only
possible way was quite simply impossible:
The entire system is becoming polycentric and even within
the communist movement itself one cannot speak in terms of
any single
guide but rather in terms of progress which is
made by taking paths which are often diverse.
One general problem which is common to the whole movement
has resulted from the criticisms levelled at Stalin— the
problem of bureaucratic degeneration, of the suffocation
of democratic life, of the confusion between constructive
revolutionary forces and the destruction of revolutionary
legality, of the separation of the economic and political
leadership from the life, the initiatives, the criticisms
and the active creativity of the masses...It will be up
to us to v/ork out our own ways and methods so that we too
may be protected against the dangers of stagnation and
bureaucratization in order to solve together the problems
of freedom and social justice for the working masses.31

31.

Togliatti "L*Intervista a "Nuovi Argomenti" Problem! internazionali...p. 116-117
-------- ------
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During the summer of 1956 Togliatti amplified and elaborated
these positions.

By

shattering Stalin1s myth of his own greatness, his

wisdom, his goodness and infallibility, by shattering, in a
word, the prestige which he had amassed for himself and the
party he led, the iconoclastic Soviet leaders of the Twentieth
Congress inevitably ’weakened their own prestige and that of
the CPS'u.

But, for parties such as the PCX, with long and rich

ideological and political traditions of its own, the possibilities
presented by the programme adopted by the Twentieth Congress
and the anti-Stalinist declarations of Soviet leaders were
limitless.

It would be correct to say that it was precisely

because of its ideological and political traditions that the
PCI was better prepared than some other parties {such as the
French CP) to carry the possibilities of deStalinization and
polycentrism to its most fruitful conclusions,
Togliatti lost no time in clarifying publicly lest it
be mis Linderstood by anyone, that while the party unequivocably
accepted and defended the Soviet system itself, even while
reserving serious criticism for some of its aspects, Italian
Communists were not bound to emulate or imitate the example or
experience of any other state or party.

The PCI was now even

more prepared in other words, to increase its flexibility of
attitudes, to minimise its sectarianism and to offer its
cooperation to other parties in their common struggle towards
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achieving a new "Left" majority in government.

The price of

its cooperation was to have a voice in determining the goals
towards which the new majority would address itself.
1956 began well for the POX,

The year

It ended less happily.

The events in Hungary already have been described.
The effects of the Hungarian events in Italy were widely and
deeply felt and by June the PCI was experiencing some electoral
losses during municipal elections in such traditional electoral
strongholds as Milan, Turin and Genoa.

»'hile the ferment caused

by the Twentieth Congress and the Khrushchev speech continued
within the PCI and outside of it throughout the summer months
the events of October and November caused the party its most
serious crisis.

Declarations clarifying party orientations

were able to arrest the effects of the Hungarian uprising neither
within the ranks of the PCI nor within the wider context of
the Italian Left.
Within the PCI, two tendencies wore formed:
the Left of the "official" party position
Right.

one to

the other to the

Of the two, the latter tendency was by far the most

important.

Prom this group a number of articulate younger

Communist leaders {such as Antonio Giolitti) broke v/ith the
party and entered the PCI.

The Hungarian uprising caused kno

small amount of confusion and contradiction among Italian
Communists.

The PCI’s "official" public position, reflected
\

by the party daily "L ’Unita" , ’was tc interpret the violence m
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Budapest as the work of neo-Fascist clericalists prodded on by
foreign capitalist imperialists intent on igniting a wave of
counter-revolutions in Eastern Europe.

Other pro-Communist

papers, groups of Comraunist intellectuals, even some leaders
of the CGIE, on the other hand, expressed solidarity with the
Hungarian insurrectionists,

for its part, the PSI condemned

the Goviet suppression of the uprising vigorously and "without
reticence."32
It was the solidarity which the leadership of the
PCI expressed for the boviet position on Hungary x/hich caused
dissident Communists such as Giolitti to react so decisively
against the party.

By defending the ultimate rightness and

necessity of the foviec actions in Hungary, as it had in the
past uncritically defended Btalin and the Soviet Union against
all enemies, the PCI, in the view of the dissidents, was pre
venting itself from becoming the advocate of theddemocratic
ideals which it approved and sought to pursue in Italy.

During

this period the PCX lost many of its most discerning and intel
ligent supporters, some 300,000 or so formal members.

That the

exodus was not larger than it was perhaps can be attributed to
the crisis occurring simultaneously over L-uea where the last
gesture of nineteenth century colonial imperialism was repealing

32.

The profound emotions felt by so many European intellec
tuals over the Hungarian events were given a most eloquent
expression by Albert Camus who coined the phrase "socialism
of the gallows" to describe the regime which ruled Hungary
before the uprising.
Camus* eloquence articulated the
feelings of many of the Italians who broke with the PCI
over the Hungarian question.
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itself to be as ruthless against Egypt as the Soviets were
against Hungary.

To be against the stance of the PCI did not

mean approving the behaviour of the other side.

Caught in this

bind was the PSI to which many of the disaffected Communist
intellectuals turned.
The Hungarian events finally ruptured the SocialistCommunist alliance which had already suffered a great strain
E/er since 1953> from the time of De Gasperifs fall, Menni had
been intimating to parties of the Centre and

flight that the

PSI was willing to move from the opposition into the ranks of
the government.

After Hungary, Henni returned to the Soviet

government a Stalin prize which he had been awarded when his
relations with the Communists had been closer and, in a series
of articles in "Avanti" and other socialist publications, Nenni
other socialist writers sought to express with greater clarity
the ideological divergences which separated the PSI from the
PCI and In these writings the question of Stalin was treated
more as the point of departure than as the kernel of the problem.
The Socialists sought to justify the autonomy of the PSI on
the basis of deeper differences.

In this polemic the Socialists

even returned to some of the criticisms directed by Karl Kautsky
against

Russian Marxists,
Kautsky, and by inference the Italian Socialists who

referred to his positions, had insisted that in doctrinal terms
a socialist revolution was impossible in Russia for it would
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not be based on the Imperative preceding bourgeois and indus
trial revolutions carried to their most advanced stages.
criticisms, Togliatti replied, were but:

These

"Old absurd heresies,

I’ri.th which we have been acquainted for a long time, but which
in the face of a record of forty years of successes, of vic
tories, of progress toward Socialism cannot today provoke
anything more than a smile."33
In reviving this old issue at its Thirty-Second Con
gress in early 1957 j the PSI was resurrecting its Maximalist
dilemma.

Two choices had always faced the PSI after 1921,

choices which created unsolvablo approach-approach conflict:
one choice was to accept the Bolshevik revolution and to assume
the consequences of defending it like it or not, as the PCI
had done, or to accept the implications of Kautsky*s criticisms
and hence move towards Social-Democratic positions.

In the

past the PSI had always hedged on both but final choice was
to come shortly and is in fact now being made.

In 1957 the PSI

was still unable to take any dramatic step even though the
record showed that since 1946 the PCI had been absorbing
Socialist supporters into its ranks to an alarming degree.
On the other hand, Interest in PSI-PSDI reunification
was aroused when during the summer of 1956 Nenni and Saragat

33t

Togliatti "Le decision! del XX Congresso e il Partito
socialists italiano," Problemi internaaionali, p. 2B4
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held a series of conversations at a resort tovm where both
were passing their holidays.

The hopes aroused in many quarters

that the reunification was imminent were to prove as yet prenature.

A major reason for this was the existence of a large

and influential Left-wing in the PSI which wanted neither to
break with the PCI nor to reunite with the Social-Demoerats
particularly If reunification occurred on the latter*s terms.
For the next few years therefore the PSI would become engaged
in a slow and anguishing move to the Right which would lead
eventually to the much desired aperture a sinistra and most
recently to a final process of reunification with the SocialDemocrats.

In this process the PSI Leftwing was to break off

from the party giving Italy a fourth Socialist Party:

the

Italian Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity (or PSIUP).
The PCI emerged from 1956 badly shaken but still
remarkably intact; indeed the party was chastened by its crises.
By 1957i the fortieth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution,
prospects seemed brighter:

1957 was the year of Sputnik I, the

year Soviet schools graduated over 50,000 engineers (more than
the US figure for the same year), and the year when finishing
touches were being worked out for the new Seven Year Plan by
which Soviet industrial production was to be increased by SO#
(at a time when the West was experiencing its recession of the
late Fifties).
Inevitably, just as the PCI shared the faults of
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Soviet policies it benefitted from its achivements.

Distaste

ful as the events of Fall 1956 were to many Italians, and as
serious as was the damage these events caused to the PCI,
greater distance in time tended to place 1T1956,f in the context
of painful time of readjustment for the Soviet Union, the PCUS
(and the PCI) after Stalin’s disappearance from the political
scene.

And, the more politically conscious intelligentsia

realized, after the polemical furor died down, that something
had changed.

The ideological statements of the PCI remained

on record as a possible point of departure for new attempts
to break the inertia which characterized Italian politics, an
inertia whose chief cause was the exclusion of the PCI from
being seriously considered as an active element in the sisterna.
These new appraisals of the positions of the PCI
by the more politically evolved sections of the Italian public
was not necessarily an indication that the Left-wing intelligentsia
in particular had been reconvinced of the rightness of PCI
policies any more than it was convinced that the PSI for its
part was taking the right course of action.

Many of these

individuals as a result ’were to feel most comfortably in the
small but influential PfrlUP.
The first indicator of what effect all the ideologi
cal confusion and political turbulence of the last years was to
have on the Italian electorate (especially on the Left) came with
the elections of 1958.
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New Horizons
The 195tS election results revealed several trends of
which the most fundamental was an unmistakable though gradual
shift of political sentiment to the Left.

The three Right-wing

parties (the neo-Fascist MSI and two Monarchist parties) together
obtained less than 10# of the popular vote.

Some of their

losses were picked up by spokesmen for the Confindustria. the
Liberal party, but most fell

further Left to the DC which on

several occasions in the preceding parliament had formed majori
ties with the open support of Monarchists and neo-Fascists,
The very last (Zoli) ministry before the elections lasted for a
year on the basis of such support and Right-wing Italians con
sequently felt more confident about the good intentions of the
DC.

Their votes helped in turn to strengthen the position of

the Right-wing within the Democrazia Cristiana.

Ironically such

support came at a time when the DC Left was coining into Its own
within the party and was laying the groundwork for the apertura
a sinistra.
In sum, the DC obtained a total of 42.2# of the vote,
not as good as in 194# but better than in 1953; the miniscule
Radical and Republican parties, which had joined together for
the election, managed barely to survive with a total of six
seats between them; the Social-Democrats advanced slightly
(about half as much as the Liher-als in terms of their popular
vote); the PSI improved its shewing also and won 14.2# of the
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vote compared to its 12.7# in 1953its own.

The PCI, despite 195&> held

The PCI actually obtained over half a million new

votes but this only increased its share of the popular vote to
22.7# from 22.6# in 1953.
While the voting pattern tended towards the Left, the
1958 elections produced no dramatic surprises.

more than anything

else it consolidated the party positions from which negotiations
leading towards l»apertura would proceed.

This is not to say

that all was smooth sailing from then on.

On the contrary, in

the next few years some very difficult obstacles were to be
encountered, though overcome, by proponents of the ’’opening.”
While the Leftward reorientation of Italian politics
met with the vigorous opposition many expected, it did, on the
other hand, receive quiet but effective support from a most
unexpected quarter.

A few months after the Italian elections,

in October 1958, Angelo Giuseppe Roncalli, Patriarch of Venice,
assumed the title of Pope John XXIII.

Papa Giovanni had spent

most of his life as a diplomat of the Holy See mainly in the
politically turbulent Balkans and, after
in France.

u!\'l

II, as papal nunzio

His experience and intimacy with the realities of

International politics was therefore more than superficial.
£10000111*s family origins were humble and, despite the exalted
position he personally was to achieve, his brothers continued
to live, as had their parents, as peasant sharecroppers near
Bergamo in Northern Italy.
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v/ith this background, the papal personality of
John XXIII was to reveal itself as being radically different
from that of his austere and aristocratic predecessor. Pius XII.
V/here the latter seemed to embody the posture of the Church
Militant the former seemed the incarnation of the Church Tolerant.
This was particularly true with regard to their attitudes
towards the conflicting ideologies dividing international and
national societies and especially with regard to their attitudes
about the Individuals

who championed them.

Italian Vaticanologists, who, perhaps not unrightly^
claim to be the most sensitive to the slightest nuance in
official Vatican positions, soon realiased that Pacelli and
Roncalli were two different personalities.

Just how different

was not long in being demonstrated when John XXIII suddenly
threw open the Church’s shuttered ‘
windows flooding it with the
light and fresh air which he hoped would bring about its long
needed aKglornamento.

V/hile in religiously pluralist societies

the Johanine spirit of ecumenism was correctly interpreted as
an invitation to collaboration among Christians, in Italian
terms ecumenism was interpreted as an invitation to collabora
tion between the two real Italian faiths, one sacred, the other
secular:

Catholicism and Socialism.

In five brief years John

himself succeeded in laying the foundations for both confronta
tions :

in the religious sphere by summoning the Ecumenical

Council and in the political sphere by promulgating his two
great encyclicals Mater et Kagistra and, a few months prior to
his death,

Pacem in Terris.
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For Italian politics there is no question but that
the encyclicals took priority in immediate importance over the
Council itself,

v/ith as much concern as his predecessor

Leo XIII had shown for the same problem, John reaffirmed,
in Hater et Maglstra his Church1s profound desire to see
alleviated the unjust social and economic misery in which so
much of mankind was condemned to live.

Wot only did this rein

force the commitment of the Italian Catholic Left to work for
social and economic justice but it reanimated Italian Communists
in their heretofore largely frustrated efforts at achieving a
dialogue with the Catholics on personal as well as an organiza
tional bases.

Such considerations became increasingly amplified

in the official programmes of the PCI.
The PCI had never made atheism a condition of member
ship in the party.

Anyone who accepted the political programme

of the party could become a member regardless of his religious
convictions.

This was the official position of the PCI since

its earliest Congress after V/W II and in succeeding Congresses
the policy of the "outstretched hand" became even more prominent.
At the party’s Tenth Congress in 1962 delegates were asked to
debate the thesis that "the aspiration toward a socialist soc
iety... can find a stimulus in a religious conscience anguished
by the dramatic problems of the present day world."

It now

became increasingly necessary to appreciate that the possession
of an acute social conscience was not the exclusive possession
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of any one or any group,

i-iater et legistra had shown this

clearly and the need to cooperate x/ith the Catholics was there
fore all the more pressing:
In Italy, the Catholic Church and the Catholic movement
guide not only some sectors of the labour movement but
above all a large party of the peasantry and the middle
classes who today can and should be participating in the
building of a new society. This is why the victory of
socialism in Italy being bound as it is to a bloc of
forces considerably larger and more articulated than the
alliance of workers and poor peasants, the effort to
arrive at an understanding with the Catholics is considered
to be one aspect of the Italian road to socialism...-'One could almost think that the dialogue between the
PCI and the Catholics was being conducted on one side by Pope
John personally.

Several

months after the Tenth Congress of

the PCI, in the summer of 19&3, the encyclical Pacem in Terris
was published.

In it all of Pius X I I fs uncompromising severity

towards atheistic Communism and its nefarious advocates seemed
to dissolve in a new attitude of loving one*s neighbour as one
self.

After surveying the political condition of the world in

Pacem in Terris John concluded that Catholics must seek to co
exist in societies not only "with Christians separated from
this Apostolic See” but also "with men of no Christian faith
whatever" who nevertheless were "endowed with a natural upright
ness of conduct":
In such relations let the faithful be careful to be always
consistent in their actions, so that they may never come to
any compromise in matters of religion and morals. At the

1.

From the "Tesi per il Xo Congresso del PCI" in "Le NeoFiarxisme Italien," Jarlot, op. cit. p. 39
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same time however, let them be, and show themselves to be
animated by a spirit of understanding and detachment, and
disposed to work logically in the pursuit of objectives
which are of their nature good, or conducive to good.
In the practical application of such general principles
governing human relations, the Pope continued, there lay a danger.
It was to confuse individuals with the things they advocated:
...one must never confuse error and the person who errs,,.
The person who errs is always and above all a human being,
and he retains in every case his dignity as a human person;
and he must be«regarded and treated in accordance with that
lofty dignity,-5
It bocame imperative to distinguish between "false
philosophical teachings11 and movements of an economic, social
or political nature even if the movements were animated by the
aforesaid "false teachings."

Movements of this sort were ulti

mately subject to change because the conditions in which they
operate change:
Besides, who can deny that those movements, insofar as
they conform to the dictates of right reason and are inter
preters of the lawful aspirations of the human person, con
tain elements that are positive and deserving of approval.^
Sincere pleas for understanding and conciliation by both sides
further catalyaed efforts to achieve what had been desired by so
many for so long and today this is one of the most fascinating
aspects of Italian intellectual and political life.^

2.

Pope John XXXII, Encyclical Letter Pacem in Terris. April 11,
1963, (Washington: 1963) p. 37

3.

Ibid.

4.

Ibid.

5.

Vide "Le Neo-Marxisme Italien" by the French Jesuit Georges
Jarlot

(Etudes, Jan.-June I960, pp. 32-47).
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The willingness of Italian Marxists to engage in the
dialogue stemmed not from a Machiavellian desire to convert
Catholics to Communism nor to trick innocent Catholics into
supporting the PCI but rather from the confidence that Marxist
humanism could hold its own with transcendental Catholicism.
They did hope that out of such a dialogue Catholics would at
least come to realize that their religion should not be subor
dinated to any particular political or economic point of view
nor that their Church should protect and defend the vested
interests of any one class, that Catholics would see with Fope
John that, without abandoning their faith, Catholics could
decide "the ways and degrees In which work in common with
Communists might be possible for the achievement of economic
social and political ends which are honourable and

useful.

"6

For their part Italian Communists utterly rejected
any kind of primitive or "totemiatic" view of religion, rejected
the idea of official State Atheism and publically defended the
idea of full freedom of religion without any civil discrimination being imposed against believers.

From what convictions

did such a confidence in the validity of their own point of
view arise?
To speak honestly we do not believe that the building of
a socialist society carries within itself the disappearance
of the religious fact, tfe recognize that religion has pro
found and complex roots in the human mind; that like all

6.

Pacem in Terris
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phenomena of the superstructure it has its own autonomy
with regard to the structure,
v/e speak of the decline of
the religious conscience not as something to be brought
about by a struggle nor as ammechanical consequence'
resulting from the disappearance of capitalism, less still
by an act of suppression by the Ptate. V/e believe that
the validity, the vitality of all ideological positions
and thus of all religion, still depend above all on their
capacity to offer an explanation, a solution for the prob
lems which history successively posos to mankind.'
In other words, if Catholicism as a body
can

of religious thought

successfully maintain its pertinence and validity to man as

he marches through history its value will be self-evident and
positive.

If it fails to do this its decline will be inevitable

and will occur as fast as it fails to explain and solve the
problems which history will successively present to the human
rac e :
Let us be clear about this much.
Catholicism cannot
cease being a religion of transcendence any more'than
Communism can cease being an atheistic humanism.
It is
in its very dialectic that it (marxism) must find the
justification for religious tolerance, not as a temporary
tactic but as an exigency of dialectical materialism.^
The challenge put to the Catholics by the Communists
was seductive:

If you Catholics have enough confidence in your

religion as we have in our doctrines let us begin now to work
together to build the more humanely ordered society we both desire
and let us see which of our convictions will withstand the heavy
demands the future will inevitably bring to bear on then.

7.

L*Unita. 3-9 Oct, 19&4, quoted in Jarlot op. cit. p. 40

3.

Jarlot. op. cit. p. 41
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Let

us seek to co-participate in a nev; hegemonic relationship.

In

this, we, for our part, will admit that your beliefs will bo as
necessary to us as oitr ovm because our convictions are not static.
They require praxis to live and to continue evolving.

But in

meeting us on common ground do not keep on throwing dogma in
our faces.

Try to see where your dogma has lost any trace of

objective meaning,

v/e, in turn, remain prepared to discard

whatever elements of our ovm thought become negated through
the process of our dialectical reasoning, a process in which
the positive elements of your unilateral religious sentiments
will survive synthetically with what remains positive in ours.
V/e already share after all, even if from very different posi
tions some few analogous views of fan from which we might pro
ceed.
You, as Catholics, believe in the ultimate dignity
of the human person and in the value of freedom; one need only
to refer to the great Church enyclicals and to the teachings of
Pope John to verify this.

But the freedom you defend is not

that of the capitalist bourgeoisie whose concepts you have
opposed from the time of Pius XI and Leo XIII; yours is not an
individualist freedom

it is a communal personalism.

For 3ro u >

freedom is earned as a redemption from sin achieved through
personal acts of asceticism.

Your freedom is the luminous

freedom of the children of God.

Each personal triumph is not

simply personal but is social for you believe in the unity of
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of the mystical body, of its edification in common.

For you

the history of Kan is the history of a struggle from evil to
the Good and in this every personal act of virtue becomes
amplified in the mystical body:
Veil then let us build Kan together.
Together let us help
him in his conquest of freedom, struggle together against
Man's collective enslavement through Kan's exploitation of
Man, by war. Together let us build this future society
without exploitation because lacking classes:
in freeing
Han from his fellow Man and from Nature the true freedom
of each individual will result.9
The elaboration of the "dialogue" did not occur at
once as if both sides were bursting with a pent-up desire to
have it all out.

It began slowly, modestly, quietly and at

first only among restricted groups and small circulation perio
dicals.

During the last few years it hao acquired a greater

elaboration and fluency of expression.
audience and continues to evolve.

It has gained a trider

The important fact is that

it began at all and that it did begin is due to an incalculable
extent to the influence of John XXIII.

Papa Giovanni also

helped accelerate the already initiated movement towards the
opening to the Left and by attempting so much in such a brief
time John XXIII earned the title of "Red pope."

The nickname

was not meant to flatter particularly since it was applied by

9.
10.

Jarlot, pjl^cit^ p.

kk

Vide "Italy's Catholic Communist Dialogue" Claire Sterling,
The Reporter, Vol. 32 No. 6 (April 22, 1965) pp. 18-22
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those groups and classes who were enjoying social status and
economic privilege under existing conditions.

Even (or especially)

among some Catholic circles John’s actions caused anxiety, con
sternation and no little opposition.

Powerful conservative

Italian prelates in the Curia romana and in the Italian episco
pate closely connected to the Catholic Action and, consequently,
to the DC Right were unprepared, unwilling or unable to adapt
to the new attitudes of conciliation and accommodation with the
arch enemies of the Church, especially after having participated
in nearly two decades of Pacellian intransigence.
The existence of such powerful pressure groups made
the first efforts to form a Centre Left government extremely
difficult and the strain of accommodating so many opposing ten
dencies in one Catholic party almost brought about the fragmen
tation of the DC.

The internal balance of the DC had to undergo

a delicate transformation before the Centre Left experiment
could begin.

The transformation resulted in a modus vivendi

agreed upon by the three main party currents.

Balancing the

extreme Right with the restless Left, sometimes called the V/hite
Communists, was a cautious, moderate, centre group led by the
inscrutable Aldo lioro, Italy’s current Prime Minister.

The Moro

wing was at least willing to try the Centre Left experiment
even if without the enthusiasm of the Fanfani Left,

Amintore

Fanfani was personally convinced (and tried to convince his
centrist colleagues) that the course which Italian politics had
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been following since the War had reached a dead end.
With the outlook of a political economist (which
subject he professed at the University of Rome) Fanfani was
able to look penetratingly at the unchanged realities of
Italian life tirhich the miracolo economico was failing to
influence; namely, the continuing imbalances in economic dis
tribution among classes, Regions and occupations.

Without

serious planning to coordinate investments through which cer
tain social and economic needs would receive priority attention
the continuing disparities in Italian society could attain
insoluble proportions.
With the shrewd eye of an expert politician, Fanfani
also realized that since 1943 and the rejection of "tripartism”
the political base on which the DC and its allies were operating
was being steadily eroded.

If Christian Democratic governments

continued to base their majorities on the open or tacit support
of the reactionary Right, which was not prepared to cooperate in
carrying out the reforms which were imperative, the immobilism
of the government would deteriorate into general paralysis and
the advance of the Communists would be ineluctable.
DC but one course of action remained.

For the

Since the PSI was showing

its increasing autonomy from the PCI and was offering its col
laboration the time for the centro-sinistra was now mature.
When, for a variety of reasons, the first couple of
ministries formed after the 1953 elections collapsed, the DC
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found itself at a fork in the road.

The directions in which the

party could choose to continue on were either Left or Eight, but
not Dead Centre.

The party did eventually turn Left, but not

before making some final explorations on the Right, a move
which proved to be far more imprudent than must have been
imagined.

During a t\*o month impasse in i960 both Fanfani and

Antonio Segni failed in their attempts to create "transition"
cabinets with the support of the democratic Right.

Since it

was well known that the DC was merely grooming itself for an
impending opening to the Left, the Liberal party refused to
lend itself to any such scheme.
President Gronchi then made the mistake of charging
a DC "notabile" Ferdinando Tambroni to form a government.

Tam-

broni, an ambiguous figure with no real following in the party
turned out to be an ambitious opportunist,

Wot restricted by

party loyalty or personal scruples Tambroni was fully prepared
and did in fact welcome the support of the neo-Fascist MSI to
give his government its parliamentary majority and to perpetuate
the life of what was expected to be only a temporary government.
Furthermore Tambroni revealed himself to be as ready
to crush any Leftist-inspired disturbances with the same ferocity
as had been used around 1943 and the early Fifties by De Gasperi*s
Minister of the Interior, Mario Lcelba.

In May and June of

I960 the installation of American missiles in Italy resulted
in public demonstrations in a number of Italian cities.
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demonstrations, also involved wage disputes and in both cases
Communists figured prominently, if not exclusively.
When Tambroni ordered the demonstrations to be put
down, the Prime idnister’s orders were carried out with a will
and in the ensuing police repressions a large number of demon
strators v/ere injured.

This in itself aroused great hostility.

Tambroni, however, made another move which aggravated public
hostility even more.

In July, the XiSI was given government

permission to hold a national congress in Genoa, one of the
cities where the war-time anti-Fascist Resistance had been
strongest.

Verbal protests which arose from all quarters were

ignored and the permission was upheld.
When the congress v/as about to open, violent mass
demonstrations reuniting all the old parties of the Resistance
flared up in Genoa and spread to other major Italian cities.
In Rome, the uproar occurring in the streets overflowed into
the Chamber of Deputies,

The whole country was put into a

state of such tension that the fear of civil war crossedmmore
than one mind.

In the face of such an overwhelming public

demonstration of violent anti-Fascism the compromised Tambroni,
who was accused by some of nourishing sinister political ambi
tions, was toppled and the country settled back to catch its
political breath.
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Finalmente
If anything positive came from the Tambroni adventure
it was surely the clarification of public sentiment about any
further compromises with Fascism.

The trend towards the centro-

sinistra was reinforced more than ever and on August 2, I960
Amintore Fanfani appeared before parliament seeking approval
of a new ministry to succeed that of Tambroni.

Because the

Fanfani cabinet would reject extreme Right-wing votes for its
majority, by prior understanding, the PSI abstained from voting
against the government and thus was breached the first small
opening to the Left.

The first actual centro-sinistra ministry

was not formed until a number of months later.

Before it came

about two events took place and further eased the way:

the

first was the holding of municipal elections in October I960 and
the second was the Christian Democratic Congress of January 1962.
The elections were important because the parties
directly concerned with the hypothetical Centre-Left majority
hoped to hold "dress-rehearsals" for the national experiment
first on municipal levels.

Thus, although the Tambroni affair

caused all the Left to win some substantial gains in such
centres as Milan, Genoa, Florence and Palermo, the PSI broke away
from the traditional opposition bloc it formed with the PCI
to elect, in conjunction with the DC, the PSDI and smaller
radical parties, Centre-Left municipal executive committees
(giunte).

In a few instances the new combination meant that
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the PCI could not participate in the new giunta.

'.'Jhile thin

aroused a natural resentment within the PCI certain elements
in the PSI (the faction which was later to form the PCIUP)
were also unhappy with their party’s official line and tried
to resist it.
A majority of the party followed Nenni’s leadership
nonetheless and the latter began to steer his party towards its
historic appointment with the DC.

The second important event

preceding the Centre-Left experiment, was the Maples Congress
of the DC,

On this occasion koro himself used his considerable

forensic skill for some five hours to harangue.his party into
accepting the new course the party was taking.

When the Con

gress adjourned, the DC was pu’
olically committed to trying the
centro-sinistra formula.
The way was no^w clear:

both major participants had

given public demonstrations of their good Intentions and indi
cations from the Vatican were favourable.
needed to be worked out.

Only the terms

While Socialists still remained tli9

outside buttress of Fanfani’s new cabinet, the PSI promised to
give the government the support it needed if it carried out
certain measures

which the PSI wanted.

The latter concerned

domestic matters; in foreign affairs the Socialists were willing
to suspend their opposition to the government’s commitment to
uphold the Atlantic alliance.
The programme Fanfani presented for parliamentary
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approval included among proposed measures:

establishment of the

Regions; nationalization of the powerful electric industry; for
mulation of a national economic plan; school reforms and new
agricultural measures.

So pledged, the Fanfani ministry, bas

ing its parliamentary majority on the Socialist pledge not to
vote against it, took office on March 10, 1962.
'/hen the term of the Fanfani government was ended
by the scheduled national elections of April, 1963 its record
of legislative action was not unpromising.

The hydroelectric

companies had been nationalized, a tax aimed at curtailing land
speculation was placed on real estate profits and a withholding
tax of 15/fc was imposed on stock dividends (which usually remained
undeclared on income tax forms), the school system was partially
reorganized to make education less of an elitist affair

a

government committee for national economic planning was created
and the amount paid to old age pensioners was increased.
As necessary as these measures were, they were akin
to feeding aspirin to a victim of cancer who required major
surgery.

The one important measure which would have made any

kind of lasting structural modification of the centralized
Italian state, the creation of Regional governments, was not
even introduced in parliament for discussion.

If the Regions

were freed from the DC central control which was exercised through
the Ministry of the Interior acting through the provincial
prefectures, the only effective support for the DC in many areas
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would have been severely jeopardized.
Regional autonomy would mean that in at least three
Regions the executive giunta would be likely formed by Communists
(or by Communists with Socialists, a major cause of many Rightwing reservations about the whole Centre-Left business.)

In

other Regions communist power v/ould still be such that even in
opposition the PCI would influence the programme of the Regional
giunta.

for these reasons the DC procrastinated; moreover, since

the national elections were approaching the party could not
afford to antagonize its Right-wing support more than it had
already done.
Thus, when it became clear that the DC was not pre
pared to fulfill all its promises, the PSI declared Itself no
longer bound to support the government.

It was also more con

venient for the PSI not to have to appear before the electorate
as the chief underpinning of Christian Democratic power.
centro-sinistra idea was not abandoned, however.
that the elections would confirm it even more.

The

It was hoped
The PSI, parti

cularly, expected that its line would be approved because
finally a working class party was again about to become an
active element in the government leaving the PCI still isolated
in opposition,

tfith such expectations the election campaigns

began.
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II Iliracolo
During the decade of the 1950*s Italy appeared to all
the world as the epitome of the '’Good Life" offered by Western
European "neo-Capitalism"— capitalism of the masses.

Italy was

the land of La Dolce Vita, Gina Lollobrigida, "Roman Holidays,"
Vespas, Olivetti typewriters and Olivetti industrial paternalism.
Italy was Sophia Loren, sunny beaches, lakes and mountains,
artistic cities ("see Italy first") Fiats, Pirelli tires and
Pirelli Towers, JJecchi sewing machines, pizza, luxury liners,
magnificent traffic jams, Nervi architecture, high fashion.

The

"Italian line" became a synonym for a new sybaritic style of
life.

The prosperous decade seemed fittingly capped with the

Olympiad of Rome in I960 and, in the following year, by the
national centenary celebrations held in Turin.

And indeed the

decade has been dazzling.
Italian per capita income had increased in the ten
years alone almost as much as it had in the preceding half cen
tury.

The national annual growth rate became one of the highest

in the world (13^ in i960); industrial production tripled and
exports had increased fourfold.

In this same period the majority

of Italians ceased being employed in agriculture and the bigger
cities groaned to accommodate their swelling populations.

As

farmers turned into factory work^-s and Southern migrants sought
jobs in the North, unemployment fell to a third of its former
figure.

Some industries even experienced manpower shortages
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for lack of skilled workers.

Demand for consumer goods zoomed

and new Italian appliance industries mushroomed from practically
nothing.

The population became physically mobile, first on the

Vespa scooters and later, when instalment buying permitted, in
small Fiats.

Italians became better clothed and better fed.

They began to have more to spend on diversions; even publishing
became an industry under the impact of ”11 boom.11
Riding on the crest of so enormous and unprecedented a
wave of economic expansion, the exponents of those policies of
economic liberalism v/hich facilitated such a development might
well have been led to look back on their achievements with com
placency.

But Italy has always been a country of sun and shadow.

La Dolce Vita, sweet as it was for those who could live it
(though even this was questioned by Fellini) did not correspond
to the continuing struggle of those many Italians still caught
in la miseria.

And while the salutary effects of il benessere

(well being) did reach most Italian families to greater or lesser
degree, the serious shortcomings of the boom lingered.

The

most naive but fundamental mistake made by the economic liberalists was to think that by creating an abundant consumer-oriented
market economy for a fully (or almost fully) employed population,
the working classes would be satisfied and pacified and their
demands for a better life would be drowned in the clamour for
more bread and circuses.
It did not require any special skill to understand why
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a "semi-submerged" population, suddenly faced with both an
opportunity to work and an opportunity to buy would set about
acquiring all the goods and gadgets which previously it could
only look at longingly with its nose pressed to the window pane.
Studies made in some northern Italian cities among migrant
families revealed that frequently, despite greater earnings,
family diets continued to be based on the cheap but monotonous
staple of pasta and, rather than spend new income on improving
the variety of diet, families preferred to continue eating its
pasta while watching the new television set or while listening
to the voice of a blaring pop singer on the new phonograph.
Increased buying power, in a country such as dltaly
whore such power was rarely granted, inevitably pushed up demand
even more quickly so that the cost of living rose faster than
wages.

But demand did not abate and the diminished capacity

to buy only frustrated newly-aroused hopes and newly-awakened
tastes ("Howya gonna keepurn dovm on the farm...?").

And when

it became evident that the system which had successfully aroused
the new demands to share in il benessere remained indifferent
to the very problems it created, the urge for a better life moved
from the purely quantitative consideration in the direction of
a general desire for a reform of the entire system itself.
The growth had undoubtedly taken place, but not with
out its price.

Italy changed from a predominantly agricultural

country to an almost industrial one, but in the process millions
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of Italians were forced to pull up the deep roots previous
generations of ancestors had put down in the land to move to
Northern urban environments where their reception was frequently
one of hostile misunderstanding.

The almost complete abandon

ment of countless Southern villages did little to alleviate the
disparity with the North and was small help to the implementation
of the agricultural reform.
Urban building underwent an incredible growth and
cities teemed with hundreds of thousands of new apartment dwellers.
But without enough strict supervision to enforce even the inade
quate urban plans in existence, the big Italian cities sprawled
in every direction like oil stains.

The countryside around the

cities disappeared under tidal waves of reinforced concrete
poured by real estate "developers11 who scrupulously aval lid
wasting perfectly usable building land on parks and playgrounds.
Forced to live in the "periferia" of the cities for
economic reasons, urban workers had to wait for slow, crowded
and inadequate public transportation to carry them to work in
the Centro.

Italians saved to become mobile in their own Fiats

only to get caught In paralytic traffic jams.

Thousands of

families continued to live in wretched housing conditions while
thousands of newly-built apartments entirely beyond their finan
cial reach stood empty for lack of takers.

Italians began

enjoying vacations by the sea, only to watch the pristine beauty
of Italian coasts become enveloped in miles of squalid commercialism.
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Italians became used to lurid scandals often involving corrupt
high government officials caught with their hands in the public
till, while having to suffer bureaucratic insolence for the sake
of obtaining even simple documents,

While the fruits of economic

abundance were welcomed by all Italians they found that the
benessere which the centro-sinistra promised to extend was not
all it could be.

The elections of 19^3 revealed this state of

mind with unmistakable clarity.

3ut the promise of the centro-

sinistra was to dim not just by the qualitative shortcomings of
Italian "neo-Capitalism.”

By the

time the focialists and Chris

tian Democrats had courted each other long enough to be ready
to take their vows, the Italian economy, which h_d risen to
unprecedented heights, was entering the downward phase of the
business cycle and the centro-sinistra found itself facing
immense problems of a purely economic nature.
Much of the industrial expansion of the fities had
been built on the abundance of cheap labour available in Italy.
Ey the end of the decade this reservoir vras beginning to dry up
and increasing demands for wage raises put double pressure on
the employers.

The push for better wages was animated by the

big trade unions, led by the CGIL, which, after years of sub
dued activity, rekindled their militancy.
In the CGIL, Communist l. and Socialist union leaders
collaborated to work out a strategy of maddening work slowdowns
and hiccough strikes which permitted workers to earn part of
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their T.vages while making life miserable for the employers.
Union policy was that local grievances could be settled locally
according to the requirements of each case, but the national
policy would be to win a general pay raise for ail workers, ob
tain equal pay for equal work between male and female employees
and, most importantly, to force employers oo recognise the union
as the only spokesman for the workers.
After months of these tormenting tactics, which kept
nearly three million v/orkers of all categories occupied in a
game of musical strikes, the employers finally capitulated.
Because one of the largest groups of strikers belonged to the
civil service, one of the biggest of the employers was the
government.

The agreement which was signed in February 1963

sanctioned an immediate wage increase of 16,£ for1 government
employees, industrial workers and agricultural labourers.
increases were to follow.

Other

In the case of some women workers,

the parification of their earnings with those of their male
counterparts brought pay increases of up uo 40'p.
Concrete victories like these greatly enhanced union
bargaining pov/er, particularly that 01 the CGIL which had been
in the forefront of the struggle,

fay increases equalled some

two billion dollars and not surprisingly augmented the buying
power of the workers who benefitted from the pay boosts.

If

Italy was not an "affluent" society, it had become an acquisitive
society and, with more money around to spend, consumer demand
rapidly exceeded national productivity.
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On top of this, crop failures helped boost food prices.
Imports to meet both the food shortage and the sustained consu
mer demand increased so greatly that the favourable Italian trade
balance was reversed from surplus to deficit.

The trend was

alarming but a government hoping to win greater popular support
by promising the working classes a larger share of the national
wealth could not say ’Enough and no more* to the working classes
right after they had won their first substantial wage increases
since the end of the war.

On the other hand, the profits which

had been based on cheap labour were now disappearing and Italian
competitiveness in the international market began to feel the
strain.

The other alternative was to increase productivity

through expansion which would permit more earnings from export
sales.

Expansion, however, required capital and in the infla

tionary Italian economy what money was being invested went where
prices could be expected to rise most with the inflation, In
property.

But there was another reason which caused capital

to become scarce.
The nationalization of the electrical industry had
been an act of good faith by the DC to show the PSI, which had
insisted on this action, that its Intentions were serious.

The

nationalization was not only very expensive for the national
treasury (it cost $25 billion), but politically it cost the DC
dearly.

Seeing that Fanfani was determined to carry out the

Centre Left adventure the business community stiffened in
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opposition and, fearing that the power companies were only the
first of a long list of PSI victims, worried investors quickly
sent their money to safer Switzerland.

In 1962 alone about half

a billion dollars in lire was sent abroad.
doubled.

Later the figure

Some of this returned to Italy as Swiss reinvestment

but most stayed out of the country.

Thus, short of investment

capital, industrial improvements ifere curtailed, expansion was
slowed and unemployment began to creep up again.

It was against

this dramatic background of contradictory trends that the 1963
elections were held.

The Elections
The outcome of the national elections of April, 1963
surprised everyone but particularly the DC and PSI.

Both of

the chief exponents of the Centre-Left formula lost votes:

the

DC lost 4*1$ of its vote dropping from 42.3$ in 1958 to 38.3$ in
1963, the second lowest share of the popular vote it had ever
won; the PSI managed to hold its lines but still lost .4$ of
its vote falling from 14.2$ to 13.8$,

Monarchists suffered

most severely falling from 4 .8$ to a decimating 1.7$.
winner*s circle stood all the other parties.

in bhe

On the Right,

the MSI advanced by .3$ to win 5.1$ but the PLI did no less
than double its share of electoral support by winning 7.0$ of
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the total.

On the Left the PSDX advanced by 1.55& to win 6,1%

of the vote, but the greatest surprise was the support given
to the PCI,
In 1963 one out of every four Italians voted for the
Communists; this despite all the vicissitudes the party experi
enced during the preceding few years— deStalinization and its
effects, Huigxry and its aftermath, the break with the PSI and
the unprecedented prosperity caused by the boom.

But perhaps

the greatest consternation over the communist advance was
caused by the failure of the Centre-Left government, after almost
a year and a half of power, to break the PCI hegemony of
working class support.

The party not only held its positions

but gained over a million new votes (195&: 22.7%; 1963: 25-35") *
Although the parties of the Centre-Left won a combined

of

total of 59.6% of the popular vote (this includes the 1.4%

the Republican party) the 1963 election results could not be
taken as an unqualified endorsement of the incipient apertura a
sinistra, at least as it had developed up to that point.

On

the Right the doubling of the vote for a party which spoke for
business interests was itself eloquent of conservative senti
ment since many of the votes lost by the DC are thought to have
gone to the Liberals,

On the other hand the utter failure of the

PSI to lure any communist votes away from the PCI indicated
that even many Socialists were displeased with their party*s
relations with the DC.
The PCI had also benefitted elsewhere partly by winning
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the votes of the internal migrants.
split in two ways:

The Monarchist vote was

unsophisticated peasants, influenced by

relatives who returned home from jobs in Germany, Switzerland
or France to vote, probably joined them to support the PCI
while all but the hard-core of nostalgic Monarchists, realizing
the futility of their cause switched to the MSI.

Social-Democratic

gains came from both Right and Left; from Right-wing Socialists
anxious to get on with l*apertura and from middle class progres
sives who were impatient with DC cautiousness.
Shortly after the elections Togliatti was asked his
opinions about their outcome particularly about i*hy it seemjd
that prosperity had not favoured the fortunes of the centrosinistra.

The reasons, Togliatti, thought, were not very

obscure:
Italy is in the process of rapid reconomic and social
transformation.
But this process is taking place in a
society dominated by big business and conservative poli
tical forces and therefore creates more problems than it
solves... change has itself created...the desire for a
better life and a more just social and economic order
and hence has driven (the electorate) towards the Left.
VJhat is more, economic development has accentuated and
clarified a whole series of social contrasts and injus
tices of which the workers are victims.
These cannot be
rectified within the framework of our present antiquated
society which has been overtaken by its own economic
development. Thus powerful forces are now driving towards
a renewal and a reform of the structure and its institu
tions. These forces are simultaneously reformist and
revolutionary. They are reformist because they include
precise demands of a democratic and social nature.
But
they are also revolutionary because of the resistance of
the ruling class which is obstinately conservative and
whose own conduct demonstrates the need for a new class
to control the country. We made gains in this election

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

245

because we offered the people both satisfaction for their
economic and social demands and an opportunity to share
in the control of society.il
Regardless of its partisan origin this analysis of
the background of the election results seems correct.

To have

accurately discerned the problems of Italian society was not
to exercise in polemics.

In reviewing the same question a

correspondent of the French radical journal I.»Express arrived
at a similar conclusion:
The success of the PCI cannot be interpreted as a cry of
protest; rather it bears witness to the attraction exer
cised on the Italian people by a party which offers it a
new society, qualitatively different from the old while
the parties of the Centre-Left offer a larger quantity of
material possessions.12

The International Aspects
Aside from bewildering certain circles in the West,
who could not understand why or

how a party like the PCI could

continue to make the advances it did, even when growing Italian
prosperity was alleviating the economic distress of so many
Italians, the successes of Togliatti*s party had other implica
tions.

These were related to the international communist movement.

11.

Quoted by K.S. Karol in "Togliatti Speaks His Mind," New
ftatesman. (24 Mayi 19&3) p. 790

12.

Michel Bosquet "Aspects of Italian Communism" The Socialist
Register 1964. (New York: 19&4) p* £3

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

246

The grave and complex problems faced by the interna
tional communist movement after the critical events of 1956

have

already been partially related, particularly as they affected the
PCI.

The questions raised in international communist circles

by the crises of 1956 did not abate with the passing of years.
On the contrary the problems became more acute and profoundly
altered relations among communist states and communist parties.
The most widely known aspect of this is the Sino-Soviet ideolo
gical dispute which has caused relations between the two countries
seriously to deteriorate.

The complex causes of the dispute are

all but clear and some aspects remain impenetrably recondite
even to those whose studies on this subject are more than super
ficial.
"What is really maddening about the Russians," a Czech
Communist recently told me with a sigh, "is that we
barely ever know what they are up to. V/e d o n ft even know
what really happened between them and the Chinese.
Some explanations which have been offered are interest
ing in themselves but, to review, in the context of this paper,
all the elements of the Sino-Soviet falling out is impossible
both for reasons of space and because it is only incidental to
the immediate subject natter,

fet, the dispute does bear on

the problems of Italian Communism and, to the extent that the
former has a bearing on the position which the PCI was to adopt
in its regard, the causes which initiated the whole conflict

13.

Reported by K.S. Karol "Avant la Reunion Des Parties Communistes” Le foonde Hebdonadaire, (3 Sept.-9 Sept. 1964) p. 3
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must be touched on briefly.
History, according to ijarxism is a record of changing
relationships.

Changing conditions of economic production

change the social and political texture of the community whose
economic underpinning has altered.

The changes in the political

and social disposition of the community in turn modify the cul
tural "superstructure* (philosophy, literature, religion, the
fine arts, etc.).

Put in another way, it slowly changes the way

people think about things, the v/ay they see things, even though
seme old ideas persist for a long while even under the new condi
tions, a phenomenon which, as we have seen, fascinated Gramsci.
The "superstructure," while possessing a certain autonomy of
its own, always reflects, more or less, its genesis during par
ticular historical moments.
This "dynamic" of history is eventually spent but only
after historical evolution arrives at the ultimate stage of
"pure" Communism.

Until this last stage is reached the social

and political contradictions of imperfect societies remain
implacable motives for continuing modifications which are achieved
peacefully or violently, depending on circumstances.
To utilize such an analytical framework, it is possible
to suggest that those very societies where I-larxism possesses the
status of an official ideology have become the very elements of
the historical dynamic described.

Elsewhere in this narrative,

the conditions out of ’which the first revolutionary socialist
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state in history was created have been briefly described.

How

the Soviet Union existed for almost thirty years as the unique
example of such a socialist state and what effects the peculiar
conditions of its development had on its internal structure havo
also been related.

And, finally, the very subject of this

paper has necessarily required that the relationship between
the PCX and the CPSU be attentively delineated because the his
torical development of the PCI was for so long a while intimately
affected by the vicissitudes of the CPSU and the Soviet state
itself.
Latterly, the attempt has been made to particularise
how the PCI evolved from a tiny conspiratorial group into the
largest non-ruling communist party in the w o r l d , ^ how the
peculiarly Italian variant of Marxism, exemplified by the thought
of Antonio Gramsci, has helped to achieve this success and
how the suitability of the "Italian road to Socialism" for Italy
has ultimately won the approbation of the CPSU itself.
At the height of Stalin’s power and prestige, when the
distinction between Communism and the USSR became so blurred
that defense of Soviet raisons d ’etat sometimes became confused
with defense of the Marxist idea Itself, the political and ideo
logical authority of the Soviet centre became unassailable truth

14-

The Indonesian CP is perhaps more correctly the largest non
ruling party but the recent massacres and dispersion of
Indonesian Communists connected with the power struggle in
Indonesia suggests that the power and influence of that
party has been severely curtailed at least for the present.
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for all sections of the Communist International:

It was che

chief adhesive for all communistrmovements intthe world, a
source of pride and encouragement ("the International shall be
the human race").

The International embodied, so to speak,

the universalized ideological "superstructure" of Socialism in
one country.
But, History, unsatiated, continued its tireless evo
lution tovrards the one goal which alone could satisfy It.

During

its progress a plurality of socialist states were created in its
wake by an historical agent, the Red Army; states, where pecu
liar internal conditions had created different problems and
required different solutions but where, because the ideological
superstructure of Socialism of One Country remained so influen
tial, inappropriate solutions were borrowed and indiscriminately
applied by emulators of the USSR.
to change this:

One important exception helped

the Chinese Revolution.

Here, the internal

dynamics of Chinese social and political contradictions matured
autonomously to create a socialist revolution.

It was an inde

pendent development unsubordinated as elsewhere, to the exigencies
of Soviet power and there was no necessary identification of
Chinese interests with Soviet interests.

The independent rise

of communist China ended the uniqueness of the USSR as a centre
of doctrinal authority even though the Chinese were prepared to
concede Soviet priority in this area because of the immense
prestige the latter had accumulated during all the years it stood
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alone as the single bastion of Socialism.
But, with a plurality of states well on their way to
creating socialist societies, the ideological centralism of an
earlier era, when communist parties were still struggling for
their existence, now seemed unnecessary.

The one factor which

sustained the preeminence of the CPfLi remained its unchallenged
historical prestige.

;Jhen, tnerefore, in

±9$& the

exigencies

of internal Soviet growth and development induced the Soviet
leadership itself to destroy the prestige which had been won by
Stalin and his party, they destroyed the basis upon which they
themselves could continue to base their own international authority:
if Communists had to stop believing in the past infallibility
of Stalin (and hence the CPSU) y/hen the fate of entire national
communist movements had depended so much on the unquestioning
acceptance of his decisions, for what reason should Communists
continue uncritically to adhere to the Soviet counsels now when
conditions were so much more favourable for autonomous development.
If Stalin had mademmistakes in the past who was to say that
current leaders could not do likewise.
Thus, a vacuum of authority was created in the apex of
international Communism and there existed no personality of
Stalinas stature to refill it.
except liao Tse-Tung.

None, the Chinese suggested,

Togliatti, on the other hand, thought

that the change was more fundamental.

Socialism was no longer

limited to one country; therefore, the superstructural reflection
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of that one historical-political moment had become outmoded:
"The Soviet model can no longer be considered obligatory."

The

system was now "polycentric" and this required new attitudes,
especially concerning the possibility of diversity in the
various national approaches to Communism.

The "Italian road

to Socialism" was but one example of this diversity which in
the peculiar context of one national was not vfithout its value.
In the past, the unity provided by fidelity to the
Soviet vanguard of revolution had been an indispensible source
of strength and this strength in unity remained indispensible
for communists movements today.

For a number of reasons it couid

not exist in the institutional manner of the past but it had to
be maintained nonetheless.
Lacking any overriding central authority and with the
existence of a plurality of communist states, any incipient
disputes between these states over method, interpretation or
application of doctrine not to speak of conflicts arising out
of surviving sentiments of nationalism, could not be settled,
as in the past, by acceding to the directives of the authorita
tive centre.

Therefore, to avoid conflict, the principle of

unity in tolerant diversity had to be the idea binding communist
parties and communist governments.
The USSR could not be denied the prestige and respect
which were due to it but, in a polycentric context, the unhappy
negative effects which Stalinism had left in Soviet society had
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to be eradicated to that a regenerated USSR could win spontan
eously the solidarity which in the past it obtained through
historical circumstances.

Standing in the way of this were the

Sino-Soviet disagreements.
It is at this point that we must be satisfied to say
that for a numer of reasons:

ideological, political, economic,

diplomatic, organizational and military, the CPSU and the Chinese
Communist Party and then the USSR and China engaged in a dis
pute which has been aggravated today to incredible degree and
has strained Soviet-Chinese relations almost to the point of
rupture.

While the dispute began after the Twentieth Congress

of the CPSU, it became more serious and public after the TwentySecond Congress of the CPSU in 1961,
For its own reasons the Soviet leadership was ready
to renounce its role as monitor of the international communist
movement whereas for other reasons the Chinese insisted on the
necessity for a central doctrinal authority to enforce ideologi
cal unity.

At first the Chinese hoped that, by giving unqualified

support to the USSR during the crises of 1956, the Soviets would
pay greater heed to Chinese views even while the former remained
the acknowledged leaders of the world communist movement.

In

perpetuating the authority of the Centre there could be little
toleration for national deviations from Leninist fundamentalism
such as the line followed by the "revisionist" Tito and the
flexible Togliatti,

But it was precisely the Stalinist insistence
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on unsuitable orthodoxy and uniformity which had led to tne
eruptions of 1956 in the People's Democracies of Eastern Europe.
For these international and other internal reasons the
Soviets renounced the idea of reviving the Centre and were will
ing to tolerate heterodoxy in non-Soviet communist movements.
When the boviet position became clear the Chinese sought to
assume the mantle of authority on their ovm since tue CPSU vfas
"revisionist” and the USSK "bourgeois.”
In the

torrent of words which flowed around these

questions the extreme language used by the CPC against its
ideological adversaries became, at times, quite vehement and
vitriolic and in the source of the debate some of the choicest
words uttered by the Chinese were aimed at the figure who seemed
to incarnate the "rightist” viewpoint:

Comrade Togliatti,^*5

At first, attempts were made to patch up the dispute through
meetings of all the international communist parties.

In 1961

eighty-one communist parties met in Moscow and tried to work
out a compromise statement.
and the debate continued.

This turned out to satisfy no one
As it unfolded the PCI was, at times,

to become very actively involved because acceptance of the
Chinese theses concerning the proper method of carrying out
revolutionary activity would have meant the complete rejection

15.

In this regard the Chinese views are amply stated in "More
on the Differences Between Comrade Togliatti and Us.” Written
in 1963j it is a long polemic against the political strategy
followed by the PCI with all the proper references to
Chapter and Verse from the Texts to prove that the PCI was
not Marxist-Leninist.
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of "la via italiana al socialismo" which the PCI had so care
fully been plotting out since the war.

But, on the other hand,

the Italians were equally disturbed when the Soviet leaders,
wanting to have it out vfith the Chinese, invited national
communist parties to a meeting which was to have been a pre
liminary for an international coimaunist conference.
come implications were clear:

The unwel

ohe conference would have amounted

to a showdown and, led, inevitably, to a disastrous schism.
Out of this dissent with both Chinese and Soviet posi
tions an "Italian tendency" arose.

This was not an official

position promoted by the PCI to rival either the Chinese or
Soviet theses but, nonetheless, it exercised a deep influence
within communist circles and was greeted with widespread
approbation when it became known publically.

The "Italian"

interpretation of the problems facing Communists in the sixth
decade of the twentieth century and the solutions with which it
suggested the problems be approached were basically the public
profession of what were private thoughts.

The latter were

expressed by Palmiro Togliatti with such candour that what
became his last political act was assigned an unexpected status
of a public document with ramifications which continue to bear
fruit.
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II Proinemoria
In the summer of 19^41 during a visit to the Crimea,
Togliatti took occasion to dwell upon problems which had arisen
over the last several years and sat down to record them on paper.
Although Togliatti could not know it at the time, the twentytwo pages he was to fill with hie reflections became one of
the most significant documents of contemporary Communism.
Pince the Italian party secretary was scheduled to
meet with Chairman Nikita Khrushchev, the thoughts he expressed
in the notes probably were intended to serve as a memorandum to
be communicated to the Soviet leader.

Thus, Togliatti surveyed

a very wide panorama of issues which he felt were of deep con
cern not only to the PCI and the CPSU but to the entire
communist movements.
Almost immediately Togliatti expressed his serious
reservations about the wisdom and timeliness of calling an
international conference of communist parties to deal with the
dissension with the Chinese, reservations which were equally
shared, he noted, by other parties.

The problem was not of

opposing Chinese positions but of opposing them while avoiding
an undesirable rupture in the international movement.

By

holding an international conference such a consequence might
be hastened rather than avoided.

Togliatti therefore suggested

what he felt would be more fruitful methods of combatting the
"erroneous political positions” and "splitting activities" of
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the Chinese party.

It was necessary, he wrote, never to dis

continue the polemic against points of principle and policies
of the Chinese; but in doing so the verbal violence used by
the Chinese in their sweeping denunciations had to be avoided.
Instead the debate should be based on concrete issues and
carried on in an objective and persuasive manner and "always
with respect for the opponent."

This could best be carried out

by holding at the same time a series of meetings with groups
of parties belonging to various sectors of the movement (West
Europe, Latin America, the Third World and of the Peoples
Democracies) so that the problems raised since 1957 could be
reviewed collectively and common interests and responsibilities
could better be defined.
After this had been carried out over a year or longer,
then the advisability of holding a general conference could be
raised.

In the interval the Chinese Communists could have been

isolated by confronting them with a more united movement possess
ing a better defined general policy line for use in common as
well as a better understanding of the tasks to be faced in each
sector.

With this much having been accomplished the idea of

holding an international conference could have been given up if
this seemed necessary to avoid a formal split.
Togliatti regretted that this line had not in fact
been followed by the Soviets:

Chinese attacks had instead been

answered in kind "with ideological and propagandist!c polemics"
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and these results of this he judged as being "none too good."
If, instead of countering Chinese attacks with more attacks,
more time was spent on developing and applying actual positions
of policy, the Chinese could have been answered with facts and
not words.

Defeat of Chinese positions could most effectively

be accomplished by concrete political initiatives.

For example,

the universal welcome reserved for the signing of the Nuclear
Test Ban Treaty revealed world-wide approval of the Soviet
doctrine of "peaceful coexistence."
This type of action would be of great value to communist
movements in other countries also.

If Western communist par

ties and representatives of communist and progressive movements
from the "Third World" were to meet to elaborate a concrete
policy regarding the cooperation and forms of aid which the
former might extend to the latter this too would be to answer
words with actions.

During internal debates in the PCI, Tog

liatti noted this strategy had always rendered Chinese positions
"completely indefensible and powerless" because the greatest
success occurred when the shift was made from "general questions
(the character of Imperialism and of the State, of the motive
forces behind revolution etc.) to concrete policies currently
being followed (the struggle with the government,

criticism of

the Socialist Party, unity of the labour unions, strikes etc.).
The gist of the entire matter,

Togliatti argued, was

that in continuing the struggle against the Chinese theses,
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even if a conference were in fact to be convened, political
initiatives which could contribute to defeat of Chinese posi
tions should never be abandoned and such initiatives could
most easily arise out of discussions among various sectors of
the world movement concerning their mutual and particular pro
blems.

From these considerations, Togliatti moved to considera

tions about the international situation in general which he
viewed "with some pessimism" since the problems facing inter
national communist movements existed within the larger context.
The American presidential campaigns were disturbing,
not just because one candidate (Goldwater) included "war as a
part of his programme" and "talks like a Fascist," but because
the latter*s offensive "was pushing the American political
front further to the Right" and was strengthening the tendency
to regard greater aggressiveness in the international sphere
"as an escape from domestic crises" of which "the race conflicts
between Negroes and Vifhites was but an element" and as "a basis
for an understanding with reactionary elements in Western Europe."
This made the world situation quite dangerous.

In Western

Europe the monopolistic concentrations "of which the Common
Market was the Instrument" was being "accelerated by American
competition" and this formed the basis for increasingly reactionary
policies of authoritarian regimes which intended "to prevent
any advances of the working class."

In the international sphere

this rivalry was resulting in deep conflicts of which the crisis
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in NATO was one expression.
Such contradictions might be exploited but there was
no cause for any great optimism since ”all these groups tend to
greater or less degree...to engage in neo-colonialism and impede
the economic and political advancement of newly liberated Afri
can states,”

The crisis over Vietnam was revealing how ”we

could suddenly find ourselves facing...dangers in vrtiich all
communist and working class movements in Europe and the entire
world will have to commit themselves to the hilt.”
All of this had to be realised when dealing with the
Chinese:
The unity of all socialist forces, regardless of ideologi
cal differences, joined in a common effort against reac
tionary imperialism is an urgent necessity. We cannot
imagine that China and the Chinese Communists could possibly
be excluded from this unity.
VJe must, from now on there
fore not place obstacles in the way of this objective but
rather make it easier. Let us not break off our polemics
by any means, but let us always keep as their point of
departure the evidence based upon today*3 realities that
the unity of the entire working class and the communist
movement is necessary and can be achieved.16
Concerning communist movements in Western countries
Togliatti declared that they should not be depicted in an overly
optimistic light.

Even if in a few specific countries,

such as

Italy or France, progress was being made, communist forces fre
quently were ”not up to the tasks which they must face” and

16.

Togliatti, Fromemoria Pi Yalta (Roma: 1964) p. 10
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instead of having an effective influence on the life of their
countries parties were reduced to carrying on propagandists
types of activity.

It was urgent to overcome this by forcing

Communists out of their relative isolation and to insert them
selves actively in the political system by becoming effective
mass movements.

This being the case the consequences of a

split in the international movement were to be feared:

a split

In the international movement would inevitably result in splits
within national movements.

All parties, especially the ones

with weak bases, would then be forced to dedicate a great part
of their energy and already limited resources to carrying on
internal polemics with pro-Chinese factions.

"This would cause

much discouragement among the masses and would place great
obstacles in the way of the development of our movement."
Objectively, the conditions for the advancement of
the communist movement among the masses and in public life in
general did exist but it was necessary to know how to exploit
the conditions; to have enough courage to overcome political
dogmatism; to be able to face new problems in new ways using
methods which were suitableto the political and social environ
ment in which rapid and continuous transformations were taking
place.
This was particularly valid for the situation in which
the PCI had to operate and which was valid for most Western
European parties; a situation resulting from the problems of
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capitalist economic development which the ruling classes were
unable to deal vrith using traditional methods.

The bigger

countries particularly were faced with problems of centraliza
tion of economic management and attempts were being made to
solve them through economic programming made, in the interests
of big monopolies, from above, through state intervention.
"This issue is the order of the day throughout the West and
now there is talk about international programming...by leading
bodies of the Common Market."
Such were some of the new problems which the working
classes had to learn to deal with in new ways.

"We have to

fight in these areas also" and there were concrete ways of
doing so.

It required that the immediate claims of the working

classes be combined with proposals for reforms in the economic
structure (such as agrarian reforms, nationalizations etc.)
placed within a general plan for economic development designed
as an alternative to capitalist programming.

This would not be

socialist planning but it would he a net* form and a new means
of struggle making progress towards Socialism.

The possibility

of maki"g successful advances in this direction depended
greatly on how the whole problem is posed then solved:
Political initiative in this direction could make it easier
for us to achieve greater influence over the broad sectors
of the population which have not yet taken the path of
socialism but are looking for new possibilities.17

17.

op. cit. p. 13
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The fight for democracy, in this context, comes to assume a
greater concreteness which is tied to the reality of economic
life because "capitalist programming has in fact always been
tied to anti-democratic and authoritarian tendencies," against
which a democratic procedure in the management of economic
life must be adopted.
But, besides all of these areas of endeavour open to
the communist movements there are others of great importance
where Communists must operate with greater courage especially
by abandoning old formulae which are not related to today1s
conditions.

This is particularly true with regard to relations

with people of religious conviction:
In the Catholic world both within organizations and among
the masses there was a clear shift to the Left at the time
of Pope John, Today a countershift to the Right has taken
place at the centre (of Catholicism).
But at the lower
levels the pressures for a shift to the Left remain strong
and this we must realize and encourage. For this purpose
the old atheistic propaganda is useless. The very problem
of the religious conscience, of its content of its roots
in the masses and of the way it must be overcome must be
posed in a different manner than the past if we wish to
:each the Catholic masses and be understood by them.
Otherwise our "outstretched hand" will be taken to be an
expediency and almost as a bit of hypocrisy.
The problem of relations with the Catholics was related
to another, that of relations with the world of culture.

There,

opportunities for the penetration of communist influence still

16.

op. cit. p. 15
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remained largely open if Communists became the real champions
of freedom in intellectual life, of artistic expression and of
scientific progress.

This required the understanding on the

part of Communists that those in the intellectual world who
see things differently are not enemies or enemy agents.
Mutual understanding reached by continuous discussion
adds to our authority and prestige and at the same time
helps us to expose our real enemies, the pseudothinkers,
charlatans in art, etc. In this area much help could
come to us--which is not always the case— from those
countries where wo already direct public life,19
The point of departuro for all of those considera
tions remained the resolutions of the Twentieth Congress but
the latter needed to be developed and deepened:
For example, deeper reflection on the issue concerning the
possibility for the peaceful transition to socialism leads
us to clarify what we mean by democracy in a bourgeois
state, how the limitation of freedoms and democratic
institutions should be broadened and what the best forms
for participation by the working masses in economic and
political life would be within the framework of a state
whose bourgeois nature has not change and hence whether a
struggle aimed at gradually transofrming this nature from
within is possible. In countries where the coDimunist
movement is already strong such as our own (and in France)
this is the central issue’of our political struggle.,.My
own view is that in line with present day developments
and general prospects (for the advancement and victory of
socialism in the whole world) the concrete forms and condi
tions for advance and victory of socialism will today and
in the immediate future be very different from what they
have been in the past.
At the same time the differences
between ono country and another will remain great. For
this reason every party must know how to operate in an
independent manner. The autonomy of parties, of which we
are most vigorous advocates, is not only an internal
necessity of our movement but is essential for our progress

19.

op. cit. p. 16
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under present conditions.
v;e would therefore be against
any proposal to create a centralized international insti
tution. We are determined champions of unity in our
movement and in the international labour movement but this
unity must be realised through a multiplicity of concrete
policy positions that correspond to the conditions and
the levels of development of each c o u n t r y . 20
Isolation among parties was the opposite danger but
it must not be prevented by an international communist conference
adopting rigid formulae for all conditions.

These would only

prove to be impediments to further advance.

Let there bo instead

meetings and exchanges of ideas between parties in order to
study common problems of politics, economics, philosophy, his
tory, etc. and let debates among responsible spokesmen of
socialist governments even occur publicly so that public opinion
can become interested.

This could only add tc the prestige of

the spokesmen and their governments.

Lut; in holding such

debates, the rudeness and vulgarity displayed by the Albanians
and Chinese must have no place.
finally, Togliatti wrote with regard to the problems
faced by the socialist countrios that "it is 'wrong to say that
everything is always going well in the socialist countries1' when
in fact "difficulties, contradictions and new problems are always
coming to light."

These should be presented in their true light.

"The very worst thing is to give the impression that everything
is always going fine when all of a suddon vre find ourselves
faces with the need to discuss and explain difficult situations."

2 0*

op. cit. pp. 16-17
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The criticisms of Stalin must not be hidden for they have left
scars which are deep enough already and have made even those
elements who would be closest to the communist parties cynical
about new economic and political achievements:
Besides this there remains unresolved the problem of the
origins of the cult of Stalin and how it was possible that
it occurred. No one accepts the explanation of everything
having risen out of the serious personal defects of Stalin,
The inclination is to examine what political errors could
have led to the origins of the cult. This debate is
occurring among historians and qualified groups within the
party, '/e are not discouraging it because it tends towards
a profounder understanding of the revolution and its pro
blems. Vie do advise prudence vrhen arriving at any conclu
sions to keep in mind the publishings and researches being
made in the Soviet Union.
But the problems vrhich arouse the greatest amount of atten
tion...today in particular is that of the suppression of
democratic and personal liberties which f.talin carried out.
Not all the socialist countries present the same picture.
The general impression is one of slowness and l'esistance
in the matter of returning to the Leninist norms which used
to guarantee '-rithin the party and outside of it broad free
dom for expression and debate in the field of culture, art
and also in politics.
This slowness and resistance is
difficult for us to explain especially in view of the
present situation when capitalist encirclement no longer
exists and economic construction has made tremendous
advances, \'Ie have always proceeded from the idea that
Socialism is the system in which the workers enjoy the
greatest freedom possible and actively participate in an
organised way in the management of all social life, We
welcome therefore all the positions of principle and every
fact which shows us that this is the reality of every
Socialist country and not just the Soviet Union.
On the
other hand those facts which at times indicate the opposite
damage the entire movement,21
Finally

Togliatti lamented what he called the "mani

festation of a centrifugal tendency" among socialist countries

21 •

o p . cit. pp. 20-21
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regretting that there was "without doubt a renascent nationalise.
VJe realize however that national reeling remains a lasting fac
tor in the working class and socialist movement for a long time
even after the winning of power."

At the end Togliatti again

urged a greater critical spirit which would lead to better
understanding and greater unity v/ithin the government.

Reminding

himself that these ideas and others of purely Italian concern
would have to be elaborated with greater detail verbally,
Togliatti finished

his memorandum.

A few hours later, on a visit to the international
camp of Young Pioneers at Artek, near Yalta, the Italian
communist leader was stricken with a cerebral hemorrhage.
few days later, after guiding the destinies of the Italian
Communist Party for forty years, Palmiro Togliatti died.
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In a very real sense, that which has been written up
to now is but a preface to what could be written on the same
subject taking the Yalta Memorandum as point of departure
instead of point of arrival.

If Togliatti wrote what became

his "political testament" it was probated by his successors in
the PCI.
When Togliatti1s funeral bier was carried In pro
cession through the streets of Rome over a million Italians
followed it to the cemetery gates and "the depth of their grief
*]
was striking.,tA At the height of the emotional exequies the
new secretary of the PCI, Luigi Longo addressed the mass of
mourners and it was then that the existence of the Togliatti
commentary became known to the public.

Later the text itself

appeared in the pages of Rinascita and was ready not only by
the fascinated Italian public but in international communist
circles where Togliatti "was regarded with an admiration*3
approaching reverence.”2
Our enemies, Longo later wrote, ...found themselves in a
difficult position on seeing the collapse of their anti
communist propaganda" because "the frankness of the Memor
andum caused consternation among those who accuse us of
not being able to call a spade a spade while the interna
tionalist spirit permeating it embarrassed those who think
that the autonomy of the Communist parties implies a break
with the international Communist movement and rejection of
proletarian int e m a tionalism.3
1* ..Claire Sterling "The Torturous May of Palmiro Togliatti", The
Reporter. Vol. 31, Wo. 5 (Sept. 24, 1964) pp. 33-37
2,

Ibid.

3.

Luigi Longo "The Italian Communist Party and Problems of the
International Communist Movement, World Marxist Review.
Vol. VII, Mo, 1 1 . (Nov. 1964) pp. 3-11
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Calling a spade a spade did not help very much in pre
venting any further aggravation of the Sino-Soviet dispute but
perhaps it is significant that the do facto split has never been
formally acknowledged by either side.

What remains most remark

able about the document is that, in being made public, Togliatti’s
private rebukes to the Soviet leadership over its policies,
while being delivered "with respect for the opposition” became
what has been called, the "Magna Charta of Neo-Marxism.”
For Togliatti’s heirs in ’he PCI and, indeed, for the
leaders of other national communist movements, especially for
those in power, the "testament” articulated, once and for all,
the unspoken feelings of many Communists who, while remaining
sincere in their convictions, were no longer prepared to accept
tutelage from outside their own movements because in the past
this had already "left scars which are deep enough.”
This

"declaration of independence” was itself a

remarkable enough achievement and that it should have come with
such an eloquent conviction from spokesmen for the Italian
Communist Party was a fact of great significance} a fact of sig
nificance but not of surprise.

At least the hope is that the

reader of this paper will not have found it surprising:

the

writer has aimed throughout to show how such a development could
come from the PCI, to show why it should even be expected to
have come from the heirs of Gramsci and Togliatti.
It is perhaps not incorrect to believe that the Soviet
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leadership itself, or part of it, accepted the accuracy of
Togliatti*s criticisms.

The last Soviet personality with whom

Togliatti spoke before his death was Leonid Brezhnev.

It was

Brezhnev who accompanied Longo in bringing Togliatti»s coffin
back to Italy; it was Brezhnev who first learned of the contents
of the memorandum, and it was Brezhnev who was later to sub
stitute Nikita Khrushchev as First Secretary of the CPSU when
the latter submitted to his political defeat at the hands of
younger men in the Soviet leadership.

V/ould it be wrong to

infer a connection between these circumstances?
Togliatti»s memory remains highly honoured in the
Soviet Union today.

The new Fiat auto works which will double

automotive production in the USSR when they are finished are to
be built in the ancient city of Stavropol whose name has been
changed to "Togliatti."

This would not be done if someone were

being bitterly remembered as a heretic.

On the contrary, these

facts attest to the new maturity which has been reached in the
relations among communist parties, relations based on tolerant
respect for diverse opinions which Togliatti urged so forcefully.
In the Italian context also the "testament" left a
rich bequest one which has not been, is not being, squandered
by the present leaders of Italian Communism.

Since the summer

of 1964 Italian politics have been undergoing a metamorphosis
whose rapidity has not made its implications superficial.

Com

mentators are speaking of the "crisis of the PCI" as it has not
been spoken of since 195 6; of the party’s "isolation," of its
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"unsolvable contradictions*"

What seems to nourish such judg

ments is the spectacle of vigorous and unprejudiced debate
occurring among Italian Communists in public, debates which
take as their point of departure Togliatti»s specific exhorta
tions that such events take place ("with respect for either
side,") "on the basis of objective arguments."
Some of the current objective arguments arise from
the very character of the political transformations occurring
in Italy.

The principal result of the changes some have dis

cerned to be an incipient "bi-partism" in Italian politics.
The PSI, minus the Social-Proletarians, has continued the
evolution begun after 1956.

What this seems to mean more than

anything is the final disappearance of Italian "Kaximalist
Socialism" into a Social-Democratic oblivion.

The PSI and the

PSDI are on the eve of their reunification, a reunification
which seems to be taking place under terms most congenial to
the positions of the PSDI which has over the years tended to
become an undistinguishable appendage of the Italian political
Centre still dominated by the DC.

At the same time the PSDI

lost what little rapport it ever had with the v/orking classes.
Perhaps the PSI will succeed in carrying over its working class
political base and out of the union will come a party which can
finally challenge the political power of the DC.

The outside

help of the PCI is admitted to be a reserve power to the PSI-PSDI
alliance in this confrontation even though the PCI still remains
"outside the game."
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On the other side of the foreseeable bi-partisan
realignment will stand the DC and the Liberals who have more or
less absorbed the support once given to the small Right-wing^
parties.

Italy too will then have a political system which

will approximate a balance between two "acceptable" democratic
alternatives.
Out of this situation is seen to stem the "crisis of
isolation" facing the PCI.

The erosion of its political base

is seen as an inevitable consequence of the Socialist reunifi
cation.
196S :

Y/hether this really does occur can only be seen in
the results of 1963 would not tend to confirm this in

advance nor xvould the increasing support obtained by the PCI
in every election since 1946.

This is one of the great riddles

of current Italian politics.
But TogliattiTs heirs particularly the younger ones
are not sitting on their hands to see what turns up.

Abandoning

the "old formulae which do not correspond to today1s conditions"
party personalities such as Giorgio Amendola and Pietro Ingrao
are vigox-ously leading the debates which have excited imagina
tions within the PCI and outside of its ranks.

Both men are

aware that despite the current power of the PCI and despite the
slow advances which it has made, Italian politics at the root
remain characterized by a rather depressing stagnancy.
The problem both men are posing isJiow to make the
one quarter of the electorate controlled by the PCI mean some
thing more than just the largest political opposition group.
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The economic crisis which began in 1962 got worse before it
got better and taught Italians the meaning of a new word which
they were to hear often:

con,"iuntura, meaning a complex of

circumstances leading to economic recession.

Yet, despite the

congiuntura, the centro-sinistra became a going concern and
Communists were being left out of it.
Togliatti had raised the question of whether the
advance of socialism were possible inside the framework of a
bourgeois state.

After his death this problem was carried

further into a deeper examination of the nature of the state
particularly with regard to Lenin’s interpretation of it as
contrasted to Engels1 and Gramscifs interpretation.^

Out of

these scrutinies the Gramscian characterization of the state
as ’’apparatus of hegemony" took on greater relevance in the
actual Italian situation than Leninas depiction of it as
purely a repressive instrument offering no possibility of inter
nal modification.
Gramsci (and Engels) interpretations suggested rather
the real possibility of internal mutation through utilization of
universal suffrage and parliamentary power.

Thus, concluded

both Amendola and Ingrao echoing Togliatti, the question was
how to find allies for the PCI to collaborate in forming a mass
bloc which would revolutionize the capitalist bourgeois state

4.

Vide Luciano Gruppi "La tesi di Lenin e di Engels sullo stato”
Rinascita, (Rome) No. >0, (July 25 1964) p.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

273

not by frontal attacks (as urged by Lenin) but by achieving
intermediate changes which would foreshadow socialist trans
formations.
Ingrao and Amendola agree on the problem but not on
strategy.

Ingrao thinks in broader philosophical terms 01 a

massive realignment of Italian politics which would result in
the creation of a substantially new Left based upon an ideologi
cal understanding between the Catholic Left and the Communists.
In this effort both the DC Left and the PCI would
have to subject themselves to critical self-examination.

For

the DC Left it would mean to follow its socialistic inclinations
to their logical conclusions; that is, to oreak away from the
party whose leadership has frustrated and sabotaged efforts to
achieve social reform by exploiting the bogey of a totalitarian,
atheistic,

communist threat to Catholic survival.

Now, the

PCI, through its own self-examination has reduced the latter to
a ludicrous piece of prejudiced propaganda.

The dialogue with

the Catholics has become an irreversible fact of Italian cul
tural life and a book II dialogo alia prova (Dialogue put to
the Test), in which ten Catholic and Communist intellectuals
each contributed a chapter in a collective discussion about
possible understanding between both groups, was testimony to
the commitment to follow through the tendency to its ultimate
degree wherever it led.

If this could convince the Catholic

Left to break off from the DC and form a new "hegemonic bloc"
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with the PCI the rest of the Italian Left would have cc adhere.
The future of Italian politics would be revolutionary.
For Amendola, Ingrao*s abstract goals and the method
of attaining them, by placing the political nature of the PCI
in an amorphous ideological paranthesis while undertaking its
own ideological self criticism would be both a danger to the
integrity of the party and would not guarantee the successful
attainment of the proposed entente with the Catholic Left.
(\mendola*s strategy is another; more pragmatic but no less
radical.

The solution Amendola proposes is based on the con

crete political realities of the country.

Considering that

those parties who more or less constitute the Italian Left
(excluding the DCfs Left wing) command 4b£
/; of the popular vote
(based on the results of the November 1964 administrative elec
tions) Amendola speaks in terms of forming "a new party" of the
Left.

But the implications of his proposals are truly startling:
Today the exigencies for a single party of the Italian
working class are b o m out of a critical awareness; neither
one of the two solutions presented to the working class
in the capitalist countries of Western Europe during the
last fifty years, the social-democratic solution and the
communist solution, has shown itself up to now as being
valid for the goal of achieving a socialist transformation
of society., or a change in the system. If we do not pro
ceed from this admission which is critical and self-critical
at the same time we will not be able to understand the
pressing need for a radical change which will permit the
overcoming of the causes which for fifty years have pre
vented the working class movement of advanced capitalist
countries from giving its determining contribution to the
advance of socialism in the world.5

5.

Giorgio Amendola, ,fIpotesi sulla riuniflcazione" Rinascita
(23 November, 1964) p. £>
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The reasons for this are historical and arose from
particular conditions.

The problem today is to see if nev/ con

ditions have been created which would permit 3a different grouping
of the forces of the working class, and, in Italy, a new reor
ganization of the political array on the Left.”

When Amendola*s

declarations were published a minor earthquake occurred in
Italian political life.

A month earlier, the London Economist

had written, with regard to the Italian Communist party, that
"the Italians are banking on becoming a successful mass radical
party at the risk of losing their communist character."6
Amendola showed just how great a risk he was willing to take.
Since the Eleventh Congress of the PCI, held in January
of this year, Atnendola*s theses have prevailed over Ingrao*s,
although Longo himself devoted a great part of his address to
the Congress to invite the Catholics to extend the dialogue
which had already been initiated to ever wider areas.

In this,

the PCI itself was prepared "to risk losing" its colonist
character.

But to risk and to lose are not the same thing:

what

Amendola is proposing is a pragmatic agreement among parties of
the Italian Left as they are already constituted.
What he is urging is an abandonment of the old partisan
prejudices ivhich in the past nullified the political efforts of
both the communists and social democratic movements which instead

C.

The Economist - Foreign Report No. B76 (Sept. 10, 1964) pp. 1-4
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achieved their greatest success in splitting the uniiiy of the
European working class.

There was 110 reason why these parties

could not now join together, on pragmatic "bases, to collaborate,
according to their own particular tendencies or inclinations,
to build a mutually desired society which would embody shared
principles of economic and social justice.

If it were desired,

Longo was to declare, the PCI would even be willing to change
its name.
What should be made of all this?

Is it all mere

expedience to win power at any price, to seduce the opposition
by dazzling feats of ideological contortion?
opinion of the writer.

This is not the

He prefers to interpret current day

Italian Communist politics as the muturest articulation ox a
political line that can be -eracod back to L*Ordine Muovo, a
line which has been leading to an unchanging goal, that of
realizing in Italy a society based on economic, social, poli
tical and cultural justice among men.
The Italian Communist Party has pursued its selfimposed goal with a tenacity unmatched by any other Italian party
including the PSI and has paid with great sacrifices the price
of perpetuating its struggle, at times against overwhelming odds.
In its political and ideological history, the PCI had, from its
inception, possessed an intellectual vigour which was never
completely extinguished not even when the exigencies of a hos
tile environment demanded that it be subordinated to a greater
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need for political solidarity with the movement which incarnated
the hopes of Communists everywhere.

It did not succumb to the

shackles of a twenty-year prison sentence,
From the time the PCI emerged from its clandestine
existence after the end of the Second World War, the party
gave the greatest articulation to the aspirations of the
Italian masses and the latter remained attached to "their”
movement despite the onslaughts directed against it from every
direction,

Much of the confusion of modern Italian politics

can be better understood if in the background one looks for the
consistent efforts on the part of the anxious powers who govern
to stave off the communist advance by any means available,
violence notwithstanding,

The best that was ever achieved was

the political stalemate which exponents of the PCI have untir
ingly been seeking to break.
It is this writer’s opinion that the PCI cannot be
prevented much longer from claiming its share of public power
which mass support has made legitimate.

Even an "opening to

the Left,” if it excludes the communist Left, will not reduce
the pressure of public demands for greater justice in Italian
society unless the claims elaborated by the PCI are satisfied.
And if these claims are satisfied the "opening to the Left"
will have included the communist Left even without the PCI,
It is the writer’s thesis that the Italian Communist
Party has revealed itself to be eminently qualified to share
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in the governing of Italy, qualified politically, intellectually,
ideologically and historically.

The PCI does not seek to

impose totalitarian rule on Italian society but seeks to exer
cise its rightful role in shaping the destiny of the Italian
people.

It is hoped that the justification for this thesis

has been demonstrated in this paper.

With this hope, the reader

is invited to share it.
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APPENDIX

I

Some of the key articles in the constitution were:
Article 3

...It is the task of the Republic to remove

the

obstacles of an economic and social order which, limiting in
fact the liberty and equality of citizens, prevent the full
development of the human personality and the effective parti
cipation by all workers in the political, economic and social
organization of the country.
Article 39

The organization of trade unions is free...

Article 40

The right to strike is exercised within the

sphere of the laws which regulate it.
Article 41

Private economic initiative is free.

This may

not develop in conflict with social utility or in such a manner
as to cause damage to security to liberty, to human dignity.
The law determines the appropriate programs and
controls in order that public and private economic activity
may be directed and coordinated toward social ends.
Article 42

Property is public or private.

Economic goods

belong to the state, to organized groups, or to individuals.
Private property is recognized and guaranteed
by law, which determines the methods of its acquisition and
enjoyment and the limitations designed to assure its social
functioning and render it accessible to all.

279
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In cases prescribed by law, and on the basis of
compensation private property may be expropriated for reasons
of general interest.
Article 43

For the purpose of general utility the law may

originally reserve or may transfer, by means of expropriation
and with indemnity, to the state, to public bodies, or to
communities of workers or of utilizers, specified enterprises
or categories of enterprises which relate to essential public
services or to sources of energy or to situations of monopoly
and which have a character of pre-eminent general interest.
Article 44

For the purpose of securing a rational exploita

tion of the soil and of establishing just social relationships,
the law imposes obligations and restrictions on private property
in land; it fixes limits to its extension according to the
region and agrarian zone it promotes and requires reclamation,
the transformation of latifundia, and the reconstitution of
productive units; it aids the small and medium scale proprietor...
Article A 5

The Republic recognizes the social function of

cooperation conducted on the basis of mutuality and without
purposes of speculation for private gain.

The lav; promotes and

favours its extension by suitable means and assures its character
and permanence subject to appropriate controls...
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Article

U&

With a view to the economic and social advance

ment of labour and in harmony with the requirements of produc
tion the Republic recognizes the rights of workers to
collaborate in ways and within limits established by the law
in the management of business enterprises.
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APPENDIX II
The constitution also contains an article> number
seven, which is probably the roost controversial of the entire
document.

The position which the PCI adopted regarding its

insertion brought down upon it a barrage of criticism and
accusations of expedient hypocrisy by shocked anti-clericals
and other "lay parties.”
Article 7 reads:
"The State and Catholic Church are, each in its own
order independent and sovereign.
Their relationships are regulated by the Lateran
Pacts.

Modification of the Pacts which have been accepted by

the two parties do not require the procedure of constitutional
amendment.”
Although the Constitution adds in Article Eight that all reli
gious confessions are "equally free before the law” the very
nature of the Lateran Pacts act as a substantial negation of
Article Eight.

The Catholic Church under the terms of the

Lateran agreements is quite unquestionably given a position of
privilege for Article One of the Pact declares Roman Catholicism
to be "the sole religion of the state."

The Church is given

special rights to teach religion in state high schools as well
as to run its own private schools.

Furthermore, Italian laiv

concerning marriage and divorce was to conform to canon lav/.
The latter was particularly offensive to non-Catholic religious
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minorities who were placed in an inferior status since their
desire to dissolve a marriage was regulated by the religious
court of a Church to which they did not belong.

Finally, the

Pope and Princes of the Church were given special privileges
in Italy which amount to rights of censorship since numerous
works of arts and letters can be sequestered on charges of
contempt for the state religion or "defamation" of the person
of the Pontiff.
The PCI rationalized its vote for retention of the Lateran
Pacts as a gesture of good will towards the Catholics with whom
Communists sought to collaborate and to whom they wished to
their lack of anti-clerical prejudice.

Be that as it may,

Article Seven of the Italian republican constitution has time
and again been cited as justification for censorship in the
arts and letters and caused more than one Communist to be
brought to court on charges of "defamation" of the papacy or
"contempt for the state religion."
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